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abstract
The present study provides an empirical analysis of
export promotion in Pakistan over the period 1959-60 to
1976-77, developing and extending the methods used for
other countries by the NBER. The Export Bonus Scheme and
the Export Performance Licensing Scheme are discussed in
respect of their institutional framework, rate structure,
scope and coverage, premia and other important features.
The rebates of import duties paid on inputs used in the
production of exports and the exemption of exports from
indirect taxes are also discussed. The Effective Exchange
Rates (EERs) for exports taking into account the export sub¬
sidies involved in these Schemes and the export taxes where
applicable, are calculated for a large number of commodity
groups as well as for the manufacturing and primary sectors.
Both nominal and real EERs are examined in detail. The
extent of discrimination against the exports of the primary
sector implied by the lower EERs afforded to them is deter¬
mined, and its effects on the growth of the economy and on
export performance are outlined. It is found that this dis¬
crimination has fallen, on average, by about 23 per cent
during the period after the devaluation of 1972 compared
with that during the pre-devaluation period. The price-
level-deflated-EERs (PLD-EERs) in Pakistan are compared with
the PLD-EERs in some other developing countries for the period
1960-61 to 1970-71.
A statistical analysis of the exports of the manufac¬
turing and primary sectors as well as of a wide range of
commodity groups is undertaken to determine the relationship
between export performance and the EERs. On the premise of
the relative unimportance of Pakistan's exports in total
world exports, a single-equation model is estimated. The
partial adjustment model is also estimated to take account
of the lag structure. It is found that the EERs have been
a significant determinant of exports, particularly of manu¬
factures, from Pakistan during the period studied. Moreover,
during this period, the growth of the manufacturing sector
has been export-biased, while the growth of the primary
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Pakistan ^ like many other developing countries has
pursued a policy of export promotion since the late fifties.
This was done within the context of an over-valued official
rate of exchange. Various export promotion schemes such as
the Export Bonus Scheme, the Export Performance Licensing
Scheme and a number of other monetary and fiscal incentives
were adopted in order to promote exports from the country.
As a result, Pakistan's exports have increased at an annual
rate of about 15.5 per cent during the period of 1960-61 to
(2)
1977-78 v (though substantial year-to-year variations in the
rate of growth of exports were also observable during this
period). These schemes, in essence, provided a mechanism
through which the domestic currency earnings of exporters
(especially of manufactured commodities) could be enhanced at
an unchanged official rate of exchange, and the exporters
could be compensated for the high costs of production of
exportables incurred by them due to protection. The general
aim of the present study is to evaluate the effectiveness of
these schemes in expanding exports from the country during
the period 1959-60 to 1976-77. Some other effects of the
schemes like sectoral discrimination and its impact on the
economy and on export performance will also be examined. More
specifically, the purpose of the study is:-
(i) to describe and analyse the main features of the export
promotion schemes of Pakistan, and the export duties,
sales tax etc., where applicable;
(ii) to express incentives (or disincentives) involved in
these schemes quantitatively in a measure of the
Effective Exchange Rate (EER), and to analyse the
behaviour of the nominal, as well as the real EERs;
(1) Pakistan in this study refers to former West Pakistan only.
(2) Pakistan's Trade/Fiscal/Agriculture Year is from July 1st to June
30th. For example, the year 1960-61 means from July 1st 1960 to
June 30th 1961.
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iii) to determine quantitatively the responsiveness of
exports of the Manufacturing and Primary sectors as
well as for some disaggregated commodities to EERs
or a relative price index.
From the very beginning, the export promotion schemes
of Pakistan, especially the Export Bonus Scheme, have
attracted the attention of economists. Bruton and Bose
(1963), Hussain (1964), Ahmad (1966),- Mallon 1966), Soligo
and Stern (1966), Islam (1968, 1969), Hecox (1969,1970),
Hufbauer (1971), Husain (1974) and Guisinger (1977) have all
examined one or other aspect of the schemes. Bruton and Bose
(1963) investigated the 'net' effects of the Export Bonus
Scheme on increasing the export earnings from some major
commodities for the three-year period of 1959 through 1961.
They concluded that the scheme had resulted in a significant
increase in Pakistan's foreign-exchange earnings over the
three-year period. Ahmad (1966) extended their study in res¬
pect of cotton and cotton manufactures to the period of
1964. Mallon (1966) considered the relative advantages of
exporting raw cotton as compared with exporting its manu¬
factures. He concluded that in 1959-60 the price situation in
the foreign market for raw cotton was such that foreign-
exchange earnings would have been higher from exporting raw
cotton than they were from exporting cotton yarn. The reason
for that was said to be a relatively low value-added in the
production of yarn and a relatively high (20%) bonus on the
export of yarn during that year. In the mid-sixties, it was
alleged that the export promotion system of Pakistan could
result in a loss of foreign exchange in a much more direct
sense. It was conjectured that the foreign exchange paid on
the total imported inputs embodied in exported goods could
exceed the foreign exchange earnings from them, while the
exporter could still make profit in domestic currency.
Soligo and Stern (1966), Islam (1968) and Hecox (1969) inves¬
tigated this hypothesis. They concluded that it was unfounded,
and among the industries studied, they found no industry which
had a negative net foreign exchange earning. All these studies
were short-run in character.
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The analysis of Pakistan's export promotion schemes
over time has been relatively limited. Hus:-ain (1974)
has investigated the response of exports to the EERs for a
limited number of commodities during the period of 1959-60
to 1967-68. The calculation of the EERs in his study
included only the Export Bonus Scheme. Since other export
promotional schemes were also operating during the period,
the EERs taking into account only the Export Bonus Scheme, would
be an under-estimate of the true EERs. This, in turn, would
over-estimate the response of exports. The NBER project
'Foreign Trade Regimes and Economic Development' co-directed
by Professors Bhagwati and Krueger had included Pakistan
among the project countries. Due to the events of 1971 (i.e.
the separation of former East Pakistan from the rest of the
country), the study on Pakistan was not carried through. The
present study, which accepts the framework established by the
NBER as a starting point, may, therefore, be regarded as
correcting this omission. Two qualifications should be made
to this:-
Firstly, this being a one-man study rather than a team study,
as in the NBER case, it concentrates on one aspect, namely
the calculation of the EERs and the responsiveness of exports
to the EERs.
Secondly, in view of the events of 1971, the study concentrates
only on what was formerly West Pakistan (now the Islamic
Republic of Pakistan).
Although the present study draws upon the concepts and
methods of the NBER project, it is hoped that the way in
which it adapts and extends them to the unique situation of
Pakistan will provide material which might be of interest to
scholars currently active in this field, and will make avail¬
able empirical estimates which might be useful to policy¬
makers. The study goes beyond the NBER methods in that it
deals with two schemes, that is, the Export Bonus Scheme and
the Export Performance Licensing Scheme, which were unique to
Pakistani economy. The computation of the EERs in the
present study involves not only the fiscal incentives, but it
also involves these two schemes. Furthermore, at present the
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work on this area in Pakistan is limited, both in extent
and scope. The present study examines almost all the impor¬
tant export promotion schemes for about 27 commodity groups
and covers the period from 1959-60 to 1976-77. The exports
covered in the study have ranged from about 69 to 88 per
cent of the total exports of Pakistan in different years,
and have included important primary commodities, raw mater¬
ials and manufactured commodities. Thus, the present study
is considerably broader in scope, and considerably extends
(both in terms of commodities and time-period covered) the
existing body of analysis.
The scheme of the study, in brief, is as follows:-
Chapters 2 and 3 provide the necessary background to
the remainder of the thesis. Chapter 2 considers the general
features of the growth of the Pakistan economy for the period
of 1949-50 to 1978-79. This chapter begins with discussing
the major structural changes in the economy during this
period, which is followed by a detailed examination of the
problem of balance of payments and the problem of debt
servicing in Pakistan. After that, main features of Pakistan's
commodity exports such as their composition, growth rates
and geographic distribution etc. are discussed. In Chapter 3
the focus is narrowed and the evolution of the protective
structure of the Pakistan economy is examined. In Chapter
4, measures taken by the Government to overcome some of the
effects of protection, in particular those concerned with
export promotion, are discussed. The institutional frame¬
work, rate structure and scope and coverage etc. of the Export
Bonus Scheme and the Export Performance Licensing Scheme as
well as the fiscal incentives given to exporters are dis¬
cussed in Chapter 4. To express the export promotion schemes
quantitatively, Chapter 5 undertakes the calculations neces¬
sary for determing the EERs and presents a detailed analysis
of the EERs. In Chapter 6 a statistical analysis is under¬
taken of the relationship between the EERs and the exports of
a wide range of commodity groups over the period of 1960-61 to
1976-77. Finally, Chapter 7 concludes the study by giving a
summary of main findings of the preceding chapters.
_ 4 _
CHAPTER II
THE ECONOMY OF PAKISTAN AND ITS GROWTH.
The importance and achievement of any economic policy
is determined by the overall picture of a developing economy.
It is easier to focus on the specific problem at hand, once
this broader context is summarised and the specific problem
is put in proper perspective. The perspective would contri¬
bute to a better understanding and appreciation of the problem.
The primary purpose of this study is to evaluate the export
promotion schemes of Pakistan and their role in achieving
the expansion of exports from the country. It is, therefore,
useful to review the actual growth experience of the economy
from 1949 - 50 to 1978 - 79. This will provide a foundation
upon which the discussion of specific aspects of export
promotional policies can be carried out.
2.1 Major Structural Changes in the Economy of Pakistan
1949 - 50 to 1978 - 79.
At the time of Independence in 1947, the economy of
Pakistan was primarily agricultural; agriculture contributing
nearly 60 per cent to G.N.P., 75 per cent to employment and
90 per cent to foreign exchange earnings.* * Pakistan had
almost no known natural resources except agricultural land
and practically no industry. Her manufacturing capacity was
limited to a few textile mills, cement factories and an oil
refinery. The reasons for this relative backwardness of the
manufacturing sector go back into the past century. They
include the lack of conditions necessary for the development
of industry in the areas now in Pakistan, like lack of coal,
iron and other minerals, lack of developed port facilities,
lack of entrepreneurial class etc., and perhaps some element
of official neglect, because the then government policy was
content to develop these areas as a supplier of agricultural
(2)
products and a recruiting ground for the armed forces.
(1) The First Five Year Plan. p.213.
(2) For details see Andrus & Mohammad (1958). pp.166-169.
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Since then, major structural changes have taken place
in the economy of Pakistan which can be seen from Table 2.1.
Data on GNP at constant factor costs in Table 2.1 give
clear evidence of the changes in the composition of GNP, which
have characterised the Pakistan economy. The agricultural
sector which contributed more than 50 per cent to GNP in 1949-
50 has shrunken to about 30 per cent in 1978-79. This is
because other sectors of the economy have grown relatively
faster than agriculture. The manufacturing sector has almost
doubled its share from 7.8% to about 15% of the GNP during the
same period. Notable in this sector has been the growth of
/ 3 \
large-scale manufacturing, which increased its share from
2.2 per cent of GNP in 1949-50 to 12.5 per cent of GNP in
1969-70, although it decreased somewhat in later years. The
annual compound growth rates of different sectors, GNP and
income per capita are given in Table 2.2.
It can be seen from Table 2.2 that over the entire
period from 1949-50 to 1978-79 the GNP increased at an annual
compound rate of 4.95 per cent and the per capita income
rose at an annual rate of 2.13 per cent in real terms.
However, during this period, there have been substantial
variations in the growth rates. In the 1950's, GNP increased
at a low rate of 3.1 per cent per annum. The high rate of
population growth swallowed almost all of this increase and
there was hardly any rise in per capita income. The rate
of increase, and to some extent the pattern of growth, changed
around 1959-60. During the 1960's the rate of increase of
GNP averaged around 6.8 per cent per annum, which was signifi¬
cantly higher than the rate of population growth. As a result
per capita income increased at the rate of about 3.8 per
cent annually. The 1970's again witnessed a down-turn in
the growth rates. Whereas the major growth impetus in the
1950's came from the rapidly growing industrial sector, since
1959-60 both agriculture and industry have contributed to
development.
During the 1950's, the agricultural sector grew very
slowly - at a rate below that of the population. The reasons
(3) Large-scale manufacturing covers all factories and plants
employing twenty or more persons and using power.
- 6 -
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for that perhaps were reliance on age-old agricultural
technology and acceptance of constraints on key agricul¬
tural inputs such as fertilizer and water. During the
1960's, the situation changed dramatically and the rate
of agricultural growth roughly tripled. This change during
the 1960's, as argued by Stern and Falcon (1970) came primar¬
ily from a strategy involving the following assumptions:-
(a) that the farmers would respond to economic stimuli;
(b) that one of the most important actions that government
could take would be to create a favourable economic
climate for the farmers;
(c) that sound economic policy would be fruitless unless
major efforts were made to supply modern agricultural
inputs at the right place and time.
In implementing this incentive/technology strategy, a number
of policy decisions were significant. Major subsidies were
provided for fertilizer and plant protection materials. To
take the case of fertilizer, the subsidy averaged about 50
per cent for much of the early 1960's. The situation has
not changed much since then. The government have all along
been subsidizing the sale of fertilizers. In addition,
irrigation and use of improved seed were also responsible for
agricultural break-through. The surge in private tube-well
development was indeed one of the most spectacular elements in
( 4)
Pakistan's agricultural modernization. The government
have been providing large amounts of subsidy for encouraging
the installation of private tube-wells. The tube-wells
expanded irrigation water supplies and permitted higher
cropping intensities, greater flexibility with regard to crops
that could be grown and higher yields per acre.
(4) Annual rate of installation of private tube-wells in Pakistan
in some selected years.
Year. Tube-wells
1. 1959 - 60
2. 1963 - 64
3. 1968 - 69
4. 1973 - 74






SOURCE: For 1,2,3 Stern & Falcon (1970) p.42.
For 4,5 Pakistan Economic Survey (1978-79)
Statistical Table 3.7, p.33.
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In the mid-sixties wheat-seed developments in Mexico
and rice-seed improvements at the International Rice Research
Institute (IRRI) in the Phillipines provided the means to
increase food production in Pakistan. Since then, rather
successful efforts have been made to bring more and more
areas under high yielding varieties of seed. Starting with
12,000 acres under high yielding varieties of wheat seed
in 1965-66, the area under these varieties had reached
more than 11 million acres in 1977-78. Starting a year
later, the situation for rice has been roughly similar.
Due to these developments Pakistan in 1968-69, found
itself in a new situation. The problems of deficits had
given way to surpluses in food grains. However, this
success story could not be carried on into the 1970's.
There had been a serious set-back to agriculture in the
early 1970's. Short-fall in investment in the economy coupled
with a series of bad weather years slowed down the agricul¬
tural growth rate. After the severe droughts of a number of
years, 1973-74 was marred by the worst floods in the history
of the country. The growth rate of agriculture during 1969-
70 to 1974-75 had been less than 1 per cent, which after
strenuous efforts of the government, picked up somewhat in
later years to become 3.4 per cent per annum during 1974-75
to 1978-79.
The process of industrialization started from a very
low base, but has shown a remarkably high rate of growth
of more than 10 per cent per annum for the large-scale manu¬
facturing sector during the period 1949-50 to 1978-79.
This rate of increase has not remained steady over time, but
has shown considerable variations during different sub-periods.
The highest growth rate of 23.7% was observed during the
early fifties, which slowed down in the latter half of the
fifties. During 1959-60 to 1964-65 it accelerated to 16.8%
per annum, but declined again to 9.9 per cent in the second
half of the sixties. Finally, after 1969-70 the rate of growth
(5) We concentrate on the discussion of large-scale manufacturing
sector instead of the manufacturing sector including both large
and small scale, because growth rates of the small scale manu¬
facturing sector, as reported in the national accounts up to
1969-70, are assumed to be equal to the growth rates of population,
which is not a very plausible assumption.
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of the large-scale manufacturing sector fell drastically
and for the first time, it fell below the growth rate of
GNP. It has often been alleged that the high growth rate
in large-scale manufacturing during the early fifties was
more a statistical than a real phenomenon. Given the
extremely small base from which Pakistan's industrial out¬
put was measured, the argument runs, large rates of increase
were to be expected. Yet during the 1960's, when the manu¬
facturing sector was clearly no longer an insignificant
part of the economic structure of Pakistan, the annual
growth rate of more than 13 per cent was one of the highest
observed in the developing countries.
A number of factors contributed to the impressive
performance of the manufacturing sector during the first
two decades. After Independence, a drive for industriali¬
zation started in Pakistan. Recognizing the deficiencies
in the industrial sector and the predominantly agricultural
character of the economy, the government announced in the
'Statement of Industrial Policy' of April 2, 1948, that
"Pakistan would seek to manufacture in its own territories, the products
of its raw materials in particular cotton, hides and skins etc.
for which there is an assured market whether at home or abroad. At the
same time, to meet the requirements of the home market, efforts will
be made to develop consumer goods industries for which Pakistan is
at present dependent on outside sources Some of the heavy
industries might have to come at a later stage of the industrial pro¬
gramme, but no opportunity should be lost to develop any heavy industry
which is considered essential for the speedy achievement of a strong
(6)
and balanced economy".
Muslims who emigrated from India and Burma had brought
with them small amounts of capital, as well as a limited
fund of technical and entrepreneurial skills. They took
advantage of the opportunity. Initial investments were made
in factories that could provide the goods and services pre¬
viously purchased from plants which were located in now
independent India.
(6) Report of the Economic Appraisal Committee, Karachi 1953,
Appendix No. 16.
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The outbreak of the Korean war in 1950 raised the
prices of Pakistan's exports of primary commodities to an
unprecedented level. This allowed the government to adopt
a policy of import liberalization, which after the 1949
decision of non-devaluation of Pakistan's Rupee had been
cautious. During the Korean boom period from 1950 to
1952, exports and imports rose rapidly. The resulting
prosperity further stimulated investment, but perhaps more
important, it led to the development of a class of traders
who gained considerable business acumen and were able to
accumulate large cash reserves. With the end of the Korean
war and collapse of the raw materials boom, the government
found it necessary to curtail imports sharply. The control
of imports through quantitative restrictions led to a highly
protected market for consumer goods. At the same time,
imports of capital goods remained relatively cheap as Pakistan
maintained its over-valued exchange rate and relatively low
tariffs on machinery.
From the outset, the government policies provided
the incentives necessary for rapid industrial growth. As
early as 1948-49, the government announced certain measures
designed to stimulate investment in industry, which included
among others the provision for allowing depreciation at
enhanced rates, and exemption of profits of new undertakings
from direct taxes for a numer of years and up to a certain
(7)
proportion of profits earned. Although Pakistan's indus¬
trial sector has been largely in private hands, its success
during the early fifties was clearly not due to private
initiative alone. The government provided the necessary
infrastructure, credit facilities and other incentives con¬
ducive to rapid private investment. In addition to these,
the government had, through the Pakistan Industrial Develop¬
ment Corporation (PIDC) established in 1950, itself under¬
taken some industrial investment. The primary purpose of
the PIDC was to venture into those areas where private
investors were reluctant to go, either because of the extreme
risks involved, or because they required a level of invest-
(7) For details, see Andrus & Mohammad (1958). pp.168-169, 326-27.
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ment beyond the resources of the private entrepreneurs.
Lewis (1969) has observed that high growth rates
of the manufacturing sector in the earlier years were
largely the result of an adjustment in the structure of
production following the partition of the sub-Continent
into two independent states of Pakistan and India. Even
if economic policy had been scrupulously neutral, it was
likely that industrial growth would have been relatively
faster simply because of Partition which destroyed the
/o\
Customs Union. Government policy was not neutral,
however, but decidedly favoured industrialization.
The growth of the manufacturing sector slowed down
in the latter half of the fifties mainly because of the
limited availability of finances and severe controls on
imports, investment and prices. After the initial favour¬
able effects of the 1955 Rupee devaluation, export receipts
fell drastically The main causes of this decline in exports
were the internal inflation generated by deficit financing
and food shortages, the fall in the exportable surplus of
raw cotton brought about by its increased domestic absorp¬
tion, the lack of a corresponding increase in exports of
(9)
cotton manufactures and the decline in the export prices.
The import controls adopted in late 1952 were made more
stringent and the private sector investment goods imports
were squeezed. The shortages of imported raw materials and
spare parts remained serious and continued to hamper full
utilization of industrial capacity. In 1958, the Martial Law
Government imposed price controls covering a large number
(88 articles originally) of consumer goods and industrial
raw materials, in order to check the rising spiral of prices.
All these factors resulted in slowing down the industrial
expansion during 1954-55 to 1959-60.
(8) Lewis, (1969) p.13.
(9) The money supply expanded by 37 per cent over the three-year period
from mid-1955 to middle-1958; domestic consumption of raw cotton
increased from 810,000 bales in 1955-56 to 1,125,000 bales in 1957-8;
exports of raw cotton dropped from 948,000 bales to 447,000 bales
during the same period; and the index of export prices (Base March
1948 to April 1949= 100) fell from 91.00 in 1956-57 to 81.5 in
1959-60. Source: Hasan, (1961) pp. 32-33.
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During the period from 1959-60 to 1964-65, the massive
capital inflow permitted the government to liberalize the
foreign exchange market. The total inflow of grants and
loans during the Second Five Year Plan (1960-65) was 2757
million dollars, compared to 1073 million dollars during the
First Five Year Plan (1955-60). Besides the policies
of import liberalization, the government took various
measures such as the granting of tax holidays, accelerated
depreciation allowances and subsidies to the exports of
manufactured commodities in order to promote manufacturing
activities during this period. All these factors played a
major role in accelerating the growth rate from 7.64 per
cent during the 1954-55 to 1959-60 period to 16.83 per cent
per annum in the 1959-60 to 1964-65 period. The war with
India in September 1965 and following the war the suspension
of 'Aid' put a great strain on the availability of resources
for the growth. The domestic resources were diverted from
development to defence, and the disruption of foreign assist¬
ance put heavy constraints on the raw material imports. The
process of liberalizing the foreign exchange market was
reversed and the expansion of consumer goods industries was
deliberately slowed-down. All these factors coupled with
the labour unrest of the late sixties, caused the growth rate
of the manufacturing sector during the period of 1964-65 to
1969-70 to fall to 9.88 per cent per annum.
A notable feature of industrial development in Pakistan
was the important qualitative difference which marked the
investment process in the 1950's as compared to the 1960's.
Whereas the initial impetus for investment was found in the
development of consumer goods industries and other manufac¬
turing processes based on a relatively simple technology,
the later pattern of investment was concentrated more heavily
in less traditional sectors such as fertilizer plants, elec¬
trical machinery and other capital goods industries. This
made the growth of industrial output broadly based and more
diversified.
(10) Pakistan Economic Survey (1978-79). p.146.
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Another difference between the two periods was brought
out in a study of the sources of growth of large-scale manu¬
facturing by Lewis and Soligo (1965). They found that while
in the period from 1954-55 to 1959-60 the process of import
substitution had provided a major impetus to growth, in the
early sixties the growth of domestic demand became a major
motive force. This can be seen from Table 2.3. After 1969-70
the manufacturing sector in Pakistan suffered from serious
set-backs. Many factors working simultaneously led to a
decline in the growth rate of the large-scale manufacturing
sector. The crisis in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) and
the war with India in 1971 resulted in the loss of market
of the eastern wing. The economy which had been developed
on complementary basis over the past two decades was forced
to rationalise its production structure in accordance with
the new situation. The haphazard nationalisation policies
of the Government in addition to the labour unrest of the
early seventies created a considerable amount of uncertainty,
which led to a sharp fall in private investment. In 1972,
the Government started the process of nationalization, by
taking control of 32 industrial units in 10 categories of
basic industries, and this process continued intermittantly
until 1976. <'11^ The oil price rises since 1973 and the inter¬
national recession have also adversely affected manufacturing
activities in Pakistan. As a result of all these factors,
during the period of 1969-70 to 1978-79, the rate of growth
of the large-scale manufacturing sector fell drastically to
a low level of 2.4 per cent per annum, which was even below
the population growth rate of 3 per cent per annum during
(11) The industries nationalised in January, 1972 were:
1. Iron and steel industries. 2. Heavy Engineering Industries.
3. Heavy Electrical industries. 4. Basic Metal Industries.
5. Assembly & Manufacture of 6. Tractor Plants - assembly &
Motor Vehicles. manufacture.
7. Heavy & Basic Chemicals. 8. Petro-chemical industries.
9. Cement Industries. 10. Public utilities, i.e.
(a) electricity generation, transmission and distribution;
(b) gas and (c) oil refineries.
In March, 1972 Life Insurance business was nationalised.
In Sept. 1973 26 industrial units producing vegetable ghee
were nationalised.
In 1974 Pakistani Banks, Shipping industry, Petroleum marketing
distribution, and
In 1976: Rice-husking mills were nationalized.
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TABLE 2.3







Consumption goods 55.7 16.5 27.8
Intermediate goods 34.0 57.9 8.1
Investment & related goods 71.8 1.0 27.2
Total 53.1 24.0 29.9
1959-60 to 1963-64
Consumption goods 110.0 -1.1 -8.9
Intermediate goods 47.6 21.8 30.6
Investment & related goods 108.5 1.2 -9.6
Total 95.7 4.6 -0.3
SOURCE: Lewis & Soligo (1965) p.106.
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C12)
the same period. It may also be seen from Table 2.2
that during the period of 1949-50 to 1978-79 the growth
rates for construction and electricity and gas sectors
were quite high, i.e. on average 9.45 per cent per annum
for construction and 14.43 per cent per annum for elec¬
tricity and gas. However, during this period of three
decades the growth rates for these sectors showed wide
fluctuations and ranged between 5.27 to 19.23 per cent
annually for construction and between 6.5 to 30.02 per
cent annually for electricity and gas. Due to the high
growth rates the contribution of these sectors to the
GNP increased considerably. The share of construction
increased from 1.45% of GNP in 1949-50 to 4.87 per cent
of GNP in 1978-79, and for the electricity and gas sector
it increased from 0.22 per cent to 2.68 per cent of GNP
during the same period.
(12) In fact, the large-scale manufacturing sector experienced for
the first time in the history of Pakistan, negative growth of
the order of -6.8, -1.7, -0.5, -2.3 in the years 1971-2,
1974-5, 1975-6 and 1976-77 respectively. Source: Computed
from data in Pakistan Economic Survey, (1978-79), Statistical
Tables 4.1, 4.2, p.45.
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2.2 Investment and Savings.
Many economists [Arthur Lewis (1954), Rostow (1960)
etc.] have emphasized the role of capital accumulation as
the major factor governing the rate of development. Capital
accumulation depends upon investment and more investment
necessitates more savings or foreign assistance. Foreign
assistance if not in the form of grants, means some burden in
the future. Domestic savings are, therefore, the more
reliable source of investment to break the vicious circle of
poverty and under-development.
The investment and savings performance of Pakistan has
been quite encouraging,as can be seen from Table 2.4.
TABLE 2.4
Investment and Savings as per cent of GNP.











SOURCE: The Fourth Five Year Plan, p.8.
Gross investment as a proportion of GNP rose from 3.5
per cent in 1949-50 to 8.9 per cent in 1959-60 and 18.3 per
cent in 1964-65, though it fell to 13.5 per cent in 1969-70.
This escalation of investment ratios has, to a considerable
extent, been due to the large aid inflows. After 1964-65,
when the aid inflows decreased, the investment ratio fell
sharply.
The movement of savings paralleled that of investment.
While gross savings were only 2.2 per cent of GNP in 1949-50,
they increased to 6.1 per cent in 1959-60 and to 11.7 per
cent in 1964-65, however falling back to 9.7 per cent in
1969-70. This might suggest a positive correlation between
domestic savings and external resources inflow - a hypothesis
which needs empirical verification. Moreover, during the
1950s and 1960s higher domestic savings were sought through
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(13)
the promotion of inequalities of income distribution.
Relentless pursuit of economic growth and the distribution
of additional output in favour of the saving sectors
resulted in wide-spread social unrest in early 1969. Since
then the development strategy has been changed and attempts
to achieve greater social justice have been made.
(13) Based on the "Quarterly Surveys of Current Economic Conditions"
conducted by the C.S.O. during the fiscal year 1963-64. Bergan
(1972) estimated the following distribution of Personal Income
in Pakistan:-
Income Shares of Ordinal Groups
Cumulated percentage of households. Cumulated percentage of
(in terms of income per household) total Personal Income
(1963-64)
Lowest 5 per cent get 0.8
1* 11 11 11 2.3
ii 20 " " " 6.5
it 30 ii ii ti 11.5
ii 40 " " " 17.5
ii 5o ii ii it 24.5
ii go ii it it 33.0
it 7Q ii ii ii 43.0
ii go ii ii ii 54.5
ii go ii ii ii 69.5
it 95 ii ii it 80.0
ii 10Q » » » 100.0
SOURCE: Bergan: "Personal Income Distribution and Personal
Savings", in Griffin & Khan (1972), Table 8.4, p.214.
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2.3 Balance of Payments.
The balance of payments of a country is 'a systematic
record of all economic transactions during the period
between residents of the reporting country and the residents
of other countries'. As in normal accounting practice, the
balance of payments is shown in terms of debit and credit
entries. All international transactions which give rise
to foreigners' money claims on the home country are debit
entries; all those giving rise to domestic money claims
on foreigners are credit entries. The main items in the
statement of the balance of payments include:-
1. Visible imports and exports (i.e. imports and exports
of goods).
2. Invisible imports and exports (i.e. payments or receipts
in respect of services like shipping freight, tourist
expenditures, payments for financial and insurance
services, and interest payments in respect of outstand¬
ing loans etc.)
3. Unrequited transfers (i.e. gifts, emigrants' remittances,
governmental grants etc. - payments and receipts which
are not matched by simultaneous flows of goods and ser¬
vices in the other direction)
4. Capital payments and receipts (i.e. loans, capital
repayments, purchase or sale of assets etc.)
In an accounting sense the balance of payments always
balances since, as in all double-entry accounts, total
receipts must equal total payments if all transactions are
included. Wherein then may we derive the meaning for the
terms 'surplus' and 'deficit' in the balance of payments?
(14)
For this purpose, using the terminology of Meade we
may divide the items included in the balance of payments into
Autonomous items and Accommodating items. The autonomous
items consist of commercial imports and exports, unrequited
transfers and all foreign capital investments undertaken for
profit by private enterprise, while accommodating items
should include gold and currency transfers by central mone¬
tary authorities, short-term balance adjustments and loans.
(14) Meade (1951, Vol.1, Ch.l).
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A deficit or surplus then is measured by the actual amount of
accommodating finance required over a given period of time.
Pakistan's balance of payments experience has in
several ways been typical of a developing economy attempting
to achieve rapid economic progress. Deficits in her balance
of payments have been almost a permanent feature from the
very outset. While Pakistan has been heavily dependent on
the export of a few primary commodities like cotton, rice
hides and skins etc., markets for which show a great deal of
instability, her import needs have been increasing due to
the import of development goods like machinery, equipment
and raw materials and spare parts. The prices of primary
commodities, due to inelasticities of supply and demand, tend
to show extreme fluctuations. Unavoidable and unforeseeable
factors such as natural calamities, droughts, floods and
pest attack, can result in crop harvest failure, on whose
export the country depends.
Then there are the more 'fundamental' causes like the
secular deterioration in the terms of trade and structural
changes at home or abroad. The loss of export markets, mone¬
tary imbalance in the domestic market or increased import
intensity of domestic production might result in the worsen¬
ing of the balance of payments position. Since 1973, the
oil price rises have caused serious problems of balance of
payments for the developing countries.
The balance of payments position of Pakistan for some
recent years is shown in Table 2.5. It may be seen from the
table that for all these years the current account has been
in deficit, and the deficit has varied from year-to-year.
Although exports have been rising, the import bill has been
rising even faster, thus widening the trade gap. But for
the unrequited transfers, the deficit in the current account
would have been much higher. The unrequited transfers, par¬
ticularly home remittances on the private account from people
working abroad, have increased very rapidly in recent years,
e.g. private remittances increased from $106.7 million in
1969-70 to $229.9 million in 1974-75, and to $1226.2 million
in 1977-78. However, if capital transactions are taken into


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































SOURCE:(i)1965-66basedonTableNo.34P kistanEconomicSurvey(1977-78)Statisticalect onpp.96-97. (ii)Restoftheablebas dontdatainPakistanEconomicSurvey(1978-79)Sta isticalS c ion Table9.10,pp.120-127.
A brief review of the component parts of the Balance
of Payments of Pakistan is given below:-
2.3.1 Merchandise Account
The position for the imports and exports of goods,
which is the major factor in the balance of payments is
given in Table 2.6.
TABLE 2.6: Value of Commodity Imports and Exports (Million Rupees)
(July-June) IMPORTS EXPORTS BALANCE EXPORTS AS %
OF IMPORTS
1948-49 1176.8 542.4 - 634.4 46.1
1949-50 912.2 535.1 - 377.1 58.7
1950-51 1167.1 1342.5 + 175.4 115.0
1951-52 1473.9 921.9 - 552.0 62.5
1952-53 1017.3 867.4 - 149.9 85.3
1953-54 824.3 641.0 - 183.3 77.8
1954-55 783.0 491.4 - 291.6 62.8
1955-56 964.5 742.4 - 221.1 77.0
1956-57 1516 .0 698.2 - 817.8 46.1
1957-58 1314.3 433.6 - 880.7 33.0
1958-59 1024.6 444.4 - 580.2 43.4
1959-60 1805.7 763.1 -1042.6 42.3
1960-61 2173.2 540.2 -1633.0 24.9
1961-62 2236.3 542.9 -1693.4 24.3
1962-63 2800.1 998.1 -1802.0 35.6
1963-64 2981.6 1075.0 -1906.1 36.1
1964-65 3672.4 1139.6 -2532.8 31.0
1965-66 2880.3 1203.6 -1676.7 41.8
1966-67 3625.7 1297.3 -2328.4 35.8
1967-68 3327.2 1644.8 -1682.4 49.4
1968-69 3046.6 1699.9 -1346.7 55.8
1969-70 3285.1 1608.6 -1676.5 49.0
1970-71 3602.4 1998.4 -1604.0 55.5
1971-72 3495.4 3371.4 - 124.0 96.5
1972-73 8398.3 8551.2 + 152.9 101.8
1973-74 13479.2 10161.2 -3318.0 75.4
1974-75 20925.0 10286 .3 -10638.7 49.2
1975-76 20465.3 11252.9 -9212.4 55.0
1976-77 23012.2 11293.9 -11718.3 49.1
1977-78 27814.7 12980.4 -14834.3 46.7
Note: (1) Figures are unadjusted for the devaluation of rupee in May
1972, when par value of the rupee was changed from
Rs 4.76 = $1 to Rs 11 = $1, and the revaluation in February
1973 when the par value became Rs 9.9 = $1.
(2) Data on exports do not include re-exports from 1967-68
onwards.
SOURCE: Pakistan Economic Survey (1978-79) Statistical
Section, Table 9.1, p.99.
Pakistan has experienced a negative balance on the
merchandise account for almost all the years since Independence.
- 26 -
The only exceptions have been the years 1950-51 and 1972-73.
In 1950-51 the unprecedented rise in export prices of primary
commodities due to the Korean war resulted in Pakistan's
high earnings. The surplus of 1972-73 was achieved partly
because of the sharp increase in the volume of exports due
to the diversion of exports from former East Pakistan to
foreign countries, and the devaluation of the rupee in 1972,
and partly because of a slower increase in imports due to
uncertain internal conditions. In all the other years imports
have exceeded exports both because of internal and external
factors. Higher imports during the sixties and seventies were
allowed by the increased flow of foreign assistance mainly in
the form of long-term loans. The imports have been growing
primarily because of the development needs of the country.
Liberal imports of machinery and spare parts, agricultural
inputs and industrial raw material have been allowed, while
some imports of consumers' goods, mainly food items, are
needed to meet the minimum consumption needs of the country.
The exports have failed to match the growth of imports because
of a number of factors like bad weather conditions, lack of
availability of surplus for exports and lack of competitiveness
etc. On the external front a notable factor has been the
secular deterioration of the terms of trade for Pakistan's
exports which can be seen from Table 2.7.
Table 2.7 gives indices of unit values of imports,
exports and terms of trade from 1960-61 to 1977-78 with differ¬
ent base periods. They are not directly comparable, but one
can see the trends in each. The import prices have been rising
faster than the export prices, making the terms of trade
unfavourable. During the period 1960-61 to 1977-78 there has
been a deterioration of nearly 30% in terms of trade, which
has accentuated the already unfavourable position of the
balance of payments.
2.3.2 Invisible Account.
The Invisible account has two broad segments, viz.
(i) Services, and (ii) Unrequited transfers. Under the
Services Sector, payments and receipts have both been increasing
but the payments have always exceeded the receipts. The main






































































































SOURCE:PakistanEconomicSurvey1973-74 StatisticalT ble35pp.76-77 (Correctedwhereronglycal ulatedint originalandputiparenthesis).
SOURCE:PakistanEconomicSurvey1978-79 StatisticalTableNo.9.2,p.100.
services like shipping and insurance etc. The frequent
increases in the international freight and insurance rates
have resulted in heavy payments under this heading.
The other important component of invisibles is
those unrequited transfers which consist of two parts,
namely, private transactions and official grants. While
official donations are on the decline, as mentioned
above, private remittances are increasing. In recent years
home remittances from workers abroad have increased very
rapidly. The sizeable increase in the private remittances
has made the invisible account show a surplus, and reduced
slightly the deficit on the current account.
2.3.3 Capital Account.
Heavy deficits on the current account necessitate
the finding of means to bridge the gap between payments
and receipts. Some deficits might have been deliberately
created for the purpose of achieving rapid economic growth.
Pakistan's deficits, particularly during the 1960's, were
part of the policy of financing development through foreign
assistance. In recent years the situation has become severe
both because of internal and external factors. Oil price
rises and depressed conditions for Pakistan's exports have
made larger capital inflow necessary in order to strengthen
the balance of payments position. The following table shows
the amount of capital inflow into Pakistan mostly in the form
of loans repayable in foreign exchange.




Five years (1955-56 to 1959-60) 1073
Five years (1960-61 to 1964-65) 2757
Five years (1965-66 to 1969-70) 2746




SOURCE: Pakistan Economic Survey (1978-79) Table 10.1, p.146.
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2.4 External Finance in Development Plans.
Economic policy in Pakistan has been concerned
primarily with the difficult task of developing a back¬
ward economy. The start of planned development was made
in 1951 with the Colombo Plan (1951-57), which was hardly
a Plan in the scientific sense of the word. "The six-year
Plan was prepared in the absence of much essential information and
many basic statistics. So it could not be based on a proper assess-
(15)
ment of the national resources - human, physical and financial".
Scientific planning began in Pakistan with the First Five
Year Plan (1955-60). Since 1955 three medium-term plans,
each spreading over five years, had been launched when the
country underwent some fundamental changes. The Fourth
Five Year Plan (1970-75) had to be scrapped due to the
separation of the former East Pakistan (now Bangladesh).
The country then resorted to ad-hoc planning on an annual
basis, which continued till 1978. Since July 1, 1978 the
country has again returned to medium-term planning with the
launching of the Fifth Five Year Plan (1978-83). The basic
aim among other objectives of the whole planning process
has been the acceleration of the rate of growth of gross
national product. It is widely believed that any increase
in income hinges upon capital accumulation, although other
factors such as entrepreneurship and training of workers
also play an important role. The resources for capital
accumulation and development expenditures come from internal
and/or external sources. In view of the inadequacy of
internal finance, a significant proportion of the develop¬
ment plans in Pakistan has been financed through external
resources. Foreign resources financed 34 per cent of the
Third Plan (1965-70) development expenditure as against 40
per cent in the Second Plan (1960-65The familiar two-gap
analysis provides the rationale for this. Developing coun¬
tries in the task of raising the level of investment suffer
from deficiency of domestic savings as well as from that of
(15) The First Five Year Plan. p.9.
(16) The Fourth Five Year Plan. p.40.
(17) For further discussion of two-gap analysis, see McKinnon,R.(1964),
Chenery & Strout (1966) and Islam (1970).
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foreign exchange. Domestic savings, even if they are
adequate for meeting the demands of the target investment
rate, cannot always be converted into foreign exchange.
An expansion of domestic output requires fixed inputs of
foreign imported capital equipment and, in many cases,
imported raw materials; the exports which are predomin¬
antly agricultural and primary commodities cannot be
expanded to meet the growing import needs. Foreign aid
meets both deficiencies and thus, contributes to growth
by enabling the recipient country to overcome the critical
bottlenecks, i.e.inadequacy of savings and of foreign
exchange. The extent to which foreign assistance has con¬
tributed to accelerating the rate of investment and thus
the rate of growth in Pakistan, can be seen in Table 2.9.
The increase in domestic savings has not kept pace
with the increase in investment: the need for foreign
assistance has consequently been increasing over time. It
may be seen from Table 2.9, that the share of foreign
assistance, which made a small contribution till 1955 in
the financing of total investment, rose sharply from about
14 per cent in 1954-55 to about 46 per cent in 1959-60, fell
to about 28 per cent in 1969-70 but increased again to about
46 per cent in 1974-75. The main reason for the decline in
the share of foreign assistance in the total investment in
the late 1960's was the curtailment of foreign aid inflows
from donor countries after the 1965 Indo-Pakistan.. con¬
flict. The 1970's have witnessed events of an exceptional
nature, both domestic and international. Among the domestic
factors, weather conditions, combined with the need for
restructuring of the economy, and on the international side,
the energy crisis and the stagflation of the developed
economies, have all contributed to Pakistan's increased
dependence on foreign assistance.
The panacea for all development problems in Pakistan
has been 'more aid', as remarked by Keith Griffin (1972,p.57).
Up to the end of December 1978, foreign economic assistance
worth $14.68 billion had been contracted - $3.95 billion in
the form of grants and grant-like assistance, and the balance
of $10.73 billion in the form of loans and credits repayable
in foreign exchange. Disbursements of loans and credits up
- 31 -
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SOURCES:Cols.(1),(2),(3)fr mThirdFiveYearPl n,able8p.8. Cols.(4)&5fr mF urthiveYearPl n,Table2p.42. Col.(6)calculatedfr md tinT bl10.3,p.148 andstatisticalT ble2.4,pp.15-17,P k t n EconomicSurvey(1978-79)
(19)
to the end of December, 1978 amounted to $9.2 billion.
Pakistan had repaid $1.8 billion leaving a net debt
(disbursed and outstanding) of $7.4 billion. This consti¬
tuted nearly 40 per cent of Pakistan's GNP and is generally
recognised to be a heavy debt liability.^20'
The increase in the volume of foreign assistance has
been accompanied by a continuing shift in the composition
of aid from grants and grant-like assistance to loans and
credits repayable in foreign exchange, as shown in Table
2.10.
Table 2.10 shows the distribution of foreign assist¬
ance between grants and grant-like assistance and the loans
repayable in foreign exchange. Grants and grant-like
assistance, which constituted 70 per cent of the total
aid during 1950 to 1955, and about 79 per cent during the
First Plan Period (1955-60), declined to about 43 per cent
during the Second Plan period (1960-65), to about 26 per
cent during the Third Plan Period (1965-70) and to only
about 9 per cent during the five year period of 1970 to 1975.
It has varied from 11 to 17 per cent of the total foreign
assistance in the subsequent years. Over the years, the
proportion of grants has been declining, while that of loans
has been rising. Keith Griffin (1965) suspected that once
Pakistan's alignment with the West, in acceptance of U.S.
military aid and its membership in SEATO and CENTO were
assured, the composition of foreign assistance changed, i.e.
the proportion of loans in total foreign assistance increased
and that of grants decreased. Whether this suspicion is
justified or not, the fact remains that the terms and con¬
ditions of loans for Pakistan have been hardening since the
early sixties, and the proportion of 'tied aid' has been an
increasing part of the total foreign assistance. Aid may be
tied by both source and end-use: the recipient country may
not have the freedom to apply the aid to import from sources
other than the donor country, and the use of aid may be
(19) Inclusive of debt disbursed (but not repaid) in former East
Pakistan (now Bangladesh) amounting to $64.5 million, which
has been/likely to be taken off.











































































restricted via specification of commodities or projects.
Aid-tying reduces its real value to the recipient country.
The direct costs of tying aid can be estimated as the differ¬
ence between the cost of importing from the tied source and
the cost of importing the same commodities from the cheapest
source. Mahbu3»-ul-Haq (1967) estimated that purchasing all
United States aid financed commodities in the United States
resulted in a 17 per cent excess cost to Pakistan, as com¬
pared to world market prices for the year 1965. In addition
to the direct costs incurred, tying of aid may have signifi¬
cant indirect costs for the recipient country by causing a
distortion of development priorities. The distortion in
the allocation of investment resources may be caused by
biasing the recipient's development programme toward those
projects that have a high component of the special import
content allowed-for under the conditions of the tied aid.
' The import-intensive industrialization of the borrowing
country may become permanently dependent upon a high-cost
supplier for spare parts, replacements and ancillary equip¬
ment'. Tied loans, furthermore, lead to higher debt repayment
obligations and a greater debt burden.
2.4.1 Debt servicing.
Foreign economic assistance to Pakistan started in
1950. Initially the burden of debt servicing was relatively
small because of the grace periods of a number of loans.
As the grace periods of loans and credits contracted earlier
expired, the debt service liability increased sharply after
1965. The ratio of debt service payments to the country's
foreign exchange earnings for some selected years is shown
in Table 2.11.
It may be seen from Table 2.11 that debt servicing as
a ratio of Pakistan's foreign exchange earnings, which was
3.6 per cent in 1960-61, rose sharply to 9.9 per cent in
1964-65, and from then on by an average of 20 per cent during
the seventies. In relation to the country's export earnings,
debt servicing on external debts is very high from all inter¬
national standards. Expressed as a ratio to export earnings











Earnings = [ (3)v(2)xl00]
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1960-61 476 17 3.6
1964-65 629 62 9.9
1969-70 901 176 19.5
1974-75 1519 259 17.1
1975-76 1813 407 22.4
1976-77 2028 420 20.7
NOTES
(i) Debt service figures are net of debt relief/rescheduling, and
include debt servicing of short-term credits of less than one
year's maturity.
(ii) Figures from 1960-61 to 1969-70 are for all Pakistan, including
former East Pakistan (now Bangladesh).
SOURCES: (i) 1960-61 to 1969-70 from Pakistan Economic Survey (1970-71)
Table 74, p.138.
(ii) 1974-75 and onwards from Pakistan Economic Survey (1978-79)
Table 10.2, p.148.
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in the years 1960-61, 1964-65, 1969-70 and 1974-75 res-
( 2 1
pectively. With limited debt relief provided during
the year 1978-79, this ratio was expected to go up to
40 per cent. ^22^
The rapid increase in debt service obligations has
principally resulted from two basic factors:
(i) a sharp and continuing shift in the composition of
foreign assistance from grants and grant-type assist¬
ance to loans and credits requiring service in
foreign currency, and
(ii) A decline in the share of loans carrying concessional
terms and as a result contracting of loans and credits
on hard terms, particularly after 1965.
Such a sharp increase in debt service payments adversely
affected net aid inflows to Pakistan. An increasingly
higher percentage of gross aid had to be returned to the
lending countries/agencies in the form of repayment of
principal and interest dues. Net transfer of resources
from abroad which constituted 91 per cent of gross dis¬
bursements in 1964-65 dropped to 69 per cent in 1969-70
and to 60 per cent in 1973-74. ^23^
It may be noted here that the increase of the debt
service ratio to foreign exchange earnings or to export
earnings is related not only to the terms and conditions
of borrowing, but also to the performance of the export
sector of the country. The rapid increase in debt service
ratios has occurred in spite of the comparatively rapid
rate of growth of Pakistan's exports and the considerable
debt rescheduling arrangements made since 1971. The debt
relief agreements were made with Consortium^24^and non-
Consortium countries after the separation of former East
Pakistan (now Bangladesh). These agreements rescheduled
the debt servicing ranging between 55 to 71 per cent falling
due during the period of 1971 to 1978.
(21) Pakistan Economic Survey (1974-75), p.132.
(22) Pakistan Economic Survey (1978-79), p.148.
(23) Pakistan Economic Survey (1974-75), p.133.
(24) The Aid-to-Pakistan Consortium includes Belgium, Canada, France,
Germany,Italy,Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, U.K., U.S.A.,
I.B.R.D. and I.D.A.
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2.5 The Need to Expand Exports.
The discussion above regarding the performance of the
Pakistani economy indicates that in an effort to achieve
higher growth rates the country has evolved a system, which
has become heavily dependent on foreign assistance. In
general, the deficits in the balance of payments have been
increasing and the gap between exports and imports has been
widening over time. The persistent deficits in the balance
of payments means that the country has been living beyond
its means, which is a danger signal. Continued reliance on
foreign borrowing has resulted in heavy debts servicing
obligations, which are growing at a rate faster than the
rate of growth of exports. This means that a growing propor¬
tion of current earnings of foreign exchange will be required
to service foreign debts or more loans will have to be con¬
tracted merely to meet the debt repayment obligations. The
implication is that an economic system which has been created
and sustained with the help of foreign assistance is not
viable. The adverse effects of this situation on the economy
can only be avoided if:—
(i) more foreign assistance is available and the trend in
foreign assistance is reversed in favour of more grants,
and
(ii) export earnings and/or import substitution grow at a
phenomenal rate.
As regards (i), the whole issue of foreign assistance is at
the cross-roads. Both developed and developing countries are
getting frustrated by the consequences of aid to the LDC's.
Doubts have grown in the developed countries, as to the
effectiveness of aid in promoting economic development, the
wastes and inefficiencies involved in the use of aid, and the
dangers of getting involved, through extensive foreign-aid
operations, in military or diplomatic conflicts. Foreign aid
is under attack on the grounds that it strengthens the hands
of the political groups who are in power in the poor countries
and who often inhibit the socio-political changes in attitudes
and institutions necessary for economic development. The dis-
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enchantment on the part of the recipient countries is, on
the other hand, associated with the inadequacy of aid, the
stop-go nature of its flow in many cases, and the intrusion
of non-economic considerations governing the allocation of
aid amongst the recipient countries. Now that most of the
donor countries are increasingly concerned with their domestic
problems, the chances of the avilability of foreign assist¬
ance in the form of grants are very limited.
As regards (ii), import substitution (i.e. domestic
production of those goods which would otherwise have been
imported) was a popular strategy of economic development in
the 1950's. By the mid-sixties the developing countries
became increasingly disenchanted with those policies as they
exacerbated the problems (particularly that of the balance
of payments) which they were designed to cure. The evidence
of the historical path of industrialization indicates that in
the developing countries import substitution initially takes
place in the consumer goods'industries. This is because in
the early stages of development most of the imports consist
of consumer goods, technology required for many consumer goods
is relatively simple, capital requirements are not large and
existing domestic demand is adequate relative to the economic
size of an industry. The instruments, like tariffs and import
licensing etc. used to implement this policy, are usually such
that they impose higher restrictions on the imports of consumer
goods than on those of raw materials and capital goods. Easier
imports of capital goods and raw materials give rise to capital
intensive processes of production using imported raw materials.
Paradoxically enough, the development of this sort of production
structure increases the economy's dependence on imports of raw
materials, parts and components. In addition, if the policies
of import substitution succeed in raising real incomes, they
would tend to increase the demand for other consumer goods.
However, an import-substitution policy, directed primarily
towards consumer goods industries, quickly reaches its limit
as set by the protected domestic market. It then gradually
extends in successive steps to intermediate and capital goods
for which the newly developed domestic consumer goods industries
provide a market. As the size of the domestic market is
frequently inadequate for the production of intermediate and
capital goods on an efficient scale, the need for finding
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export markets arises. Moreover, excessive import-
substitution is likely to result in a misallocation of
resources and technical inefficiencies. High rates of
protection might encourage the setting-up of those indus¬
tries which lack comparative advantage. Import-substitution
without corresponding export promotion may prove unsuccessful
in terms of sustained growth or the removal of severe balance
of payments constraints.
Many economists believe that there is a significant
relationship between a country's exports and its economic
growth, and have viewed the growth of exports as a catalyst
for economic development. There are logical grounds for
believing that a rise in exports stimulates an increase in
aggregate economic growth, but essentially the relationship
is one of interdependence. There are many direct and
indirect benefits from a high rate of export growth, which
help in promoting general economic growth
(i) An increasing level of exports provides a country with
the wherewithal to step up its level of imports,
especially of capital goods, which are important in
contributing to economic growth. The country is
enabled to take greater advantage of the international
division of labour, procuring desired goods from abroad
at considerable savings in terms of inputs of productive
factors.
(ii) Export development tends to concentrate investment in
the most efficient sectors of the economy - those in
which the country enjoys a comparative advantage.
Specialization in the products in which the country
has a comparative advantage increases productivity
and results in the more efficient utilization of pro¬
ductive factors.
(iii)The country gains from economies of scale, since the
international market added to the domestic market
obviously permits larger-scale operations than does
the domestic market alone.
(25) For further discussion of import sub. vs. export promotion, see
Power (1966); Schydlowsky (1967); Hirschman (1968), Streeten
(1973). Two standard works in this area are the studies made
by the O.E.C.D. (1970) and the N.B.E.R. (1978).
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(iv) The necessity of remaining competitive in international
markets tends to maintain pressure on the export
industries to keep costs low and encourages them con¬
stantly to strive for more efficient methods of pro¬
duction. The competitive pressures also tend to lead
to improvements in the quality of the export product,
and, in general to inhibit the establishment of
inefficient industries.
A growing export sector also encourages an increased
flow of technological and market innovations as well
as managerial skills. Under the pressure of competi¬
tion and the desire to continue expanding foreign sales,
suitable foreign techniques and methods are imported
to further improve productivity and quality.
(v) Expanding exports encourage investment in ancillary
industries which would supply and service the operations
of the main export industry.
(vi) Lastly, a growing export sector serves as an indirect
stimulus to increased consumption. As consumers become
gradually aware of the foreign consumer products that
they can obtain because of expanded export earnings,
there is an increased desire to acquire these products.
Thus there is a kind of 'Demonstration Effect'.
All these factors tend to reinforce each other stimula¬
ting further expansion of exports, investment and consumption.
The result is a substantial rate of growth in real gross
national product. Emery (1967) and Oyejide (1975) have tried
to estimate quantitatively the causal relationship between
export growth and the growth of GNP, and have found a signi-
/Ofi\
ficant positive relationship between the two variables.
Pakistan needs to expand its exports in order to overcome the
difficulties of the balance of payments, to fulfil the debt
repayment obligations and to achieve a rapid rate of growth
in GNP.
(26) Emergy, (1967), using the average of annual rates of change in real
per capita GNP and average rates of export growth for the period of
1953-63 generally, in respect of 50 countries, concluded that a
country increases its per capita real GNP about 1 per cent for every
2i per cent boost in its exports, p.478.
Oyejide, (1975), using average growth rates of GDP and the average
of exports as proportion of GDP over the period of 1960 to 1969 for
43 African countries concluded that a unit change in exports leads
to 0.13 change in GDP. p.185.
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2.6 Behaviour and Structure of Exports.
A brief description of the behaviour of Pakistan's
exports during the period of 1960-61 to 1977-78 is given
below and the structure of export earnings is also examined.
TABLE 2.12
Value of exports in some selected years and the rates of growth of
exports.








Annual compound rates of growth of exports (Percentages)
PERIOD For unadjusted data. For adjusted data
1960-61 to 1965-66 17.38 17.38
1965-66 to 1970-71 10.67 10.67
1970-71 to 1975-76 41.29 22.04
1970-71 to 1973-74 71.96 34.71
1973-74 to 1977-78 6.31 6.31
1960-61 to 1970-71 13.98 13.98
1970-71 to 1977-78 30.64 17.67
1960-61 to 1977-78 20.57 15.48
NOTE: (a) Pakistan's rate of exchange has been:-
Prior to May, 1972 One U.S. $ = Rs 4.76
From May '72 to Feb.'73 One U.S. $ = Rs 11.00
After Feb. 1973 One U.S. $ = Rs 9.90
After the change in par value of the rupee from May, 1972 onwards, the
value of exports expressed in rupees, would be inflated by the extent of
change in the currency equivalent, even if it would have remained the
same in dollar terms. To make the figures comparable, the value of exports
prior to 1972 have been adjusted upwards to the extent of change in the




as an example for the year 1960-61 adjusted value = " x 9.90.
4 . 76
Otherwise, the value of exports expressed in dollars for the whole period,
would also become comparable. However, these adjustments do not take into
account any changes in per value of the dollar itself.
SOURCE: As for Table 2.6
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Table 2.12 presents data on the value of exports for some
selected years, from which it may be seen that the export
earnings were almost 4 times higher in 1970-71 compared to
those in 1960-61, while between 1970-71 and 1977-78 the
increase was nearly three-fold. Pakistan's earnings from
commodity exports have increased at a compound rate of
about 15.5 per cent per annum during the period of 1960-61
to 1977-78. During the decade of the sixties the rate of
growth of exports had been consistently above 10 per cent
per annum, although it was higher during the first five
years compared to the last five years. More precisely,
exports grew at about 17.4 per cent annually during 1960-61
to 1965-66, while during the later five years of 1965-66
to 1970-71 this rate fell to about 10.7 per cent. The
pattern of export growth during the seventies has been
haphazard. The rate of expansion of exports was phenomen¬
ally high during 1970-71 to 1973-74, being about 34.7 per cent
annually, while from 1973-74 to 1977-78 they rose at a modest
rate of about 6.3 per cent per annum. The extraordinarily
high rate of export growth during the early seventies may be
explained by two factors. Firstly, the separation of former
East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) from the rest of the country
made available the exportable surplus, which was diverted to
the international markets. Secondly, the develuation of
the Pakistani rupee in May, 1972 by more than 57 per cent
facilitated the disposal of this exportable surplus in the
foreign markets. However, the favourable effects of the
devaluation were short-lived. The oil price hike of 1973 and
the resulting recessionary conditions in the developed
economies have affected the exports from Pakistan adversely
in recent years.
Another feature of Pakistan's exports may be seen from
Table 2.13, which presents annual data on the rupee and dollar
value of Pakistan's exports, Pakistan's share of world
exports and the share of Pakistan's exports in GDP for the
period of 1960-61 to 1977-78. Pakistan's share of the world
market rose from less than 0.1 per cent in 1960-61 to about
0.17 per cent in 1962-63. Although there had been year-to-
year fluctuations in the share of Pakistan's exports to
world exports after 1962-63, on the average, this share



























































































































































SOURCE:Col.2PakistanEconomicSurvey(1978-79),tatisticalTable9.1p.9 . Col.3:PakistanEconomicSurvey(1978-79),tatisticalTable2.2pp.1 -13. Col.5:alculatedfromC l.2bydividingthrupeefig r srel vantatofxchange, i.e.upto1970-71neU.S.$=Rs4 6,f r1971-72,oneU. $=Rs5 54;f r 1972-73,oneU.S.$=Rs.10.59,andfrom1973-74o wardsneU S.$=Rs90. Col.6:IMF,"InternationalFinanci lS atistics"var ousssues. (a):Dataonworldexportsisfcalen ery ars,i. .thiblw rldexpo ts for1960-61standfexportsin19 0.
period to 0.156 per cent for the period of 1965-66 to
1969-70 - an increase of nearly 15 per cent. This may be
regarded as an indication of the success of Pakistan's
efforts to break through the world market. Pakistan's
share of world exports increased rapidly in the early
seventies for the reasons mentioned above and reached an
all-time high of 0.214 per cent in 1972-73. Since then
it has constantly been on the decline and plunged to
0.126 per cent in 1976-77, an all-time low after 1962-63.
An almost similar pattern is discernable for
Pakistan's exports as a percentage of her GDP. The share
of exports to the GDP rose from 2.94 per cent in 1960-61
to 4.87 per cent in 1962-63, which was never reattained
until 1971-72. However, on average, the ratio of exports
to GDP increased from 3.94 per cent in the 1960-61 to
1964-65 period to 4.19 per cent for the period 1965-66 to
1969-70 - an increase of about 6.4 per cent. The highest
ratio of exports to GDP, 14.07 per cent, was achieved in
1972-73, since when it has been declining continuously
reaching 8.29 per cent in 1977-78.
2.6.1 Composition of exports
The structure of Pakistan's exports by broad economic
categories, i.e. primary vs. manufactured commodities is
given in Table 2.14. This table gives evidence of the
changes in the composition of Pakistan's exports. Whereas
most of the foreign exchange earnings came from the export
of primary commodities in the fifties, the share of this
category in total exports has been diminishing over time.
The share of primary commodities in total foreign exchange
earnings decreased from about 91 per cent in 1955 to about
41 per cent in 1969-70. This has been primarily because of
the expansion of the manufacturing sector within the country
and concerted efforts of the government through different
export incentive schemes for the expansion of manufactured
exports. While on the one hand, expanding manufacturing
industries consumed an increasing proportion of primary
commodities within the country leaving less of those avail¬
able for export, on the other hand, the subsidies to the
exports of manufactured products led to an increase in the
















































NOTES:(a)PSTCSections(0+1+2+3) (b)PSTCSections(5+6+7+8+9) (c)dataforcalenderye rs. SOURCE:Datafor1955nd9fromQ.C.Hufbauer(1971).Appendix,Ta l3. ,p. 4-95; fortheryears'ForeignTradeStatisticsfPakis an*.variousissue ,gi n Appendix.
The commodity composition within these broad categories
has also been changing over time. The contribution of some
major commodities to total foreign exchange earnings in some
selected years since 1960-61 is given in Table 2.15.
The data on some commodities' percentage shares in
total export earnings given in Table 2.15 presents some
noteworthy trends. The main primary commodities exported from
Pakistan have been raw cotton, raw wool, hides and skins,
fish and rice. While the percentage shares of raw cotton,
raw wool and hides and skins in the total export earnings
have been decreasing over time, the rice group has achieved
pride of place in the primary commodities category. The
percentage share of raw cotton had creased from 64.4 per
cent in 1955^27^ to 27.7 per cent in 1960-61, which dropped
further to about 8.8 per cent in 1975-76. The same trend
is observable for raw wool and hides and skins whose shares
declined from 14.1 and 5.0 per cent in 1960-61 to 0.66 and
0.25 per cent in 1975-76 respectively. The export earnings
from rice, which were about 9 per cent of the total foreign
exchange earnings in 1960-61, increased to about 22 per cent
in 1975-76. The main reason for the decline in the percen¬
tage contribution to total export earnings from raw cotton,
raw wool and hides and skins has been that instead of
exporting these commodities in their raw form, they have
been exported in the manufactured form. As a result, the
share of yarn in the total exports rose from about 12.5 per
cent in 1960-61 to about 17.9 per cent in 1970-71, that of
cotton cloth from about 8.3 per cent to about 15.6 per cent,
and of wearing apparel from about 0.21 per cent to about
1.6 per cent during the same period. The same is true for
the manufactures of wool, especially carpets - the share of
which in the total exports increased from about 1.7 per cent
in 1960-61 to 6.9 per cent in 1976-76.
In spite of this shift in the structure of exports,
Pakistan's commodity export earnings have been dominated by
the cotton group over the past two decades, which has con¬
tributed nearly 50 per cent, on average, to the total export








































































































































SOURCE:Computedfromdatacompile''F reignTr dSt sfPakis ",v iouissu ,(Appendix)
earnings. If we add to this the rice group and the hides
and skins, leather and leather manufactures group, this ratio
jumps up to nearly 70 per cent on the average. This does
not mean, however, that no diversification in the structure
of exports has taken place during this period. An important
beginning has been made in the export of some engineering
goods. A start has been made in the export of electric and
non-electric machinery and chemicals. The increase in the
ratio of 'all others' group from 10.8 per cent in 1960-61 to
about 17.2 percent in 1970-71 also points to the diversification
in exports.
2.6.2 Geographic distribution of exports.
Table 2.16 gives data on the value and percentage
share of exports going to different regions, trade blocks
and countries.
Some important trends may be observed from the data
in Table 2.16 on the volume and share of Pakistan's exports
going to different countries. While the U.S.A. and U.K.
alone purchased nearly one third of Pakistan's exports in
1960-61, this share has diminished over time and was only
about 12 per cent of the total exports in 1977-78. However,
America and Western Europe have remained Pakistan's major
trading partners throughout the past two decades, and more
than one-third of Pakistan's exports were destined for these
regions during this period. EEC countries, on the average,
have provided about 20 per cent of the market for Pakistan's
exports. A significant shift in the direction of Pakistan's
exports may be noted from the fact that the share of these
exports going to developed market economies namely America,
Western Europe and Japan has been continuously declining
during the period of 1960-61 to 1977-78. It declined from
about 50.7 per cent in 1960-61 to about 38 per cent in
1970-71, though it improved marginally to be about 40 per
cent in 1977-78. The reason for that might be that the
exports from developing countries faced harder competition
in the developed markets and/or that .the developed countries
have tried to keep them out of their markets through tariffs
and other restrictive policies.
Two other features of Pakistan's exports are noticeable,
namely, the share of these exports going to Eastern Europe
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TABLE2.16


















































































































































































































































































ofwhich: U.S.S.R Bulgaria Czechoslovakia Hungary Poland Romania Yugloslavia
___
—
59.8 1.0 22.1 12.7
4.97 0.08 1.84 1.06
162.0 27.1 34.1 24.7 78.6 17.8 37.3
8.11 1.36 1.71 1.24 3.93 0.89 1.87
194.5 20.6 17.2 39.9 119.1 105.9 63.5
1.73 0.18 0.15 0.35 1.06 0.94 0.56
273.2 86.3 59.8 59.1 24.3 61.5 11.6


































ofwhich: AbuDhabi Bahrain Dubai Iraq Kuwait SaudiArabia
9.7 6.7 3.5 8.0 10.9
1.80 1.24 0.65 1.48 2.02
12.1 21.4 N.A. 6.8 30.6 20.4
1.01 1.78 N.A. 0.56 2.54 1.69
9.4 20.4 29.7 53.7 42.7 29.3
0.47 1.02 1.49 2.69 2.14 1.47
113.8 136.9 252.7 584.8 380.1 796.4
1.01 1.22 2.25 5.20 3.38 7.08
23.7 75.7 212.3 652.1 277.6 426.0
0.18 0.58 1.64 5.02 2.14 3.28 Continued
TABLE2■16(Continued)






























































































































































































































































































Notes:-*includingU.K.,DenmarkandIrishRepublic. —meanslesth nR0.5million. —meansNIL Totalsmaynotalwaysdd100.00duetrounding. SOURCE:Basedondatai"ForeignTradeSt t sticsofP kistan",variousi sues.
including U.S.S.R. and that going to the Middle East
countries. The share of exports going to the East European
countries including U.S.S.R, which was negligible in
1960-61, soared up to about 19 per cent in 1970-71, although
it declined again in the seventies, falling to about 4.5
per cent in 1977-78. Most of this trade was barter and has
been on the basis of bilateral trade agreements.
The share of exports destined for the Middle Eastern
countries has been rising continuously throughout the
period of 1960-61 to 1977-78. It has risen from only about
8 per cent in 1960-61 to about 27 per cent in the seventies.
This may be explained partly by Pakistan's efforts at
increasing co-operation with the Islamic countries, which
have been made vigorously in the seventies. Moreover, since
July 1964, Iran, Pakistan and Turkey have been trying to
expand their intra-regional trade through the Regional
Co-operation for Development (R.C.D), although with limited
success. Among other Asian countries, Hong Kong has been
an important customer for Pakistan's exports. There again
the share of Pakistan's exports going to Hong Kong has
been falling in the seventies. It fell from about 12.3
per cent in 1970-71 to about 6.1 per cent in 1977-78. The
share of exports going to other individual countries and
the changes in that over time are given in Table 2.16, which
may be seen from there.
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CHAPTER III
EVOLUTION AND STRUCTURE OF PROTECTION IN PAKISTAN.
Pakistan like many other developing countries has
used commercial policy in order to achieve certain specific
objectives which are diverse and numerous. They include
fuller utlization of industrial capacity; promotion of
exports; progressive substitution of imports by local
products; improving supplies through commercial channels
of such goods of industrial and consumer interest as are not
produced in the country or are in short supply; stabiliza¬
tion of prices at reasonable levels; and to obtain necessary
goods for economic development.^ The instruments employed
for the attainment of these objectives have been a combination
of foreign exchange controls, import licensing restrictions,
tariffs and export promotion policies. The exchange control
policy has been used to restrict the demand for foreign
exchange to its supply from various sources (trade, aid etc.)
as well as to allocate the available exchange between public
and private uses. Import licensing, since 1952, has been the
basic procedure for rationing limited supplies of foreign
exchange. In the earlier years after Independence, import
controls were largely applied as an instrument of conserva¬
tion of foreign exchange, rather than as a means of 'resource
allocation' as understood in the terminology of economic
development. Later on, however, import controls have come
to be regarded as tools of economic planning and of resource
allocation for achieveing the set objectives defined in the
development plans. Tariff policy, besides its effects on
resource allocation, has been a major source of government
revenue. Finally, specific measures have been formulated to
stimulate exports in the context of an over-valued exchange
rate. In order to put the Pakistan's commercial policy in
proper perspective, we start by examining the variou argu¬
ments put forth for protection in the developing countries.
(1) Pakistan Economic Survey (1969-70), p.113, and
Pakistan Economic Survey (1974-75), p.119.
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3.1 Free Trade vs. Protection.
The gains from free trade have been much discussed
by economists on the grounds of the law of comparative
costs. In the context of a two-country, two-commodity
model, whenever the relative domestic costs of production
of the two goods in one country differ from the relative
domestic costs of production in the other country, there
is some potential economic gain if both the countries
specialise in the production of the commodity in which
they have a comparative advantage,and trade it with the
other country. Extended to the multi-commodity, multi-
country case, this means that free trade greatly enhances
the potential real national products of all nations and
makes possible higher standards of living all over the
globe. The classical case for free trade, which dominated
economic thought in Britain for the whole of the 19th
century, was developed simultaneously with the case for
Laissez-faire. Gradually, more and more evidence has accum¬
ulated supporting the view that Laissez-faire may not lead
to an optimum for a country. Perfect competition does not
necessarily rule, there may not be full employment, the
income distribution that is yielded by the Laissez-faire
situation may not be a desirable or just one, necessary
structural changes may not take place and so on. Therefore,
many qualifications to the case for Laissez-faire have been
made, and many reasons for the government to intervene in
the economy have been put forward - to maintain full employ¬
ment, to bring about a desirable distribution of income, to
adjust resource allocation and consumption patterns in the
light of external economies and diseconomies and so on.
The law of comparative costs pre-supposes that the
price of resources truly reflects their real scarcity in
the economy. There are no divergences between private and
social costs and there are no externalities. If these assump¬
tions do not hold, then some sort of intervention is called
for. The proponents of free trade advocate that in the
presence of domestic distortions, the best way to deal with
them may be to intervene in some direct way at the source
of the distortion, and at the same time to allow the trade
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to follow freely. Hagen (1958), Bhagwati, Ramaswami (1963),
Johnson (1965) and Bhagwati (1971) among others, have argued
that optimal intervention involves intervention at the source
of distortion. If the market wage rates exceed the shadow wage
rates, then the optimal policy is to subsidise the use of labour.
If the production of manufactured goods falls short of the
optimal level because of the existence of non-reversible econo¬
mies, then the optimal policy is to subsidise production. It may
be noted here that an analysis of optimal intervention assumes
that the taxes to finance the subsidies can be raised in a non-
distorting way, and that the collection of taxes and the dis¬
bursement of the subsidies is costless. These assumptions are
not very realistic, however. In a developing country like Pakistan,
the taxable capacity is extremely limited and in its initial stages of
development tariffs were the only way of increasing tax revenues.
Protectionist history, on the other hand, spreads over
many centuries and numerous arguments have been put forward
to justify protection. These arguments for protection against
the competition of foreign imports have taken different forms
- both economic and non-economic. Non-economic arguments
stress that economic welfare is not the sole goal of life. It
may be necessary to become partially self-sufficient in certain
lines of activity, even at great cost, because of fear of
future disruptions in their supplies, especially during a war.
Considerations of national defence may make it desirable to
protect certain industries, say the steel industry, even if
a country does not possess a comparative advantage in that
industry. Apart from the non-economic arguments, a large
number of economic arguments have been advanced to justify the
case for protection. We shall briefly discuss some of those
arguments, which are related to growth.
3.1.1 The infant-industry argument.
The infant-industry argument is one of the most widely
accepted arguments for protection in less-developed countries.
Its origin is usually associated with Alexander Hamilton (1791)
and Friedrich List (1841), and is said to have been approved
by orthodox economists like John Stuart Mill, Alfred Marshall
and Frank Taussig, among others.
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The infant-industry argument is essentially an argu¬
ment for temporary protection. It is based on the assertion
that because of various reasons, such as lack of experience
on the part of the workers and entrepreneurs, it is diffi¬
cult to establish a new industry in the face of competition
from an established industry abroad. The costs of produc¬
tion in the new industry in its earlier stages of establish¬
ment exceed costs of imports. Therefore, the domestic
producers cannot compete with the foreign producers and
require protection for a transitional period till they
become competitive in the world market after both labour
and entrepreneurs have acquired the necessary know-how.
This formulation of the argument assumes that the superiority
of one country over another in a branch of production arises
only from having begun it sooner. There may be no inherent
advantage on one part, or disadvantage on the other, but
only a present superiority of acquired skill and experience.
The average costs of a firm are assumed to fall, the longer
its output has continued; it learns from experience. This
is to be distinguished not only from costs falling with the
scale of output in a static sense, but also from costs
falling over time for exogenous reasons. Sometimes these
dynamic economies are called "irreversible economies", since
experience of production in one year causes costs to fall
once and for all for later years. When factors of produc¬
tion are engaged in producing output in a particular year
two products really result, visible current output, saleable
currently on the market, and the invisible accumulation of
experience and knowledge. Insofar as the invisible human
capital does not depreciate, the effects of learning are
indeed irreversible.
The infant-industry argument is usually based on dynamic
internal and external economies. Dynamic internal economies
spring from the existence of imperfections in private informa¬
tion or imperfect ions of the capital market, while dynamic
external economies are the result of the training of labour,
knowledge diffusion or atmosphere creation. Private enterprise,
owing to a lack of information or excessive caution may not
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be able to look so far ahead as to see the fruits of invest¬
ment in learning capital. The state, in the form of its
civil servants or planners, has a longer view and sees a
more favourable learning curve than the firm's owners or
managers do. As a result, investment in an infant industry
will not be forthcoming in the absence of protection.
Secondly, due to imperfections of the capital market
there may be under-investment, or failure to invest at all,
in the creation of long-term learning capital if the infant
industry is not protected. The possible reasons for that
are : -
(i) Investment in human capital is not embodied in physical
goods and hence is more difficult to finance; the
capital market is biased against "invisible" investment.
(ii) While existing enterprises have no trouble in obtaining
funds, new enterprises find it difficult; there is a
bias against infant firms.
(iii) Private investors, especially when using their own
funds, may not be prepared to undertake long-term
investment in human capital and wait for the years of
infancy to end. The minimum time-period required for any
significant learning to result may be high. The
initial losses, which could be substantial, may not
be overcome without assistance for infant industries.
When the process of production by a certain firm
creates an invisible capital asset, the benefits of which
go in later years to other firms, and other firms are not
charged for it, there are dynamic external economies. The
training of labour or the accumulation of human skills
through 'on-the-job' training is one of the most commonly
cited examples of external economies. If the firm trains
labour specifically for use only in that firm, no external
benefits will accrue to other firms. But in the case of
more general training, whether in technical skills appropriate
to an industry or perhaps in the habits of working regularly
in a factory environment, a skill required for all the manu¬
facturing industry, the benefits cannot be restricted to the
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firms which provide training; some of them are bound to
spill-over. A certain firm trains labour, and this experi¬
enced or trained labour may then go off to other firms.
The general atmosphere, that is conducive to factory work or
to the development of mechanical or scientific interests
which has been created by one firm,may affect the quality of
workers in other firms. The new attitudes and knowledge will
go from worker to worker, and the gains will then spill over
to other firms. Moreover, knowledge may spread from firm to
firm. To some extent firms can keep new knowledge and ideas
secret or patent them, but there is an inevitable diffusion
process. In all these cases there is an externality, because
new firms will be creating assets from which other firms
benefit even though the other firms do not pay for them.
Hence, there may be a case for providing protection to those
firms which generate externalities, because this 'learning by
someone else's doing' generates social benefits which exceed
the private benefits.
The 'infant-industry' argument in developing countries
is usually associated with manufacturing. This may be because
historically many developing countries have deliberately
sought to shift the output pattern from agriculture to manu¬
facturing. The 'infant-industry' argument postulates that
there is more scope for learning economies in manufacturing
as its output expands and more time passes, perhaps because
manufacturing is more difficult and requires a higher stage
of technique and knowledge. The argument may be explained
with the help of diagram 3.1, adapted from Haberler (1950,
p.239).
In diagram 3.1 Agriculture and Manufacturing (in some
compositite units) are measured along vertical and horizontal
axes respectively. U-^, Ug and Ug are the community indiffer¬
ence curves and W-jW^ and ^2^2 are free trade terms of
trade curves. AB and AB' are the production possibility
curves, concave to the origin, implying that the extra amount
of manufactured goods which can be produced by decreasing a
given amount of agricultural goods is steadily decreasing as
we move downward along the production possibility curve, i.e.
the opportunity cost of manufactured goods in terms of agricul¬
tural goods steadily increases as the production of manufactured
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goods is increased and the production of agricultural goods
is decreased.
DIAGRAM 3.1: Short-run vs. Long-run Effects of Protection on Welfare.
AB is the production possibilities curve given by the produc¬
tion factors at time zero. The country is relatively ineffi¬
cient (in the static sense) in the production of manufactured
goods and therefore, in the free trade situation only OM of
the manufactured goods are produced. The country exports EF of
agricultural goods in exchange for FC of manufactured goods and
enjoys consumption at point C. Protection changes the relative
prices in such a way that the domestic terms of trade are moved
in favour of the manufactured goods and more resources are
allocated to the production of the manufactured goods. In the
protected situation, OM' of the manufactured goods are produced
compared to OM in the free trade situation. Protection in this
situation leads to a decline in the level of welfare in the
short run, which can be seen in the diagram by a shift from Ug
to . The reason might be that in the earlier stages of their establish¬
ment, the manufacturing industries are relatively inefficient and
therefore the gross national product may be lower than other¬
wise, or the changes in the relative price interfere with the
choice of the consumer. If the country has a dynamic compara¬
tive advantage, the static welfare loss may be more than
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compensated by the gains at a later stage. After the
necessary skills are acquired by the labourers and the entre¬
preneurs, the production possibilities curve shifts outwards
to A B'.Fith the new higher production possibilities curve,
even when the protection is removed, the consumption of the
country would be at a higher level, i.e. at U^. The AB
curve shifts to AB' over time in the absence of any growth
in the production factors and is due to the establishment
of the industries in the base period which have generated
learning economies.
It has been argued by Johnson (1964), Cordon (1974)
among others, that the mere existence of non-reversible
externalities is not sufficient to warrant the grant of pro¬
tection. It is argued that if the capital markets are perfect
and the entrepreneurs correctly perceive the reductions in
costs, an entrepreneur would not be hesitant to finance the
initial losses. However, the producers would not invest in
the new business ventures even if the capital markets are
perfect and the entrepreneurs correctly perceive the cost
reductions, because of the possibility of a failure to intern¬
alize the externalities, i.e. the cost reductions do not
necessarily lead to higher profits because if the other
producers also benefit from the cost reductions, the prices
will be forced to come down. Therefore, the infant-industry
argument requires:
a) the existence of non-reversible economies,
b) the economies are external to the firm, and
c) the economies are internal to the industry.
It may be pointed out that the first-best policy to remove
the divergence in social and private benefits arising out of
non-reversible economies is the tax-cum-subsidy and the
tariffs are the second best.
It is also notable that most of these arguments for
protection may equally apply to agriculture in less developed
countries. Private agriculture usually finds capital harder
to obtain and more costly than industry, and surely a lack
of information or foresight is a greater weakness of farmers
than of urban industrialists. Furthermore, the scope for
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learning and innovation in agriculture is often immense.
New methods of irrigation, new seeds, fertilizers and even
machines have a large part to play in agricultural progress.
It becomes an open question as to whether the infant-industry
argument does not apply-as strongly in agriculture as elsewhere.
The infant-industry argument is usually applied to
import-competing industries, but it can also apply to export
industries. There is no strong reason why import-competing
industries should have higher learning rates, and more
specifically, why they should have more difficulty in fore¬
seeing or financing internal dynamic economies or generate
more external economies than the export industries. There
is a special learning problem in breaking for the first time
into foreign markets, so that there could be an infant
marketing argument additional to the usual infant industry
argument concerned with production.
Learning can potentially take place in many activites.
The policy of special encouragement must not apply to all
sectors, or it ceases to be effective at all. This is because
one cannot give special favours to everyone, therefore, one
must protect the industries where learning is relatively
higher. In a general equilibrium framework all externalities
and arguments for protection should be seen in relative terms.
3.1.2 Arguments arising from imperfections in the wage
structure.
Free trade argument assumes that the relative costs of
production of two goods correctly reflect the real values of
the resources used in making them. It is quite widely
believed that the costs of manufactured goods in developing
countries exaggerate the sacrifices of output required in
other sectors, particularly in agriculture. The market wage
rates in the manufacturing sector exceed the shadow wage
rates, therefore, industry needs some protection. Two main
groups of arguments are used to explain the phenomenon, viz
1) the surplus labour model, and
2) the wage-differential model.
The surplus labour or disguised unemployment model is
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generally associated with the names of Nurkse (1953), and
Lewis (1954). The starting point of the argument is the
assumption that in the rural sector of the less developed
countries, there is a vast surplus of labourers whose
marginal product in agriculture is zero. They are maintained
by their relatives at a subsistence level approximately equal
to the average product of labour in agriculture, because the
principle of income sharing operates in the rural sector. In
the manufacturing 'Advanced' sector, the profit maximization
principle rules and labour is paid the value of its marginal
product. The surplus rural labour cannot, however, be
attracted to industry at the subsistence wage, although this
already exceeds its marginal product in agriculture which is
zero. A considerable premium would have to be added to this
subsistence wage before the surplus rural labour would become
available to the urban industrial sector. Thus the private
transfer wage of rural surplus labour to industrial employ¬
ment far exceeds its true social opportunity cost which is
determined by its marginal product in agriculure which is equal
to zero. The conclusion is that labour is systematically
over-valued for the urban industrial sector and this should
be corrected by protecting manufacturing industry. First-
best policy is then to subsidize the use of labour in the
urban industrial sector, possibly financing the subsidy by
taxing the subsistence sector, if that is practical. Second-
best policy is to subsidize the labour-intensive industries
and the use of tariff being perhaps third or fourth-best.
The simple exposition of the surplus labour model
contains some grains of truth, otherwise it would not have
had so powerful an intellectual hold for several years, but
has some limitations too.
i) If labour moves out of peasant agriculture, the total
product is likely to fall. Many people may be unemployed
for a large part of the year, but at sowing and harvest
times all hands are needed. Thus the marginal product
(2) See also Ranis and Fei (1964).
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is not zero. Little et al (1970, p.146) do not believe
that it is often close to zero and suggest that a
shadow wage-rate of less than half the actual wage is
rarely easy to justify.
ii) The simple version of the model assumes that peasants
place zero marginal value on leisure, at least over the
relevant ranges of their utility functions. This is
implied in the assumption that when some of them leave
the sector, the remainder will work appropriately longer
hours so as to maintain the same total output. With
this assumption, the opportunity cost of the labour which
moves to the industrial sector is zero. In practice the
benefits of leisure cannot be ignored.
iii) If there is a significant number of hired agricultural
( 3)
labourers, then the model ceases to be appropriate.
Such labourers are likely to be paid their marginal pro¬
ducts. As long as hired labourers are available in the
subsistence sector, who are free to move into the indus¬
trial sector, employers in the latter need only pay a
wage equal to the marginal product in the subsistence
sector.
The second version of the argument is based upon the
observed differential between wages in the 'subsistence'
agricultural sector and the 'advanced' industrial sector,
which may or may not be due to the rural over-population.
Insofar as this gap is explained in terms of rural surplus
population, this is not really different from the first ver¬
sion, and the policy implications are almost identical to
those produced by the preceding model. But the observed wage
differential may have been caused by other factors such as
trade union organisations or minimum wage legislation for
(4)
industry. Hagen (1958) has advanced a dynamic explanation
of the wage differential and built on it a case for protection.
(3) In many LDCs there is a significant proportion of hired agricultural
labour. Cordon (1974, p.128) put this proportion in India as 25 per
cent of the total labour force in agriculture.
(4) See also Magee (1973).
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He argues that in any economy in which per capita income is
rising secularly and there is the process of growth, the
size of the manufacturing sector grows secularly relative to
agriculture. This is because of high income elasticities of
demand for manufactures relative to agricultural products.
It is continually necessary to transfer labour from agricul¬
ture to manufacturing. To induce the transfer of the necess¬
ary labour, the manufacturing wage will have to be continually
above the agricultural wage. As a result of this wage dis¬
parity, manufacturing industry having a real comparative
advantage will be under-sold by imports when foreign exchanges
are in equilibrium. Protection which permits such an industry
C 5)
to exist will increase real income in the economy.
One can certainly observe in many LDC's that the wage
obtainable in the 'advanced' manufacturing sector is far above
incomes earned in peasant agriculture. The question is
whether this differential represents a genuine marginal diver¬
gence. The answer may be that every apparent wage differ¬
ential may not be a true marginal divergence requiring correc¬
tion by tariffs or subsidies.
First, it is not realistic to speak of the two types of
labour in the two sectors as though they were a homogeneous
factor. Before an agricultural worker from the traditional
rural society can become even an unskilled worker in an urban
industrial sector, complex changes in the way of life, atti¬
tudes etc. have to take place. Labour in the manufacturing
sector may really be a package of subsistence labour plus human
capital. The higher real wage in the manufacturing sector may
thus be a return on investment in training and experience, and
in the costs of movement from one sector to another.
Second, the higher wage in the manufacturing sector may
be a necessary payment to obtain a permanent, stable labour
force, living with family near the place of work, rather than
the casual type of labour generally available in the tradi¬
tional sector.
(5) Hagen (1958, pp.497-8).
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Third, the monetary wage payments may not give a
correct indication of the true wages if one takes into
account the availability of non-market food supplies in the
rural subsistence sector, the higher cost of living in the
city, and the possible disutility of uprooting oneself to
go into the city.
It is probable that after all these allowances have
been made, a genuine wage differential still remains, although
precise measurement is likely to be very difficult, if not
impossible. In order to correct the divergence, the first-
best policy is to correct it at the source of divergence,
perhaps by subsidizing the use of labour in the manufactur¬
ing sector. Tariffs might rank third or fourth-best policy.
3.1.3 Protection and economic growth.
Protection can affect the rate of economic growth
through its effects on savings and on relative prices between
capital goods and consumption goods. Savings are not only a
function of level of income, but also of income distribution
if the marginal propensity to save differs between different
sections of the community. It is often claimed that in less
developed countries the marginal propensity to save out of
profits is higher than that out of other incomes, especially
wages. Hence any redistribution towards profits will raise
savings, hence investment and the rate of growth. Protec¬
tion of manufacturing industry is likely to redistribute
income in favour of capitalists and raise profits out of
which a large proportion is saved. Consequently the total
savings increase. This argument assumes that the savings
generated by a free trade pattern of real incomes are below
the social optimum and that the pattern of expenditure diver¬
ges. from the socially desirable pattern. There is a domestic
expenditure divergence. Society values the savings higher
than an individual does. The first-best policy would be to
raise taxes in a minimum distortion way through an expendi¬
ture tax, and use the revenue to supplement savings. However,
in an under-developed country with negligible manufacturing
capacity and considerable difficulties in the levying and
collection of taxes on agriculture, the expenditure taxes
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may in fact imply tariffs. Tariffs raise revenues which
the government can use to finance investment if the quan¬
tity of investment is sub-optimal. Strictly speaking, an
expenditure tax should not discriminate between the domestic
production and the imports,and as such, tariffs should be
accompanied by excise taxes on the domestic production.
However, since in addition to generating higher savings,
tariffs are also used for protecting manufacturing industries,
excise taxes are not in general imposed at the rate equalling
the rate of tariffs. If the tariffs are just sufficient to
off-set the cost disadvantages, the protection may not
increase significantly savings via the redistribution of
income, and if the tariffs are in excess of the cost disad¬
vantages protection may increase profits and hence savings.
Here two qualifications may be noted: First, while high
profits increase savings, they also may raise the consumption
of the rich and add to their wealth, both of which may have
undesirable social and political consequences. Second, it is
not uncommon for high protection to lead as much to ineffi¬
ciency as to high profits, in which case the gains from high
savings are doubtful.
So far we have assumed that protection may affect the
rate of growth by raising savings and investment through
its effects on the redistribution of income. Protection may
affect the rate of growth through its effects on relative
prices. It may reduce the prices of capital goods ruling
within a country in relation to the prices of consumption
goods. Many countries deliberately discriminiate in their
tariff or import control systems in favour of imports of
capital goods. They impose high tariffs or severe restric¬
tions on imports of manufactured consumer goods, and low
tariffs on imports of capital goods, or make import licences
for capital goods readily available. The net result is that
the domestic prices of capital goods become lower relative
to the prices of consumption goods. When the relative price
of capital goods falls, the ratio of investment to consump¬
tion may rise. This may lead to an increase in the total
amount of investment in real terms. The increase in capital
accumulation may increase the rate of growth. We can show
the effect of change in relative prices on investment in a
- 68 -
very simple two-goods model with the help of diagram 3.2,
adapted from Corden (197lt»;p. 129).







Investment goods are measured along the vertical axis and
the consumption goods along the horizontal axis. AB is the
production possiblities curve which,in the absence of trade
shows real income of the country that is equal to consumption
plus investment. The free trade price ratio is given by the
slope of TT', in which case the country produces at P, and
the absorption point is E. At this point investment is equal
to EF. Free trade income in terms of consumption is OT' and
the propensity to save is FT'/OT'. If, after the tariffs, (or
other trade restrictions which can be expressed as tariff
equivalents) the price ratio (terms of trade) is given by the
slope of RR', the production would shift from P to P'.
Income in terms of consumption falls to OR*. If the proportion
of expenditure between consumption and investment is to stay
constant, the new absorption point E' must lie to the left of
E, so that the propensity to save HR'/OR' = FT'/OT*. It
follows that after the change in the price ratio, consumption
falls, and investment increases - a sort of substitution effect.
We can see from the diagram that if point E' lies exactly above
E, investment would increase even though the expenditure on
consumption in absolute terms is unchanged. The extra amount
of investment would be financed out of improved terms of trade
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between capital goods and consumption goods. The invest¬
ment is likely to rise in real terms, even if the consump¬
tion does not fall and the expenditure on capital goods
decreases somewhat, depending upon the changes in the
domestic price structure.
The question is: will more capital-goods be purchased
at the expense of consumption-goods just because their
relative domestic prices have changed? One possibility is
that the demand for consumption goods is completely inelastic.
When prices of consumption-goods rise, consumers reduce their
savings sufficiently for purchases of consumption goods to
stay constant, and thus the funds available for investment
will be reduced, but the lower prices of capital goods com¬
pensate for this. On balance, the purchase of capital goods
will remain unchanged. Nothing will have changed; real
savings and investment will be the same as before. This is
just the limiting case. People may reduce their savings
somewhat when prices of consumption goods rise, but not so
much as to maintain constant consumption levels. Hence con¬
sumption will fall and investment will rise. The implica¬
tions of such a policy making the imported capital goods
artificially cheap have been brought out by economists such
as McKinnon (1971).
Firstly, cheap capital leads to the use of capital-
intensive techniques and the over-encouragement of capital-
intensive industries. These methods may be suitable for the
factor proportions of developed countries, but are not at all
appropriate for less developed countries with large supplies
of labour, where labour-intensive techniques are needed.
Moreover, as fixed capital is cheap, this leads to waste of
fixed capital in the form of excess capacity.
Secondly, as imported fixed capital is mainly used in
the advanced sector, the investment in the advanced sector
is subsidized, while in the subsistence sector it is not. The
influential industrialists sitting in the cities know the
techniques of extracting import licences from the bureaucracy.
The result is that the nation's scarce savings are diverted
away from the subsistence sector towards the advanced sector.
The subsistence sector becomes excessively labour-intensive
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and remains undeveloped.
Thirdly, high tariffs and import restrictions on
consumption goods provide high levels of protection to
consumer-goods industries, while capital goods industries
remain almost unprotected. This leads to the discourage¬
ment of domestic production of capital goods compared to
the production of consumer goods. That is one of the reasons
why some of the less-developed countries have been slow to
move into the production of capital goods.
3.1.4 Some other arguments.
There are many other arguments which have been put
forth for protecting manufacturing industries in the devel¬
oping countries. These include among others, economies of
scale, the diversification of industries, improving the balance
of payments and self-sufficiency. Self-sufficiency, as dis¬
cussed above, is a non-economic argument, although in practice
it plays a major role in determining the structure of protec¬
tion. The economies of scale argument is essentially an
argument of internal economies. It is argued that in the
developing country, the size of the market is so small that
even the minimum size of an efficient plant cannot be run
at an optimum level of intensity. Thus the costs of produc¬
tion exceed the prices of imports. Therefore, there is a
need to protect or subsidize that industry until the demand
grows to such an extent that capital can be used in an optimum
way. Static economies of scale combined with a moving demand
curve provide no argument for protection as such. It may be
argued that the setting-up of that industry may be postponed
till the market has sufficiently grown, or investment may be
made in a piece-meal manner. The argument for protection can
be made only if there are indivisibilities of investment and
some sort of divergence between social and private benefits.
This may perhaps arise from complementarities between various
industries, in which case the expansion of one will make the
other more profitable, or the setting-up of an industry now
rather than later is socially desirable from the point of
view of externalities. In any case, tariff protection will
not be the first-best policy. In the case of complementarity
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the problem might be that of investment co-ordination and
information. Deliberate co-ordination, consultation,
indicative planning and so on would be the first-best
methods to be used for the purpose.
The argument for diversification of production springs
from the instability of foreign trade and uncertainty about
the future. Most of the developing countries rely upon the
production and export of one or a few primary commodities, the
world demand for which is unstable. The resultant fluctua¬
tions in prices of these commodities may have serious economic
effects for the country, which can be avoided by diversifying the
production and by re-allocating the resources in favour of the
production of commodities with less fluctuations in prices.
Moreover, the popularly held view, that long-term movements of
the commodity terms of trade have been and are expected to
go against the less-developed countries, also calls for
re-allocation of resources out of primary products exports
and into the production of import-competing products. It is
argued that in order to induce this reallocation, protection
is necessary. This argument for intervention assumes that
private decision-makers lack foresight, otherwise they them¬
selves would adjust appropriately. The government or their
planning authorities are better informed, and possess greater
foresight than private individuals, and thus there is a
domestic divergence leading to the misallocation of resources.
First-best policy appears to be to spread better information;
changing present prices through taxes and subsidies would be
second-best, and through tariffs perhaps third-best.
The desire for an improvement in the balance of payments
has led many developing countries to pursue the policy of
protection. If a country is running a balance of payments
deficit, this means that foreign exchange is wrongly-priced
and there is a trade divergence. It may be argued that a
first-best policy would be to raise the price of foreign
exchange appropriately, i.e. to devalue the domestic currency.
Since the divergence is in the price of foreign exchange, the
use of tariffs will not be first-best. A tariff will only
act on the import side, but will fail to stimulate exports.
However, many developing countries are reluctant to devalue
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their currencies. The reasons for this reluctance are many,
including the extreme pessimism about export expansion, the
fear of adding to the inflationary pressures or the devalua¬
tion being interpretted as the failure of the past economic
policies and so a loss of prestige, and so on.
We have summarised above some of the arguments put
forward for protecting manufacturing industry in developing
countries. Pakistan, like many other developing countries,
has used tariffs and other import restrictions (sometimes
coupled with export promotion policies) for protecting the
domestic industry. The ground on which protection was
granted to domestic industry is not at all clear from the
reports of different committees set up by the Government
from time to time. The concern about a deficit in the balance
of payments, however, seems to have played an important role
in this connection, because tariffs and especially quota
restrictions, have been widely used in order to achieve a
balance between foreign exchange availability and the demand
for it.
We turn now to the actual developments in Pakistan's
commercial policy since Independence, and to an analysis of
various instruments of the policies employed for protecting
domestic industry.
3.2 Evolution of Pakistan's Commercial Policy.
The history of Pakistan's commercial policy can be
divided, broadly speaking, into three periods, namely
(1) the period up to 1959, (2) from 1959 to 1972, and
(3) from 1972 onwards, although distinct sub-periods within
these phases are distinguishable on account of changes in
policies or changes in emphasis on policy measures.
The period up to 1959 was, generally, characterised
by direct controls and a bias against exports. Not only
imports were subject to severe controls, but also invest¬
ment, and the prices of some manufactured products were
directly controlled. During the period too much emphasis
seems to have been placed on achieving a reduction of imports
and too little effort seems to have been made to increase
export earnings.
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From 1959 to 1972, concerted efforts were made to
alleviate the bias against exports, which was created by
the over-valuation of the currency. Exports were actively
encouraged through a number of export promotion schemes like
the Export Bonus Scheme, the Export Performance Licensing
Scheme, the Pay-As-You-Earn Scheme, tax rebates and tax
exemptions etc. In May, 1972, the Pakistani Rupee, which
had remained over-valued for a long time, was devalued.
Following the devaluation, the licensing procedures were
significantly simplified and export duties were levied on a
number of commodities in order to mop-up the windfall profits.
The partition of the sub-continent and Pakistan's
emergence as an independent State in 1947 suddenly inter¬
rupted the long-standing channels of domestic trade, which
instead became trade between two unfriendly countries. In
the undivided India, manufactured consumer goods flowed into
the areas that became Pakistan in exchange for agricultural
raw materials and food grains. The precise magnitude and
composition of flows of goods between Pakistan and India
before Partition is not known. However, Rahman (19^3, p.101)
has estimated that in 1948-49 trade with India accounted for
more than 50 per cent of the total foreign trade of West
Pakistan (the present Pakistan), on private account, which
may give a fair indication of the pre-Partition inter-regional
economic relations between Pakistan and India because of the
liberal trade that existed between them until September 1949.
The composition of trade between them may be seen from Table
3.1.
The data in Table 3.1 show that about 63 percent of
imports from India into Pakistan were those of manufactures,
while more than 76 per cent of exports from Pakistan to India
consisted of raw materials. The trade continued to flow
between the two countries with relative ease until the last
quarter of 1949. During this period, Pakistan had adopted a
relatively liberal import policy in order to re-build stocks
of essential consumer goods which had been depleted due to




The composition of Indo-Pakistan Trade in 1949.
(value in Million Rs.)







1. Food, Drink & Tobacco. 157.46 28.54 94.43 15.53
2. Raw materials 47.67 8.64 466.71 76.74
3. Manufactures. 346.62 62.82 47.01 7.73
Total 551.75 100.00 608.15 100.00
Note: These figures are for All-Pakistan (former West Pakistan
plus former East Pakistan).
SOURCE: Rahman, M.A: "Partition, Integration, Economic Growth
and Inter-regional Trade: A Study of Inter-wing Trade
in Pakistan 1948-1959". Karachi, 1963, p.102.
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On September 17th, 1949 the U.K. devalued her currency
by 30.5 per cent. India and other sterling area countries
except Pakistan, followed suit and India devalued her Rupee
to the same extent. Pakistan was the only sterling area
country which decided not to devalue her rupee and maintain
the par value of the Pakistani Rupee, vis-a-vis the U.S.
dollar and other non-devalued currencies. Three distinct
but inter-related reasons seemed to have been at the back of
/g\
Pakistan's decision not to devalue her currency.
1. It was felt that in view of the inelastic supply of
exports from Pakistan and relatively inelastic demand
for imports into Pakistan, the balance of payments was
not likely to improve as a result of devaluation; and
further
2. that the basic balance of payments position did not
give any cause for concern, and that if payments'
pressure did emerge, it could be met to a reasonable
extent by drawing upon the foreign exchange reserves
which in September 1949 were quite large; and finally
3. It was expected that the non-devaluation decision
would have a favourable impact on the internal price
level and that lower import costs in domestic currency
of machinery and other capital goods would provide an
incentive for the much desired industrial growth.
The immediate, and perhaps unexpected result of
Pakistan's non-devaluation decision, was virtually complete
trade dead-lock with India for about eight months until
April 1950, due to the latter's flat refusal to accept the
new parity between the Indian and Pakistani Rupee. Pakistan
was forced to divert trade to countries other than India -
an erstwhile major trade partner. However, the adverse
effects of this trade dead-lock were mitigated to some extent
by the later events like the outbreak of the Korean war in
1950. The period from mid-1950 to mid-1952 witnessed a
tremendous upsurge in world-wide demand for Pakistan's raw
material exports. The scramble for raw materials raised the
(6) Hasan: (1961, pp.19-20).
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prices of exports and resulted in a notable improvement in
Pakistan's terms of trade. Export earnings nearly doubled
in 1950-51 compared to 1949-50, and were well maintained
during 1951-52, although somewhat lower than in the previous
year. ^ The import policy which had remained rather
cautious after October, 1949 was liberalised in June 1950. A
large number of items were placed on the Open General Licence
(O.G.L): these could be imported without any licensing
restrictions. The import policy was further liberalised
during 1951-52, and almost 85 per cent of total private
/ g\
import by value was permitted without licence in that year.
However, this policy of import liberalization did not last
long. After the hostilities of the Korean war diminished,
export prices began to recede and export earnings to diminish.
With diminishing export earnings and a rising value of
imports, the foreign exchange reserves began to drop. The
drain on reserves had become so severe by July 1952 that
the existing O.G.L. was sharply restricted in August and
completely abolished in November, 1952. By September 1952,
deficits in the balance of payments had reduced gold, dollar
and sterling reserves to the lowest level since Partition.
Their further running-down, in view of the highly volatile
nature of Pakistan's foreign exchange earnings, was consid¬
ered extremely undesirable. The Government realized that a
foreign exchange crisis was imminent, and they chose to meet
the crisis by using direct controls on imports. The import
control system which was adopted in 1952 remained the sole
basis of import licensing decisions until 1959, and with
certain modifications until 1972, when the whole procedure of
import licensing was rationalized. The basic strategy of
the import policy adopted after the devaluation of the
Pakistani Rupee in 1972 was to minimise the administrative
controls, to free the economy from procedural bottlenecks,
and to allow market forces to operate freely to determine
(9)
investment and the level of imports. Now we shall discuss
(7) Hassan: (1961) op. cit. p.24.
(8) Andrus and Sohajmnad: (1958). p.264.
(9) Pakistan Economic Survey (1971-72) p.16.
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briefly the mechanics and institutional arrangements of
Pakista:
policy.
i tan's exchange control system and import licensing
(10)
3.2.1 Foreign Exchange Budget.
The exchange-control system of Pakistan regulates
both the inflow and the outflow of foreign exchange.
According to the Foreign Exchange Regulations Act, 1947,
exporters are required to surrender their entire foreign-
exchange earnings to the State Bank of Pakistan at the
official exchange rate Foreign exchange expenditure
is regulated by a high-level Foreign Exchange Committee,
which is charged with preparing the annual Foreign Exchange
Budget, and keeping an eye on the foreign exchange position
of the country throughout the year. The Foreign Exchange
Budget, a secret document, includes a review of the past
and an estimate for the future on both the receipts, as well
as the expenditure sides. The Budget allocates foreign
exchange expenditures among competing uses and users in
accordance with national priorities, and the limited avail¬
ability of foreign exchange resources. Foreign exchange
expenditure is limited by the expected accruals of foreign
exchange during the year, plus the extent, decided by the
Foreign Exchange Committee, to which the foreign exchange
reserves are allowed to run down.
In constructing the expenditure side of the Budget,
the Committee, after allowing for the priority claims like
debt servicing etc., divides the remaining sum between the
public and the private sectors. The allocation to the
public sector is based on estimates of its import require¬
ments, presented to the Foreign Exchange Committee by various
ministries and the semi-public corporations. The committee
(10) The descriptive and analytical work on the working of import control
system in Pakistan has been done by many, among whom are:
1. Naqvi, S.N.H: "Import Licensing in Pakistan" PDR, Spring 1964.
2. Thomas,P.S: "Import Licensing and Import Liberalization in
Pakistan" PDR, Winter 1966.
3. Child,F.C: "Liberalization of the Foreign Exchange Market"
PDR, Summer 1968.
(11) Govt, of Pakistan, Office of the CCI&E:"Manual of Imports and
Exports Control". Rawalpindi, 1964, p.55.
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distributes this allocation along the various ministries
and further specifies how much each ministry can spend on
developmental and non-developmental imports. The estimates
of private-sector import requirements are presented to the
committee by the Ministry of Commerce, and form the basis of
the allocation of foreign exchange to the private-sector.
In the case of the private sector, the Committee does not
specify how much of this allocation is to be spent on develop¬
mental and non-developmental imports. This is left to the
discretion of the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports
(CCI & E) in the Ministry of Commerce. The Foreign Exchange
Budget is approved by the Cabinet, after which the budgeted
foreign exchange expenditure cannot be exceeded without its
prior approval. The actual disbursement of foreign exchange
is done through the Exchange Control Department of the State
Bank of Pakistan. Foreign-aid funds, however, are excluded
from this budgetary process. They fall under the jurisdic¬
tion of the Economic Affairs Division in the President's
Secretariat, which also must divide these resources between
Public and Private uses.
3.2.2 Import Licensing.
As Thomas (1966) has pointed out, there are basically
three systems of exchange control in Pakistan, viz. Govern¬
ment imports, imports of capital goods in the private sector
and imports of consumer goods, raw materials and spare parts
for industries in the private sector. The Government imports
are determined as a part of the budgetary process, as noted
above. The imports of capital goods for industrial expansion
in the private sector are determined as part of the broader
industrial policy of the country, and are controlled by the
investment sanctioning procedures. Whereas in the case of
Government imports and the imports of capital goods in the
private sector the licensing procedures have not changed
significantly over time, there have been significant changes
in the licensing procedures for the imports of consumer goods,
industrial raw materials and spare parts in the private sector.
Almost every import in the private sector requires a
licence issued by the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports
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(CCI&E), in the Ministry of Commerce. Broadly speaking,
prior to the devaluation of the Pakistani Rupee in 1972,
there were two types of licences, viz. 'Commercial licences'
and Industrial licences'. The commercial licences were
issued to the importers, who acting as middlemen, generally
re-sold the imported commodities without further processing
in the domestic market, while industrial licences were issued
to the manufacturers for the import of spare parts and raw
materials exclusively for their own use. In both cases,
one licensing decision by the CCI & E determined simultan¬
eously which commodities were to be imported, in what quanti¬
ties, by whom, and sometimes also from which source. The
task of issuing the commercial licences to the 'eligible
importers' from a large number of potential importers was
carried out by the adoption of a 'rule of thumb'. Those
importers who had an import performance to their credit
during the period of July 1950 to November 1952, when there
was essentially free-importing under the O.G.L. system, were
made 'eligible' importers and were known as 'category holders'.
A category was, in essence, a unit of account, and was based
on the average value of imports of a particular commodity
by an importer during the five shipping periods of 1950-52.
One importer, however, could have more than one category if
he had imported more than one commodity during that base-
period. The actual value of each licence was expressed as
a percentage of the category, which reflected the 'essential¬
ity' of the commodity and liberal or stringent nature of the
Import Policy subject to the amount of foreign exchange
earmarked in the Foreign Exchange Budget for the private
sector.
The 'Industrial licences' for importing raw materials
and spare parts were not issued to all firms. They were
issued only to 'recognised' industrial units, which had been
set-up under proper sanction of the Government. The CCI & E
relied on the Provincial Directorates of Industries for
deciding upon the eligible industrial importers and for
determining what industrial goods in what quantities were to
be imported. The Directorates assigned a quota or entitlement
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based on the installed capacity of the manufacturing enter¬
prise, signifying that the 'quota-holder' was an eligible
importer. In addition, the Directorates issued an 'assess¬
ment certificate' indicating the 'requirements' of raw
materials and spare parts of an industrial unit on a single-
shift basis. These certificates were based on the survey of
Industrial Units undertaken regularly by the Directorates,
and were expressed as a percentage of the industrial importer's
quota/entitlement. The CCI & E then issued industrial
licences called 'regular industrial licences' largely on the
basis of these assessment certificates. It may be noted here
that, unlike categories which had not been increased, the
creation of quotas/entitlements was a continuing process. New
quotas/entitlements were created on the basis of the Survey
of Industrial Units and the installation of properly sanctioned
new industrial capacity. The creation of new capacity and the
balancing and modernization of the existing industries was
sanctioned by the Central Permissions Committee (since 1964
replaced by the Central Investment Promotion and Co-ordinating
Committee) in the Ministry of Industries. Once approved by
the investment sanctioning authorities, the industrial
licences for importing machinery for new industrial capacity
or balancing and moderni zation were automatically issued by
the CCI & E. Similarly, a loan from the Pakistan Industrial
Credit and Investment Corporation (PICIC) or from Industrial
Development Bank of Pakistan (IDBP) for establishing a new
industry,or adding to an existing one, resulted in the automatic
issuance of a licence by the CCI & E.
The relaxation of the strict rigidites of import control
system and a move towards 'import liberalization' began in
1959 with the introduction of the Export Bonus Scheme.
Further moves towards 'liberalization' were made in the
coming years with the adoption of a new open General Licence
(New O.G.L.) system, and the introduction of Repeat/Automatic
Licensing, Export Performance Licensing and the Free List.
These measures are discussed briefly below:
(i) Imports under Bonus and Cash-cum-Bonus.
We shall discuss the Export Bonus Scheme in more detail
in the next chapter. Here, let it suffice to say that the
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Export Bonus Scheme allowed some imports into the country
without the cover of a licence. The exporters of specified
commodities were given the bonus vouchers equivalent to a
certain percentage of the export proceeds. As import
licences (from a specified list of imports) were automati¬
cally issued against these vouchers, they allowed more
imports of consumer goods, spare parts and raw materials
permitted in the list.
A cash-cum-bonus procedure, established in 1967, was
a compromise between a bonus voucher system and an ordinary
licensing scheme. Under this arrangement, the importers
could obtain licences only when their applications were
accompanied by bonus vouchers covering 50 per cent of their
exchange requirements. Both bonus and cash-cum-bonus imports,
however, introduced an element of market mechanism into
import trade.
(11) Open General Licence (O.G.L.)
The O.G.L. system, suspended in 1952, was re-introduced
in 1961. The purpose of the new O.G.L. was to allow the
newcomers (i.e. those who had not been importers during the
1950-52 period) into the import trade, and especially to
encourage new importers from regions of the country where
there were no (or few) importers during the 1950-52 base-
period. The new O.G.L., however, was much more restricted
than the old O.G.L., as no 'category holder' with categories
in excess of a certain amount or 'entitlement holder' could
apply for the licence, no importer located in Karachi or
Lahore could apply for the licence and the eligible importers
(12)
under the new O.G.L. had to comply with several formalities.
(12) The importer under the new OGL had to get himself registered with the
appropriate Licensing Authority before the issue of licence. He had to
apply for registration on a prescribed form by a certain deadline and
had to satisfy the Authority that:
i) he was a resident national of Pakistan,
ii) he was a dealer in the commodity,
iii) he had a proper and independent place of business,
iv) he was registered with the Income-Tax Authorities,
v) he was not a proprietor or partner/shareholder of any other
firm getting any licence, and
vi) if he was an importer, the aggregate of his categories did not
exceed the specified limit.
'Manual of Imports & Exports Control' (1964, pp.24-25).
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It was hoped that the new system would bring the domestic
prices of imported goods down by breaking the monopoly of
the 'category holders' and by promoting greater competi¬
tion and efficiency in the import trade.
Since the amount of foreign exchange allocated for
imports remained more or less the same, and the licences
issued to the new firms did not exceed ten per-cent of the
value of imports covered by Commercial licences, the
domestic prices of imported goods did not fall. It appears,
as Naqvi (1964) has pointed out, that the re-introduction
of the O.G.L. probably reduced the profits of the established
importers, shared them more widely, and achieved a wider
regional distribution of import licences.
(iii) Repeat/Automatic Licensing System.
The Repeat/Automatic Licensing System was introduced
in 1961 for certain commodities importable under either
commercial or industrial licences. Any importer, who had
utilized his first licence for the shipping period before
the end of that period, could make a request for the repeat
licence. A new licence equalling the value of the original
licence was automatically issued to him if he had provided
the evidence that he had utilized the first licence, and if
the foreign exchange was available for the remainder of the
shipping period.
In 1962, 'request' licencing was introduced in order
to encourage certain industries with an export performance
or an export potential. Certain specified industries were
allowed to import raw materials and spare parts to be used
by the industries themselves, over and above their entitle¬
ments under normal licensing. The actual value of the
imports permissible depended upon the industries' export
performance. We shall discuss this in detail in the next
chapter.
iv) Free List.
The "Free List", introduced in January 1964, permitted
the import of some essential raw materials like iron and
(16) Naqvi: (1964), Op.cit. p.61.
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steel from the U.S. under aid agreements without cover of
a licence and with minimum administrative controls. This
was a major step forward towards 'import liberalization'.
In the import policy of January to June 1964, four items of
iron and steel were placed on the Free List; fifty more
items were allowed on this list in the following six months,
and in January 1965 another four items were added to the list.
However, this trend could not be maintained, particularly
after the war with India in September 1965, following which
'aid' to Pakistan was suspended. The number of items on
the Free List was reduced and various restrictions on some
items of imports were imposed. Child (1968) remarked that
the free list was free in name only. In 1968, of the fourteen
items on the list, two were importable by the public sector
only, five by industrial users only, and commercial imports
were subject to various restrictions such as the minimum and
maximum size of individual orders of goods of each type, the
country of origin and the destination within Pakistan.
Although the free list was much less free in the second half
of the sixties than in 1964 and 1965, it has remained a part
of the import control system of Pakistan.
In spite of the efforts for import liberalization
briefly described above, the import control system of
Pakistan had become very comprehensive, complex and discrim¬
inatory over the years. The bonus-voucher segment of
foreign exchange had been expanded gradually, which had
created a system of multiple exchange rates. The existence
of several import procedures, coupled with administrative
controls, was creating distortions of the allocation of
resources and growth of the industry. Above all, the separa¬
tion of East Pakistan from the western wing in 1971 brought
about serious disruptions in the pattern of trade of West
Pakistan. To overcome these problems, Pakistan devalued
her Rupee by about 56.7 per cent in May 1972, and the Export
Bonus Scheme was liquidated. Following the devaluation, the
import control system was revised. The basic strategy of the
new system was to minimise the administrative controls.
Since then, the system of categories and entitlements has been
abolished; the distinction between commercial and industrial
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importers, and between recognised and non-recognised units
has been discarded. An import licence would be issued
freely to any Pakistani on registration. There are only
two lists, i.e. free list and tied list - the free list
for cash foreign exchange, and the tied list for tied
credits and barter. There is, of course, a "banned list",
the commodities of which cannot be imported into Pakistan.
The procedures for the import of permitted commodities have
been simplified, and many other restrictions have been
removed. For example, the machinery for balancing and
modernization within specified limits and for new capacity
creation up to a certain value can be imported freely. These
measures have changed the nature of the whole import licen¬
sing system in Pakistan.
3.2.3 Tariff Policy.
The policy on tariffs (i.e. import duties plus sales
taxes) is another tool of commercial policy used to provide
protection to the import-competing industries. In Pakistan,
tariffs have been used to help control import composition and
to encourage the domestic production of specified import
subsitututes. The import duties are usually ad valorem,
whereas sales tax is levied at a flat-rate on the landed
cost of imports (C.I.F. import price plus import duties).
The Economic Appraisal Committee (1953) favoured protection
to the manufacturing industries through the cascaded tariff
structure which involves lower tariffs on intermediate and
capital goods, and higher tariff duties on consumption goods.
Although the Committee preferred protection through tariffs
under normal circumstances, yet in view of the then foreign
exchange situation, it recommended the use of quantitative
restrictions. The quantitative restrictions, which were
imposed in 1952 after the short fall in export earnings,
existed even before the Committee's report, and the Committee
in fact endorsed them. It may be noted, however, that in the
presence of excess demand for foreign exchange and severe
quantitative restrictions on imports, the tariffs (unless
they are raised to sufficient levels to take over the ration¬
ing of imports from import licensing) become superfluous as
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far as their protective effects are concerned. Thus the
tariffs were only used to divert a part of the importer's
profits to the government revenue. The general pattern of
tariffs and the changes in them over time, may be seen from
Table 3.2.
Table 3.2 shows that the lowest tariffs were levied
on the import of machinery and equipment; they were higher
on raw materials and the highest on consumer goods, parti¬
cularly on luxuries and semi-luxuries. The trend in tariff
rates has been that of increasing over time, and the differ¬
entiation has also increased over time.
3.3 The Structure of Protection.
The manufacturing sector in Pakistan has enjoyed a
continued high level of protection for more than two decades.
The cascaded tariff structure and the system of import
licensing, discussed in the previous sections, have provided
protection to the manufacturing sector since 1952. The
tariffs and quantitative restrictions on imports were imposed
in 1952 in view of the foreign exchange difficulties, and not
(17)
to protect the industries as such, but since then they
have afforded a powerful impetus to the domestic industry.
There are many ways of analysing the structure of protection
in a country. The average level of tariffs is one apparent
measure of protection. In the absence of monopoly and other
restrictions on the free movement of goods, the domestic
prices of import-competing goods would be equal to the prices
of imports. The tariffs would raise the domestic prices of
imports and would provide protection to the import-competing
industries. However, if there are domestic indirect taxes
on production, they will offset the tariff protection to
that extent. If we deduct the domestic indirect taxes from
the tariff rate, we can arrive at a measure of 'nominal tariff
protection'. The 'nominal tariff protection' may be defined
as the percentage excess of domestic prices over the world
market prices of a commodity, resulting from the imposition
(17) Andrus & Mohammed (1958), p.169.
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of tariffs. The 'nominal tariff protection' may differ from
'effective tariff protection'. The latter is protection
to the value added in an industry which takes into account
both the tariffs on the inputs into the good, and the tariffs
on the good itself, and may be defined as the percentage
excess of value added at domestic prices over the value
added at world prices of an activity or process resulting
from the different tariffs on both the output and the inputs.
The reasons for using effective rather than nominal protection
generally are (1) it takes account of tariffs on inputs
which may offset or accentuate the nominal protection, and
(2) the low nominal protection may still result in high
effective protection in industries with extremely low value
added. Lewis (1969) calculated all three measures of pro¬
tection afforded by tariffs from 1954-55 and 1963-64. These
are given in Table 3.3.
The rates of average tariff and 'nominal protection'
given in Table 3.3 indicate that the average level of pro¬
tection afforded by tariffs increased over time and that
there was an increase in the differential protection between
the intermediate and consumption goods as well over the
period considered. If we ignore the investment and related
goods, the figures for effective protection attribute more
than two-thirds of value added, on average, of consumption
and intermediate goods to tariff protection. Averages,
however, hide a considerable part of the inter- and intra-
industry variations in the level of protection which were
found in both the periods considered. Nevertheless, these
figures are suggestive and are indicative of the high levels
of protection which the tariff structure provided for manu¬
facturing industries in Pakistan.
Tariffs would measure the level of protection only if
they were the main determinant of the level of imports and
the domestic prices of imports. In Pakistan, as discussed
in the section on import licensing, the quantitative restric¬
tions rather than the tariffs were the binding constraints
on imports in most of the cases. In that situation, although
tariffs did play some role, they were not the main determin¬
ant of domestic prices of imports, which were primarily
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influenced by the quantitative restrictions of the import
licensing system. Pal (1964,1965) and Alamgir (1968) have
made comparisons of domestic wholesale prices and landed
costs (CIF price plus tariffs duty plus sales tax plus
minor charges such as clearing charge, licence fee,
wharfage charge etc.) of imported commodities for the periods
June - August 1964, October 1964 - January 1965 and November
1966 - February 1967. They estimated the scarcity premia -
the excess of domestic wholesale prices over the landed
costs of imports - which are given in Table 3.4.
The average mark-ups shown in Table 3.4 give an approx¬
imate idea of the extent to which the licensing system
affected the domestic prices of imports. The average mark-up
for all the imports studied was 43 per cent, and 40.8 per cent
in 1964-65 and 1966-67 respectively, which means that the
domestic prices of those commodities exceeded their full
duty-paid value at the official exchange rate by approx¬
imately 40 per cent in the mid-sixties. In such a case,
the use of an average tariff as a measure of protection
would under-estimate the extent of protection. Moreover,
the average mark-up, which in 1964-65 was about 48 per cent
for consumption goods, 38 per cent for intermediate goods
and 40 per cent for investment and related goods, decreased
to about 31 per cent in the case of consumption goods but
increased to about 50 and 44 per cent for intermediate and
investment and related goods respectively in 1966-67. From
this, it appears that the relatively low protection implied
by the tariff structure for intermediate and capital goods
was offset to some extent by the licensing system. On the
basis of data in Table 3.4, it can be said that the licensing
system created protection to the import competing activities
in addition to the one suggested by tariffs alone, and
improved greatly the competitive postion of intermediate and
capital goods. Whatever measure of protection is considered,
the conclusion is that the manufacturing sector in Pakistan
was afforded a high level of protection which favoured invest¬




Average Percentage Mark-ups on imported commodities
in Pakistan.
Dec.1964-Feb.1965 Nov.1966-Feb.1967
A. Consumption Goods. oo H* 30.8
1. Licensed items 58.0 36 .2
2. Free List items 21.4 17.5
3. Bonus List items. 7.2 10.1
B. Intermediate Goods. 38.0 49.9
1. Licensed items 52.8 55.7
2. Free List items 34.0 49.6
3. Bonus List items. — 17.6
C. Capital Goods. 40.1 44.2
1. Licensed items 62.1 84.9
2. Free List items 27.4 33.7
3. Bonus List items. — 18.9
D. Total. 43.0 40.8
Notes: (a) Mark-up or Scarcity premium calculated as
Domestic Price - Landed Cost
0 Landed Cost.
(1) Price of bonus voucher of Rs 100 worth of foreign exchange
assumed to equal Rs 150.
SOURCE: Based on Alamgir (1968), Table I, p.44.
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CHAPTER IV
EXPORT PROMOTION SCHEMES OF PAKISTAN.
Pakistan like many other less developed countries
adopted a policy of Import Substitution (IS) in the 1950s,
for which there may have been many reasons.
In view of the relative backwardness in her manufac¬
turing industry at the time of Independence, such a policy
may have been considered as a means of achieving a faster
rate of economic growth. The planners noted in the First
Five Year Plan that industrialization was perhaps the most
significant process in economic development and the purpose
of economic development, in the circumstances of the country,
was to complete as rapidly as possible the transition from
feudalism to industrialism.^ The Government officials may
have felt that the principal constraint on development was
the inability of potential domestic investors, due to their
lack of industrial experience, to decide where to invest, with
the consequence that they would consume rather than invest.
As imports were proof of a domestic market, an IS policy by
restricting imports or totally shutting them out, could induce
people to make their investment decisions. Andrus and
(2)
Mohammed (1958) have pointed out that the use of import
policy for promoting industrial development was not deliber¬
ately undertaken by the government in the earlier years, but
after the foreign exchange difficulties of 1952, it became
the most powerful factor in the rapid growth of industry.
Secondly, the export pessimism of the inter-war period
had lasted well into the 1950s. It was widely believed that
the supply-price elasticity of exportables in less developed
countries, a domestic parameter, was very low, because of
institutional rigidities in the case of rural exportables or
because of the difficulties of entry or quality in the case of non-
traditional manufactured goods. Moreover, both income and
price elasticities of the foreign demand for less developed
countries' exports were considered to be very low. Engel's
Law, synthetics etc. were the key code words. The belief that
the country's potential exports faced a dismal future, regard-
(1) Government of Pakistan, "First-Five Year Plan", p.395.
(2) Andrus and Mohammde (1958, p.169).
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less of what policies it adopted, may have forced the
country to economise on its future use of foreign exchange
and so to adopt the policy of IS.
Finally, after 'political independence' in 1947, the
desire for 'economic independence' made IS perhaps an
objective per se.
Whatever be the reasons, Pakistan adopted the policy
of IS in the early 1950's, particularly after 1952, when
foreign exchange difficulties became acute. Tariffs,
quantitative restrictions and currency over-valuation were
used as tools of 'inward-looking' policies of economic
development. The policies of tariffs and import-licensing
provided a high level of protection of the manufacturing
sector. The process of IS through policies of protection
and currency over-valuation without corresponding export
promotional policies involves a discouragement of the
expansion of exports. How does it discourage exports?
Firstly, it increases the relative returns from
investment and production in the import-substituting
industries compared to that in the export expanding acti¬
vities. In the protected domestic market, demand is likely
to be excessive relative to the supply. The domestic prices
of importables and so of import- substitutes would be higher
than world prices, making the domestic market and production
for the domestic market more profitable.
Secondly, the costs of the imported inputs for use in
the export industries or activities go up insofar as the
restrictions and tariffs on the imports designed to encourage
the import substitution raise their domestic prices. When a
potential exporter makes -use of an input which has paid an
import tax, his costs of production increase and he is at a
disadvantage compared with a manufacturer in the country
which supplies that input or where the import tax is lower.
On the other hand, if he uses an input supplied by the pro¬
tected domestic supplefcr, the exporter is equally at a disad¬
vantage, because domestically produced inputs which replace
imported inputs will certainly be sold at a price higher
than the import price without tariffs.
Thirdly, the import-substituting industries, earning
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high profits in the sheltered and protected domestic market
bid up such factor prices as the level of urban wages, often
considerably above the opportunity cost of labour. This is
partly facilitated and reinforced by the social welfare
legislation of the government and the pressure of trade
unionism in the industry. Export industries thus face an
increasing cost of labour and an increase in total costs.
Fourthly, the rate of exchange under protection will
be higher (i.e. fewer units of domestic currency will be
exchanged for a unit of foreign currency) than it would be if
trade were free. The exporter will get less domestic currency
at the official rate of exchange for a given quantity of
exports than he would if there were no protection and trade
were free. Exports abroad thus involve a surrender of sales
from the highly profitable domestic market to the less profit¬
able foreign market. This reduces the profitability of
exporting and in many cases contributes to an 'Inefficiency
Illusion' - a feeling that domestic production costs exceed
world prices and that the domestic industry would therefore
be unable to compete in the world market - which hampers the
exploitation of even existing export opportunities.
Finally, import substitution policies, which include
low or zero tariffs on imports of capital equipment, when
combined with relatively high industrial wages, may encourage
the establishment of capital-intensive industries or the
use of capital-intensive techniques which are simply not
suited to a particular country or its particular stage of
development. The resulting technical and managerial ineffi-
ciences, under-utilized capacity and lack of flexibility and
adaptability even in the industries in which the country has a
fundamental comparative advantage may all inhibit the develop¬
ment of export markets.
The bias of IS policy against the export sector can
be overcome by devaluing the exchange rate and removing import
controls and tariffs. However, reducing tariffs and disman¬
tling import controls is usually not considered politically
feasible in many less developed countries, and in some cases
a devaluation policy is ruled out. The revenus from
tariffs, the belief in some countries that civil servants
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are more competent than businessmen, the vested interests
of some civil servants and businessmen in perpetuating a
system of direct controls and a general psychological dis¬
comfort with devaluation in many less developed countries
might be some of the reasons for reluctance to use the
market place to allocate resources. One may add to the
list that there may be a conflict between political cohesion
and economic efficiency. In a purely competitive model the
market place gives all resources to the most efficient
producer (or region), while direct controls allow a compro¬
mise allocation. People who must continue living together
may prefer a compromise situation to a "winner-takes-all"
situation. Consequently, in the late 1950's and early
1960's many developing countries, including Pakistan, opted
for a more pragmatic approach by implementing various com¬
binations of export promotion measures, sometimes combined
with periodic devaluations along with the IS policy. The
term "export promotion measures" is vague and so varied
that it has included all those measures which increase the
gross receipts from exports (like the Export Bonus Scheme)
or reduce the exporter's costs (like drawback or custom
duties exemptions on inputs) on the one extreme, to informa¬
tion, marketing and establishment of export promotion organ¬
izations on the other. For instance, the following measures
have been listed under Pakistan's export promotion measures:-
a) Export Bonus Scheme.
b) Export Performance Licensing Scheme.
c) Export credit Guarantee Scheme.
d) "Tax holidays" for a period of 2 to 6 years for those
export industries which export at least 30 per cent of
their production.
e) Exemption of exports from excise duty, sales tax etc.,
and refund of customs duties, excise duty etc. on raw
materials used as inputs for manufactured goods exported.
f) Trade Agreements.
g) Export Promotion Bureau which, besides co-ordinating the
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activities of the exporters and. foreign demand, provides
the following services:
(i) Export information and Advisory Centre.
(ii) Commercial intelligence.
h) Export market Development Fund, which assists in finan¬
cing the
(i) Trade Fairs/exhibitions, (ii) Export Publicity.
(iii) Sending/Receiving Trade delegations.
(iv) Design Centres.
(v) Training and Research in export marketing.
(vi) Seminars.
(vii) Miscellaneous activities like market surveys
abroad for specific products and consultants'
services.
i) Standardization and grading of certain exportables.
j) Fixing of overall export targets and their distribution,
both country and commodity-wise, among individual units.
k) Pay-As-You Earn Scheme.
1) Concessional Railway freight rates on some export
commodities.
m) Discounting of export bills at a rate 1 per cent beneath
the ordinary discount rate.
(3)
n) Special credit facilities etc.
The alternative term 'export incentives' is also vague.
In the situation of an over-valued exchange rate and quanti¬
tative restrictions on imports when there is a bias against
exports, many export incentives may actually offset the
unfavourable effects of these policies on exports. However,
if these export promotional measures encourage exports over
and above the correction of over-valuation of the exchange
rate, they may be called positive export incentives.Whether
(3) Pakistan Economic Survey (1970-71, pp. 106 - 113) , and Hufbauer
(1971, p.66).
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these incentives are positive incentives or merely offsets
to disincentives, insofar as they affect the exporters
profits in some sense and encourage exports (otherwise they
could not be called incentives), their analysis is important
and deserves attention. Estimates of how effective the
existing or the planned level and structure of incentives
is, and how relative incentives vary among industries may help
policy-makers to formulate policies for the export vs. the
domestic market. Since we want to incorporate them into a
quantitative measure of effective exchange rates for exports
later, a brief summary of the structure and operation of the
major schemes is given below.
4.1 Export Promotion Attempts before 1959.
Several measures were taken to promote exports from
Pakistan even before 1959. In 1952 the Export Promotion
Committee recommended the improvement of infra-structure
facilities for exporters at home and systematic publicity
for the country's exports abroad. Bilateral and barter
trade agreements were entered into, rebates on customs duties
paid on raw materials used in manufactures for export were
allowed, and the process of freeing exports from controls
was accelerated.
Bilateral and barter trade agreements were perhaps
used as the earliest means of promoting exports. Barter
agreements were entered into for the first time in 1952 with
the U.S.S.R. Since then, such agreements have been the rule
in dealing with the Communist Bloc countries, although some
agreements have been negotiated from time to time with
countries outside the communist bloc as well. These agree¬
ments generally incorporated target quantities to be licensed
for export, but with no guarantee that the stipulated quanti¬
ties would in fact be shipped. Quite often large gaps
remained between the prescribed targets and actual export
performance. Primary commodities, especially cotton, appeared
prominently as exports from Pakistan in most of the agreements,
although a major objective had always been to introduce
relatively less-known exports to foreign markets. The magni-
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tude of bilateral, and barter trading has been small and
(4)
did not cover more than 2 per cent in 1965.
As industrialization proceeded, some measures were
taken to encourage the exports of manufactured goods.
Stringent import controls were hampering the import of
essential goods for exporters. For the first time,in July
1954, import privileges were linked to export performance
and an Export Incentive Scheme was introduced. Under this
scheme, the exporters of selected minor commodities (other
than cotton, hides and skins etc.) were entitled to receive
import licences worth 15 to 40 per cent of their export
earnings for importing essential goods. However, the scheme
was restricted in scope and covered less than 1 per cent of
total exports in 1957.^
Finally, export control was steadily removed. The
number of freely exportable commodities increased from 38
at the end of 1952 to 357 at the end of 1956. In January,
1959 export control was lifted altogether, except for a small
number of items considered essential for the economy, the
( g \
export of which was restricted or prohibited.
(4) Andrus and Mohammed (1966, p.36).
(5) Andrus and Mohammed (1958, p.271, 277).
(6) Prohibited items of export or items which required an export licence
or permit were:-
(i) All imported goods in their original or unprocessed forms.
(ii) Ferrous and non-ferrous metals, (iii) Petroleum & petroleum products.
(iv) Oil seeds except castor seeds and edible oils.
(v) Jute seeds, sann hemp seeds and artemisia seeds.
(vi) Chillies, garlic, ginger, onions and pepper, (vii) Grain and flour,
(viii) pulses, potatoes and red beans, (ix) Milk and milk products.
(x) Sugar, gur and jaggery powder, (xi) Bran fodder and pollards
except oil-cakes.
(xii) Animals living-all sorts except monkeys and thoroughbred race
horses both subject to certain specified conditions.
(xiii) Arms and ammunition and explosives and ingredients thereof.
(xiv) Cement. (xv) Maps. (xvi) Fissionable materials.
(xvii) Beef and muttons, all forms, and animal fat.
(xviii) Specified sports goods and surgical instruments subject to price,
quality etc. conditions.
(xix) Charcoal and firewood. (xx) Coconuts and copra.
SOURCE:- Government of Pakistan, "Manual of Imports and Exports
Control". (1964, pp.147-153).
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4.2 Export Incentives Since 1959 - The Export Bonus Scheme.
It was not until 1959 that export expansion became
a major objective of Pakistan's commercial policy. In
January 1959, the Government introduced the Export Bonus
Scheme, which replaced all previous devices for promoting
exports. The recommendation of Dr. W.Vocke, a German
advisor to the Pakistan government during late 1958, played
a vital role behind the introduction of this scheme. This
scheme provided a mechanism for transferring a portion of
the profits of import trade to the export sector through a
market. It subsidized exports of selected goods at the
expense of the importers in order to secure a greater
exportable surplus at an unchanged official rate of exchange.
The scheme combined in one measure a relaxation of exchange
control, a parti al devaluation, and the establishment of
a partial flexible multiple exchange rate.
Under this scheme, exporters of specified commodities
(initially excluding traditional primary commodities, namely
raw cotton, hides and skins, rice excluding superior varieties
i.e. Basmati, Parmal and Begami and raw wool), in addition to
the amount of rupees converted at the official exchange rate,
were issued a certificate called a 'Bonus Voucher' up to a
specified percentage of their export proceeds (F.O.B. value).
The voucher was a ration coupon honoured byfk-e-State Bank of
Pakistan for obtaining foreign exchange to import a wide
range of goods allowed on the bonus import list. The exporter
himself could use that voucher to purchase imports present
on the bonus import list, or he could sell it in an organised
market because the voucher was negotiable and transferable.
In view of the scarcity of foreign exchange, the voucher
could be sold at a price determined by the market, commonly
called a 'Premium'. Thus for an exporter who sold his vouchers
in the market, total earnings from his exports were equal to
the rupee equivalent at the official exchange rate of the price
the foreign importer paid plus the amount he received for the
voucher.
An example may be helpful at this point.
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A Pakistani exporter sold goods abroad and earned the
equivalent of (say) Rs. 100 in foreign exchange. In com¬
pliance with the foreign exchange regulations of the country,
this foreign exchange was immediately sold to the State
Bank of Pakistan at the official exchange rate. The exporter
received Rs. 100 as well as a voucher equal to some specified
percentage (depending on the commodity exported) of the amount
earned which entitled its owner to purchase foreign exchange.
Assuming that the Bonus rate was 20 per cent, the premium on
Bonus vouchers was 150 per cent and the exporter sold the
Bonus voucher in the market, his total receipts from exports
would become 100+ 100 (20%) (150%) = Rs 130, or 30 per cent
more than at the official exchange rate. In symbols:-
R. = P.(l + bp), where
1 1
R. = total receipts from exports of commodity j,
1
P. = Price in rupees paid by the foreign importer
J
(at the official exchange rate),
b = Per cent of P. earned as a voucher, and
J
p = Premium expressed as a % age of the amount of
foreign exchange that the voucher entitled one
to purchase.
The rate of subsidy involved in this scheme could easily
be computed on any item, since it was the Bonus rate for
that item times the Premium at which Bonus vouchers were sold.
This subsidy would, in turn, raise the domestic price of
exports (unless the domestic supply curve of that export
was perfectly elastic), and would also tend to increase the
profitability of exporting for the individual manufacturer.
The higher domestic price would reduce domestic consumption
of the export goods (unless the domestic demand curve for
those goods was completely inelastic) and induce greater invest¬
ment in export industries, each effect tending to increase
the exportable surplus.
On the import side, the purchaser of a voucher worth
Rs. 100 paid Rs. 150 for the voucher, which means he paid
Rs. 150 for the right to purchase Rs. 100 worth of foreign
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exchange. He must then pay the Rs. 100 necessary to buy
the foreign exchange. He therefore paid Rs. 250 for Rs.100
worth of foreign exchange valued at the official rate of
exchange, or two-and-a-half times the official rate.
Implicit in this scheme was also an element of protection
to the domestic industry. Since the premium increased the
price of foreign exchange for bonus imports or raised their
domestic prices above the CIF prices at the official exchange
rate (if there were no tariffs and additional restrictions
on their import) by the extent of the premium, in effect, it
afforded protection to their domestic production to that
extent.
The Export Bonus Scheme had been modified continuously
with respect to (a) rates of bonus available to various
items,, (b) coverage, (c) timing of surrender of vouchers,
(d) composition of items importable under the scheme, and
(e) percentage of bonus surrendered for imports.
4.2.1 Rate Structure.
Originally there were two bonus rates, i.e. 40 per
cent of F 0 B value for fully manufactured goods excluding cotton
manufactures and 20 per cent of FOB value for all other items
entitled for bonus including cotton manufactures and cotton
yarn. The 20 per cent rate was also applied to net foreign
exchange earnings from certain service industries: air-craft
repairs, salvage operations,, ships repairs, shipping and
later from Feb. 1960, the hotel industry. The official word¬
ing of the announcement contained an element of ambiguity in
terms of defining exports as belonging to one group or the
other. The general tendency on the part of exporters was to
claim the highest possible amount of manufactured value-added
in the hope of qualifying for the higher bonus rate. In
order to clarify the situation, on Dec. 9th 1959, the Govern¬
ment announced a comprehensive list of export items (initially
(7)
containing 558 items) eligible for bonus and their respec¬
tive rates. The list remained open to modifications and
(7) Government of Pakistan, "The Budget (1960-61)", p.52.
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additions and in a way represented a listing of potential
export products of Pakistan. Over the years attempts were
made to adjust these arbitrarily set rates to the competi¬
tive capacity of the individual items or specific demand
and supply constraints (or influences brought to bear by
pressure groups). As a result, the rate structure proli¬
ferated and by the beginning of 1964, the number of rates
admissible under the Bonus Scheme had increased to six, i.e.
10, 15, 20, 30, 35 and 40 per cent (or seven including zero
per cent for commodities not entitled to any bonus). A list
of items entitled to the bonus with their respective rates
as they stood in the beginning of 1964 is reproduced in
Appendix (B). Naturally, this large number of admissible
rates complicated the operation of the scheme and, what was
more serious, encouraged even more appeals for special treat¬
ment. To end this state of affairs, the Government on June
12th 1964 rationalised the whole rate structure and allowed
only two rates, viz. 20 per cent to all items which previously
earned 20 per cent or less, and 30 per cent to all other
items previously earning more than 20 per cent.
These two rates of 20 per cent and 30 per cent remained
essentially unaltered (except for minor adjustment for some
items) until November 1967, when the U.K. devalued the Pound
Sterling by about 14.3 per cent. Pakistan once again decided
not to devalue her Rupee. Instead the structure of the
already operating Bonus Scheme was used to maintain the com¬
petitive position of Pakistan's exports. Consequently, with
effect from November 22nd 1967, the following changes in the
Bonus Scheme were announced:-
(i) a 10 per cent additional bonus for all goods and
invisible export earnings already eligible for bonus,
(ii) the introduction of a 20 per cent bonus on the export
of raw wool for the first time since the inception of
the Export Bonus Scheme in January 1959.
(iii) the abolition of export duty on raw cotton.
The rate structure evolved in 1967 stayed basically
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unchanged for almost the next two-and-a-half years, although
some less significant adjustments were also made. For
example, in 1968 (since 20th July 1968) pickled hides and
skins, garlic, onions, pulses of all sorts, red beans, rice
bran and husk, wheat bran, guar meal and some seeds, were
removed from the bonus list, and the bonus rate for tanned
leather was reduced from 40 per cent to 30 per cent. Besides
such minor adjustments, no significant changes were made in the
1967 rate Structure of the Bonus Scheme until July 1970. By
that time wide-spread internal disturbances, labour unrest
and political tensions had exerted extraordinary strains on
the economy, and created foreign exchange difficulties.
As a result, the following measures were announced on July
10th 1970:-
(i) A bonus of 10 per cent was allowed, for the first time
since the introduction of the scheme in January 1959, on
the export of major primary commodities, namely raw
cotton, hides and skins, rice or any other commodity
on which so far it had not been applied.
(ii) The bonus on the export of raw wool was reduced from
the existing rate of 20 per cent to 10 per cent.
(iii) The existing bonus rates of 30 per cent and 40 per cent
were each raised by 5 percentage points to become 35
per cent and 45 per cent respectively.
(iv) A bonus rate of 10 per cent was made applicable to
the net foreign exchange earnings from some service
industries (aircraft repairs, salvage operations and
ship repairs), while earnings from shipping remained
entitled to a 45 per cent bonus.
The period of a couple of years or so after these
changes in rates was marked by chaos and instability in the
economy. Although there was relative stability in the rate
structure of the bonus scheme, several other changes were
made to it. However, after the severance of inter-wing ties
in 1971, the problem became one of enormous proportions,
probably beyond the scope of the Export Bonus Scheme. Finally,
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after more than thirteen years of operation, the scheme
was terminated in May 1972, when the Pakistani Rupee was
devalued by about 56.7 per cent (The Rate of Exchange was
changed from U.S.$.l = Rs 4.76 to U.S.$.l = Rs 11.00 w.e.f.
May 12th 1972). Following the devaluation, export duties
on some commodities were levied. These are given below:-
1. Raw cotton and cotton waste. 40 per cent ad valorem.
2. Cotton yarn. 50 paisa per lb plus 20 paisa
per lb for 21 to 24 counts.
3. Grey cloth. 15 paisa per square yard.
4. Rice Basmati. 34 rupees per cwt.
5. Rice coarse. 7 rupees per cwt.
6. Raw wool. 1.30 rupees per lb.
7. Raw hides and skins. 40 per cent ad valorem.
8. Semi-tanned and tanned skins. 15 per cent ad valorem.
9. Oil cake. 15 per cent ad valorem.
SOURCE:- Pakistan Economic Survey (1972-73, p.15).
4.2.2 Coverage.
The Export Bonus Scheme was applied to several categor¬
ies of foreign exchange earnings, viz. commodities, service
industries and invisible foreign exchange earnings, and over
time its coverage was broadened. The announced purpose of
the scheme was to increase Pakistan's foreign exchange earnings
from the export of manufactured goods and services with a high
degree of domestic value-added. As a consequence of such an
objective, as well as to account for their world elasticity
of demand and/or domestic supply constraints, certain items
(traditional primary exports such as raw cotton, hides and
skins, raw wool and rice excluding some superior varieties)
were totally excluded from the purview of the scheme from the
very beginning. Most of these commodities were not made
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eligible for bonus vouchers until July 1970, when they were
also granted a bonus at the rate of 10 per cent of the FOB
value. However, certain other items used either as inputs
in domestic manufacturing like yarn, pickled hides and skins
or as items of food consumption such as garlic, onions,
pulses, etc. had also been excluded from the scheme from
time-to-time. Their exclusion had been primarily due to
domestic supply constraints. Among the eligible commodities,
broadly speaking, semi-processed goods had received vouchers
at the rate of 20 per cent of F0B value until 1967, when
the rate was raised to 30 per cent, which from July 1970 was
further increased by 5 percentage points. Fully manufac¬
tured commodities had been allowed bonus vouchers at the rate
of 40 per cent of FOB value until 1964, when this rate was
reduced to 30 per cent, only to be raised again to 40 per
cent in 1967 and by another 5 percentage points in 1970. Of
course, there had been deviations from these rates and inter¬
mediate rates had existed almost all along during the oper¬
ation of the Export Bonus Scheme.
The scope of the Export Bonus Scheme (apart from
excluding certain items from it) was widened over time. The
number of items eligible for bonus,which was about 560 at
the end of 1959, increased to more than 650 by 1962.^ The
exports from bonus items continually increased in value and
in terms of the relative magnitude of total visible export
receipts. The percentage share of bonus exports in total
visible exports is given in Table 4.1. In terms of relative
share bonus exports increased from about 37 per cent in 1960
to about 82 per cent in 1970 of total visible exports. This
increase in the relative share of bonus exports in total
visible exports should, however, be interpreted with care.
The increase had resulted not only from the rapid growth of
bonus exports, but also from the inclusion of more and more
export items into the purview of the bonus scheme. After 1970,
all commodity exports had been entitled for bonus vouchers.
(8) Pakistan Economic Survey (1961-62, p.72).
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TABLE 4.1
Percentage share of Bonus Exports in Total Exports.
Year Percent share Year Percent share
1960 37.1 1967 54.6
1961 37.9 1968 59.8
1965 42.7 1969 78.3
1966 51.1 1970 81.8
Note:- Percentage shares are for all Pakistan (former East Pakistan
plus former West Pakistan).
SOURCE: 1960 and 1961 from Pakistan Economic Survey (1961-62, p.73.
For the rest of the table, Pakistan Economic Survey (1970-71),
Table 61, p. 108.
As far as invisible earnings of foreign exchange were
concerned, coverage of the scheme was continuously broadened
in this respect too. Certain service industries (aircraft
repairs, salvage operations, ship repairs and shipping) were
allowed bonus vouchers at the rate of 20 per cent of net
foreign exchange earnings from the outset. Net foreign
exchange earnings from the hotel industry, but with restricted
use of vouchers, were added to the list in February 1960.
Home remittances from Pakistani nationals working abroad
became eligible for bonus vouchers at the rate of 30 per cent
from September 1st, 1963. Along with other rate increases,
the bonus rate on home remittances also was raised by 10 per
cent in 1967 and another 5 per cent in 1970. Writers and
journalists' earnings of foreign exchange from all types of
literary and journalistic contributions abroad were made
eligible for bonus at the rate of 40 per cent with effect
from March 6th 1969, while the facility at 45% was extended
to artists' earnings, w.e.f. March 5th 1971, to those of
architects and consultants w.e.f. April 28th, 1971 and engin¬
eers and consultants w.e.f. November 27th 1971. In the
closing year of the scheme, almost every type of incoming
foreign exchange was made eligible for bonus vouchers at the
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rate of 45 per cent
4.2.3 Some other Features of the Scheme.
The Export Bonus Scheme introduced on January 15th
1959, on the successful completion of its first year, was
extended for another year up to 14th January 1961. The
success of the Scheme in encouraging exports was so impres¬
sive that the Government, on June 23rd, 1961 announced that
the Scheme would be continued throughout the Second Plan
period i.e. until 30th June 1965. This comparatively longer
lease of life to the scheme helped to create greater confi¬
dence in the scheme and put it on a more stable footing.
All along it was expected that the scheme would be terminated
once the exporters had gained experience in the exporting
business, initial difficulties of entering into the new mar¬
kets had been overcome and the exports had become more com¬
petitive. However, after the rationalization of the rate
structure on June 12th 1964, the scheme was extended in its
new form into the Third Five Year Plan, i.e. up to 30th June
1970. Whereas the need for earning more foreign exchange
through export expansion continued to increase, the desired
degree of competitiveness of Pakistani exports could not be
achieved. The result was that the scheme could not be ter¬
minated without drastically devaluing the Pakistani Rupee
until May 12th 1972.
Bonus vouchers at specified percentages of foreign
(9) With effect from January 15th 1972, a 45 per cent bonus was allowed
on the following types of earnings, provided the foreign exchange
was received through normal banking channels:-
All commissions received in foreign exchange; profits, interest,
dividends and rents earned by Pakistanis and Pakistani business
houses (other than banks) abroad; remittances made by foreigners
(other than diplomats) from abroad for the maintenance of their
families in Pakistan and for education expenses of their dependents;
pensions earned in foreign exchange whether for services rendered
in Pakistan or outside; receipts on account of bank charges, royal¬
ties, trade-marks and subscriptions to newspapers and magazines;
and all professional fees paid for in foreign exchange.
SOURCE: IMF, "Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions (1973)"
p. 375.
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exchange earnings were issued to those eligible (exporters
or recipients of foreign exchange) on application to the
State Bank of Pakistan. The application was to be made
within 45 days (since April 14th 1969 within 15 days) from
the date of realization of export proceeds or the date of
receipt of foreign exchange. These vouchers could be used
for (a) the importing of goods on the bonus import list and
subject to certain conditions/10^ for (b) business travel
abroad, and (c) for opening and maintaining commercial
offices abroad. For the import of goods under the Bonus
Scheme an import licence called a 'bonus licence' was
necessary. Any person (not necessarily the person in whose
name the bonus voucher was issued) upon surrendering bonus
vouchers, could apply through an authorised dealer in foreign
exchange to any Licensing Authority for the bonus licence
within the validity period of the bonus vouchers. Bonus
Bouchers had normally been valid for one month from the date
of issuance by the State Bank except for the import of machin¬
ery and equipment. The validity period of bonus vouchers
was extended from 30 days to 90 days on September 17th 1965,
but was again reduced to 30 days on April 10th 1967 in order
to accelerate the pace of their utilization. However, in
(11)
later years several changes were made in this validity period:
(10) In 1964, nationals of Pakistan or firms in which they had more than
a 50 per cent interest were allowed up to 2§ per cent of bonus
entitlement if the applicable rate of bonus was 40 per cent or
up to 5% if the applicable bonus rate was 20%. These quotas were
available for only 12 months and the quotas for travel were not
transferable. [Manual of Imports and Exports Control (1964,
pp. 297-98)].
(11) On October 10th 1970, the validity period of bonus vouchers was
reduced from 30 days to 21 days. On November 24th, 1971, it was
extended from 21 days to 42 days and on December 5th 1971, it was
further extended from 42 days to 90 days. (IMF: "Report on
Exchange Restrictions". Various issues).
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In the case of the import of machinery and equipment by
properly sanctioned industrial units, either for new
capacity creation or for balancing and modernization, the
validity period of bonus vouchers could be extended up to
one year. The actual bonus licences issued upon surrender
of bonus vouchers were normally valid for six months from
the date of issue. However, for the import of machinery
and equipment, such licences were valid for 12 months and
could be extended to 24 months on request. Both the bonus
vouchers and the resulting bonus licences were freely trans¬
ferable (except for the hotel industry), but in the case of
the sale or transfer of licences no extension in the validity
of a licence or change in description or classification of
items was allowed at this stage.
The Bonus vouchers, which could be used for importing
any item on the Bonus Import List, were freely transferable
and negotiable, and could be sold at a premium in an established
market (which included forward delivery). Changes in the
Bonus Import list naturally caused changes in the market
quotation for bonus vouchers. The eligible list of bonus
imports originally comprised 219 items, generally of an
inessential nature, or for which adequate productive capacity
was available in the country. Over the years, several changes
were made to this list. Certain items were excluded from
it, certain others were included in it and at times the
character and composition of this list was altered altogether.
Whereas the import of certain raw materials and spare parts
for industrial use had been allowed on bonus from the very
beginning, it was not until January 22nd, 1966 that as many
as 149 industries were made to meet their requirements of
raw materials and spare parts exclusively from bonus imports.
The only exceptions were the items on the Free list which
they could import without surrender of bonus vouchers. This
was done after the September 1965 war between India and
Pakistan, following which 'aid' to Pakistan from donor
countries was suspended. This resulted in severe foreign
exchange pressures and, in consequence, severe import
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restrictions. The next significant change in the bonus
imports came on July 1st 1967, when a new feature, Cash-
cum-Bonus imports, was introduced in the system of licensing
ibr the first time, and 10 items were placed on this list.
Under this system, importers had to surrender 50 per cent in
the form of bonus vouchers in order to get cash licences for
the full value of their share. While the main consideration
in introducing this sytem was the conservation of foreign
exchange, another reason was said to be that it was depriving
importers of undue profits arising from cheaper imports under
cash resources, which importers did not pass on to the consumers.
The Cash-cum-Bonus list was fast expanded to 70 items in the
next import policy (Jan - June 1968), and the expansion con-
C12)
tinued in the subsequent years. Along with this increase
in the number of items importable under the Cash-cum-Bonus
scheme, an additional facility was provided in January 1970.
Since that date, in addition to the items importable under
this Scheme, all items (except tools and workshop equipment,
and drugs and medicines importable exclusively under barter)
on the Free and Licensable lists were also made importable
under the Cash-cum-Bonus scheme within the entitlement of
importers.
On the other hand, the Bonus Import List proper was
continuously modified and altered to reflect the emphasis
of economic policy. This list was used to change the com¬
position of imports and over time shift the emphasis from
consumer goods to capital goods and industrial raw materials.
It was also employed to augment supplies of both commercial and
industrial goods. For this purpose all quantitative restric¬
tions on imports under bonus were lifted with effect from
January 1968, and since July 1st 1968 all items on the Free,
(12) The number of items on the Cash-cum-Bonus list during different
import policies:-
July-Dec. 1967, 10; Jan - June 1968, 70; July-Dec. 1968, 94;
Jan-June 1969, 95; July - Dec 1969, 111; Jan - June 1970, 115;
July - Dec 1970, 124; and from January 1971 onwards, almost all
raw materials and spare parts were placed on this list.
SOURCE: Pakistan Economic Surveys. Various issues.
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Licensable and Cash-cum-Bonus lists were made importable
under Bonus as well. These features of the bonus import
list continued to operate till its termination in 1972.
All these changes in the Export Bonus Scheme, i.e.
changes in the rate structure, coverage, items included in
the bonus import list, timing of surrender of voucher etc.,
had their effect on the market quotation for bonus vouchers.
The bonus vouchers, a ration coupon for imports, carried a
premium because the demand for foreign exchange exceeded
its supply at the official exchange rate. The mere exist¬
ence of the import licensing system and other quantitative
restrictions, which restricted the quantity of imports, may
be enough evidence to justify the existence of an excess
demand for foreign exchange at the official exchange rate.
Given the excess demand for foreign exchange, the bonus
vouchers were sold at a price once they were placed on the
free market. The price of bonus vouchers, or the premium
as it was generally called, was determined by the demand for
(13)
and supply of bonus vouchers.
The demand for bonus vouchers, in fact, the demand to
import commodities on the bonus import list, depended among
other factors, on the commodity mix of importables under
bonus vouchers, the items that could be imported both under
bonus and under other import devices, and the amount of
foreign exchange allocated by regular licensing for the
importation of items included in the bonus import list.
Obviously the greater the amount of foreign exchange allocated
under regular licensing was, the less was the demand for
vouchers, as the cost of foreign exchange through regular
licensing procedure was equal to the official exchange rate.
Similarly, the larger the number of commodities which could
be imported exclusively on bonus, the higher was the demand
for bonus•vouchers. The supply of vouchers, given the condi¬
tions of output-production, depended upon the items eligible
(13) Bruton and Bose (1963,p.77) have pointed out that the level of
premium reflected only the equilibrium of demand for, and supply
of bonus vouchers. It was not a measure of the over-valuation
of Rupee at the equilibrium, because the scheme was not applicable
to all exports and all imports, and that all foreign exchange
earned was not redeemable by vouchers.
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for bonus vouchers, the rates applicable to those items and
the proportion of vouchers earned which was placed on the
market. If an increased number of items was made eligible
for bonus vouchers, and/or the applicable rates were raised
and/or a larger proportion of vouchers was placed on the
market, the supply of vouchers would go up and vice versa.
The average level of premium on bonus vouchers from
1959-60 to 1971-72 is given in Table 4.2.
TABLE 4.2
Annual Averages of Month-end Premium quotations on Bonus Vouchers.
YEAR Average YEAR Average
(July-June) Premium (July-June) Premium
1959 - 60 161.0 1966 - 67 158.4
1960 - 61 123.9 1967- 68 170.2
1961- 62 138.3 1968 - 69 180.9
1962 - 63 157.0 1969 - 70 178.2
1963 - 64 153.0 1970 - 71 186.8
1964 - 65 150.3 1971 - 72 193.7(a)
1965 - 66 149.6
SOURCE: Calculated from (i) Bruton & Bose (1963), Table vi.l, p.81
(ii) Pakistan Economic Surveys (1961-62) Table 71, p.12;
(1966-67) Table 41, p.84; and (1970-71)Table 21,p.42
(All Economic Survey tables in statistical sections).
(a) for 1971-72 it is the rate at which the Government compensated
the holders of bonus vouchers after the scheme was abolished.
The table shows that from 1960-61 onwards there was generally
a rising trend in the average premium on bonus vouchers. It
also shows that from 1965-66 onwards, when more and more
items were placed on the bonus import list, the average
premium rose more sharply. However, these averages hide a
large part of the short-run fluctuations in the premium,
which have ranged from below 100 to over 200, depending upon
the stringency of import policies and changes in other
factors affecting the demand for, and supply of bonus vouchers.
Both the changes in bonus rates and the fluctuations in
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the premium affected the rupee returns to the exporter.
In setting the minimum price for exporting, the exporter
would take into account the expected value of the premium
as well as the rate of bonus vouchers applicable to his
product. Given the rate of bonus , if the premium on bonus
vouchers decreased, the exporter would suffer a loss; or
given the level of premium, if the applicable rate of bonus
was reduced, the exporter again would suffer a loss and
(14}
vice versa. Soligo and Stern (1966) contended that
fluctuations in the premium were not a major source of
uncertainty because (a) the monthly average of the bonus
premium fluctuated within a narrow range, (b) the unplanned
losses could be offset, over time, by unplanned gains and
(c) futures market existed for bonus vouchers and the
exporter could avail himself of that market to reduce the
risk of fluctuations. On the other hand, changes in the
bonus rates were generally made by 10 percentage points,
which changed the bonus rates by one fourth, one third or
even one half in many cases. These relatively large changes
had a more serious effect on the returns to the exporter.
Therefore, frequent changes in bonus rates were not conducive
to the orderly development of the export market.
4.3 Export Performance Licensing Scheme.
The Export Performance Licensing (EPL) Scheme, probably
the second most important incentive scheme after the Export
Bonus Scheme, was introduced in January, 1962. Under this
scheme, different exports were entitled to receive import
entitlements at varying percentages (in the initial years
at a uniform rate of 100 per cent) of their exports FOB.
above and beyond entitlements under normal licensing.
Unlike in the Bonus scheme, these entitlements were not
freely transferable, but could only be used for the import
of raw materials, spare parts, machinery and equipment for
balancing and modernization and packing material required
by the industry concerned. Export Performance licences were
(14) Soligo and Stern: (1966, pp.45-48).
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intended to ensure that exporters received an adequate
supply of imported raw materials at lower world-market
prices (plus relevant duties) instead of having to purchase
these requirements from commercial importers in the res¬
tricted domestic market. Thus, it was a means of providing
an indirect or disguised subsidy to exporters. Advance
licensing based on an agreed export target was also per¬
mitted, but the exporter who ultimately failed to 'earn'
them by export performance was subjected to a penalty in
the form of bonus vouchers to cover the licences issued.
4.3.1 Evolution of the Scheme.
Attempts to link import licences to actual export
performance had been made as early as 1954, when certain
selected primary and manufactured commodities were allowed
import licences equal to 30 per cent of FOB exports.
However, the coverage had been limited and the scheme did
(15)
not cover more than 1-2 per cent of total exports.
The import licensing system which, following the
collapse of the Korean war boom, was adopted in late 1952,
had provided for direct imports of their requirements by
the industries. The industrial import licences were granted
basically to the recognised industrial units on the basis of
official assessment of their minimum single shift require¬
ments for imports. The system was somewhat rigid and unres¬
ponsive to the changing needs of industries in terms of
quantities and types of imports required. In an attempt to
introduce an element of flexibility and liberalization of
imports, some selected industries were given the facility
of Automatic Licensing in the July - December 1960 Import
Policy. Under this procedure they received initial licences
for their import requirements at 100 per cent of their
assessed single shift capacity and repeat licences of the
same value were issued automatically after proper utilization
of previous licences (subject to overall foreign exchange
availability). In the next January - June, 1961 import policy
12 industries having export performance or export potential
(15) Hecox: (1970,p.25) and Hufbauer: (1971, p.69)
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within the Automatic Licensing group were selected for
special treatment to enable them to expand their export
business. Twelve others were accorded similar treatment
in the following July - December 1961 import policy. The
industries selected for special treatment are listed below
in Table 4.3.
TABLE 4.3
Industries receiving special Licensing treatment during 1961.









9. Paints (inc. varnishes)




2. Biscuits & confectionery.
3. Fountain pens.
4. Dry Battery cells.




9. Plywood industry .
10. Sanitary and Water Fittings.
11. Spectacle frames.
12. Tanning & leather footwear.
SOURCE: Board of Trade Journal
Jan.13th,1961 pp.97-103
SOURCE: Board of Trade Journal
July 21st,1961 pp.153-159
Those units within these specified industries which
had documentary evidence of export performance to their
credit were admitted for automatic licensing facilities and
received additional licences for the import of machinery or
capital equipment for replacement, balancing and moderniza¬
tion. The non-foreign exchange earning units within these
industries, nevertheless, received initial licences at 100
per cent of their assessed capacity but were not entitled
to repeat facilities, and were further threatened with reduc¬
tion of import privileges in the future if they failed to
establish themselves in the export market. A direct link
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between import privileges and export performance was esta¬
blished in January, 1962 when additional licensing to some
selected industries was made contingent upon their actual
export performance.
4.3.2 Scope and Coverage.
In the January-June 1962 Import Policy, the additional
import licencing to certain export potential industries
(numbering 31 including most of the industries given special
treatment previously) was linked with their export perform¬
ance. Those specified industries were given initial licences
at the rate of 80 per cent of their entitlements and were
allowed additional licensing equal to 100 per cent of the
FOB value of their exports. These additional licences
could be obtained in advance as well, provided an irrevocable
letter of credit opened by the foreign importer or a bank
guarantee against a firm export order was presented as evi¬
dence. The scope of the EPL Scheme remained essentially
limited until June 1964, although some minor additions to
the list of industries eligible for performance licensing
/ ig \
and some deletions from the list were actually made. The
coverage of the scheme was expanded in July 1964, when a
list of 90 industries along with their applicable rates of
performance licence up to 50% of FOB export value was
announced. Since then the expansion of the scheme to encom¬
pass more and more industries within its purview continued
so that in the July - December 1968 Import Policy as many as
152 industries had been made eligible for additional licensing
under the EPL Scheme. Theoretically, all industries (except
cotton textiles, jute manufacturing and BIDI) could benefit
from this facility of additional licensing against their
export performance. In practice, however, it was available
only to those industries for which an applicable rate was
(16) The number of industries eligible for performance licensing up to
June 1964 in Import Policies Jan-June 1962, 31; July-Dec. 1962,
35; Jan-June 1963, 33; July-Dec. 1963, 34: Jan - June 1964,42.
SOURCE: 'Board of Trade Journal', various issues.
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determined by the Government at the initiative of the
industry concerned. Due to Pakistan's commitment with
the IMF, the EPL Scheme was terminated on December 31st
1969 ,<17)
As regards the share of exports covered by the EPL
scheme in the total visible exports, it is very difficult
to determine. Hecox (1970) has given the following reasons
for that. Firstly, the EPL Scheme was administered by the
CCI & E which used an industry classification possessing
little relation to the commodity-export statistics published
by the C.S.O. Secondly, the CCI & E only issued performance
licences, both advance issues and final settlements for
previous export performances, and did not record the export
of industries claiming performance licences. In view of the
mixed issuance of performance licences (advance as well as
final), the statistics on licences issued in any one period
could not simply be converted into the value of commodities
exported by dividing the value of licences issued by the
percentage rate applicable. Nevertheless, the Export
Promotion Bureau has made an estimate of the coverage of EPL
Scheme for the years 1964-65 to 1966-67, which is given in
Table 4.4.
Table 4.4 shows that in terms of the overall coverage
only about one-sixth of total visible exports were eligible
for the benefits provided under performance licensing during
the years 1964-65 to 1966-67. Moreover, the distribution of
performance-licensing exports by ranges of rates shows that
the major portion of exports covered received only up to 10
per cent FOB value of exports in additional import licences.
However, the rates exceeding 30 per cent grew in importance
over the period covered, as may be seen from the table.
4.3.3 Rate Structure.
In January, 1962 when the EPL Scheme was introduced,
additional import licences to specified industries were
allowed at a uniform rate of 100 per cent of FOB value of
exports. From January 1962 to June 1964 the policy of
(17) Pakistan Economic Survey (1969-70, p.117).
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issuing special licences against export performance at this
uniform rate of 100 per cent continued, but the coverage
was restricted to a small number of 'export potential'
industries. In July 1964, the coverage of the Scheme was
expanded, the rate structure was revised and a number of
rates ranging from 10 to 50 per cent of FOB value of
exports were permitted. (The list of eligible industries
along with the applicable rates as it stood in October 1964
is given in Appendix C ). During the period of July 1964 to
June 1967, the applicable rates remained relatively steady
once they had been determined, although the number of
eligible industries was expanded. The period of July 1967
to June 1968 was marked by a rationalization of the rate
structure. The applicable rates for certain industries were
revised and in January 1968, a general policy of "no rate
to exceed 30 per cent of FOB value of exports" was announced.
This across-the-board reduction in the maximum applicable
rate resulted in bringing down all the higher rates to the
30 per cent ceiling rate. The rate structure in this revised
form was continued until the Scheme's termination on December
31st, 1969.
4.3.4 Some Other Aspects.
According to Hufbauer (1971), the Scheme's proper role
was either to exempt exporters from the payment of scarcity
premia on importable inputs or to compensate them for such
payments so that their costs could be brought in line with
(18)
world prices. The movement of the rate structure from a
single applicable rate (100 per cent) in the initial years
for all industries, covered by the Scheme to a series of dis¬
criminatory rates of up to 50 per cent (and later up to 30
per cent) was probably an effort to achieve this objective.
The difference in rates between industries were supposed to
reflect different import contents of the export products,
and thereby avoid discrimination against 'import-intensive'
exports. Thus the specific rates at which additional per¬
formance licences were given to each industry were based
(18) Hufbauer: (1971, pp.69-70).
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roughly on the estimated import component of exports.
Hecox (1970) maintained that in view of a lack of trained
manpower and the technically complicated nature of the
information required (not to mention the magnitude of the
task of determining rates for all industries) these rates
could, at best, be only rough estimates. Moreover, neither
indirect import components (of domestically produced inter¬
mediate inputs) nor the import component of capital invest-
ment were included in this exercise.
As all industries not specifically excluded from the
Scheme were, in principle, eligible for performance licensing,
and as a large number of rates were allowed to the eligible
industries, this led to a proliferation of applications for
rate decisions and revisions. The determination of each
industry's rate separately coupled with special appeals for
increases in rates seems to have flooded the system with
additional work. Probably this state of affairs of the EPL
Scheme led Frank Child (1968, p.176) to write:
"Export performance licencing is an administrative nightmare
of such horrendous complexity as to break the spirit of the ablest
bureaucrat. Procedures for establishing eligibility and issue rates
are complex and responsibility is split. Supervision of the procedure
and enforcement of conditions by the responsible agencies are onerous;
costs of compliance on the part of businessmen are unusually high. The
system is a channel for political pressure from special economic
interests. Any useful purpose served by export-performance licensing
can be met by incorporating it into the general bonus-voucher system;
EPL should be abandoned forthwith".
Finally, we come to the question of premia on import
licences granted under the EPL Scheme. The existence of
premia on performance licences arises from the fact that
there were quantitative restrictions on the importation of
raw materials and spare parts, and that there had been an
excess demand and a consequent scarcity of most of the
(19) Hecox: (1970, p. 29).
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imported raw materials in the domestic market. The results
of some empirical studies (i.e. Pal (1964, 1965) and
Alamgir (1968) /20^also support this view. The difficulty lies
in determining the level of this premium. In the case of
Bonus vouchers, they were freely transferable and negotiable,
and were sold on an organised market. The market quotation
was taken as the premium. Unlike the Bonus vouchers, import
licences granted under the EPL Scheme could not legally be
sold or transferred, nor could the resultant imported commo¬
dities be traded. In addition, certain restrictions on the
use of performance licences only to import specific raw
materials and spare parts, had also been placed. Theoreti¬
cally, the ideal means of determining premia on performance
licences would be to look separately at each market for an
imported raw material or spare part, and use the demand and
supply situation for the specific item to determine the
premium. This is practically impossible, because there are
so many sub-markets involved, and the information on the
actual eligible items for each industry is not available.
Therefore, of necessity, some indirect pieces of information
may be used to approximate the level of premia on perform¬
ance licences. Studies by Pal (1964, 1965) estimated that
domestic wholesale prices of licensed intermediate goods
exceeded their landed costs, on average, by about 58 per
cent and 53 per cent during the periods of June - August
1964, and Dec. 1964 - Feb. 1965 respectively. Another study
along similar lines by Alamgir (1968) found the average
scarcity premium on the licensed raw-materials to be about
58 per cent for a later period of November 1966 - February
1967. These averages are indicative of the level of scar¬
city premia, although there were some extreme values within
the items studied. Alternatively, Child (1968,. p.176) has
suggested that performance licences were, in effect, restricted-
use bonus vouchers similar to the stamped Bonus vouchers
issued to exporters of jute manufactures. The stamped Bonus
(20) See Chapter 3, Table 3.4.
Pal (1964, 1965), Alamgir (1968) op.cit.
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vouchers, prior to 1967, could only be used to import raw
materials, spare parts and machinery and equipment for the
jute textile industry, as well as for importing capital
goods in former East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) by any
industry listed in the Industrial Investment Schedule.
During this period, the premium on Stamped Bonus Vouchers
had only been about one-third of that on regular Bonus
Vouchers. In 1967, when certain raw materials (for both
former East and West Pakistan) were added to the eligible
list of imports under the Stamped Bonus Vouchers the
premium on those vouchers jumped quickly to 60 to 80 per
(21)
cent of the premium on the regular Bonus Vouchers. The
experience of placing industrial raw materials on the
Stamped Bonus Vouchers import list seems directly relevant
for our purposes, because the performance licences were
also issued for raw materials and spare parts. As a guide,
60 to 80 per cent of the premium on regular Bonus Vouchers
may be taken as a rough approximation of the level of
premium on performance licences. This would link the
premium level on performance licences to fluctuations in
the regular Bonus vouchers premium for which regular quota¬
tions were available. At the extreme, if restrictions on
the use of performance licences were minimal (as was the
case in the earlier years of the EPL Scheme) or the policy
to import raw materials and spare parts were more stringent
(as was the case after the 1965 Indo-Pak war), the premium on
performance licences might have been in the vicinity of the
premium on regular Bonus vouchers.
4.4 Tax Exemptions and Tax Rebates.
The Government levies various taxes (import and export
duties, excise duties, sales taxes, income taxes etc.) not
only as a means of raising revenue, but also as an instrument
for achieving certain national objectives. In a developing
country these objectives may include, among others, the
encouragement of savings and investment, the pursuit of
maximum economic growth through rapid capital formation
and industrialization, the achievement of an equitable distri¬
ct) Lewis, Jr: (1970, p.30).
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bution of income and wealth among various regions and
classes of society and a rapid expansion of exports.
Import duties are levied on goods imported into
Pakistan at various rates (ad valorem or specific) according
to the nature of the commodity. Luxury and non-essential
imports are subjected to higher rates of duty, while those
of a developmental character are charged at lower rates of
duty. Apart from being a source of revenue, import duties
are also utilized for affording protection to those domestic
manufacturing industries which suffer from high costs of
production and are unable to withstand competition from
imported goods. Similarly, excise duties are imposed, on a
selective basis, on the goods manufactured within the country.
Exporters have been, and continue to be entitled to a refund
of import duties paid on raw materials used in the manufac¬
ture of exported goods. Excisable commodities may be
exported either on payment of duty under claim for refund, or
under bond without payment of duty. Since 1962, the Govern¬
ment has issued licences for Bonded warehouses, in which the
a,
exporters can hold excisable goods without pAy£ment of excise
duties, till they are exported. When commodities using
excisable goods in their manufacture are exported, a rebate
of excise duty on excisable goods so used, is also allowed.
All goods produced and/or manufactured in Pakistan
(except fresh fish, poultry and poultry products) are exempt
from sales tax, when exported. If they have incurred sales
tax either on raw materials, or at the manufacturing stage,
the tax is refunded.
These tax exemptions and tax rebates lower the cost
of production of the product meant for export. The rebate
of tariffs and indirect taxes on the inputs actually used
in the production of exportable goods tends to bring their
prices in line with world prices, and thus partially reduces
the bias against exports. It increases the competitiveness
of exports from the country to that extent. In addition,
tax exemptions make the foreign prices of exports differ
from domestic prices by the extent of indirect taxes. This
makes the foreign market more profitable and thus provides
an incentive to expand exports.
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We have discussed above three major export promotion
schemes, namely the Export Bonus Scheme, the Export
Performance Licensing Scheme and tax exemptions and tax
rebates. Some other measures of lesser importance (mentioned
above) were also employed in order to expand exports from
Pakistan. For example, the Pay-As-You-Earn Scheme (PAYE) was
introduced by the Government on June 7th, 1962. Under this
scheme, an exporter could negotiate a foreign supplier's
credit to purchase capital equipment for an industrial
project against future payment through export of products
of the project. The payment could be made (a) by export of
products directly to the supplier country; or (b) through
remittances of earnings from the export of products to any
other country. The Scheme applied to private projects
included in the Industrial Investment Schedule and to public
and semi-public sector projects included in the Five-Year
Plans. In the first place, applications for the projects
were to be sanctioned by the Director General, Investment
Promotion and Supplies (in case of industrial projects) or
the Ministry of Communications (in case of purchase of ships).
Then the terms of repayment were subject to approval from
the State Bank of Pakistan, which generally insisted on a
repayment period of at least eight years with interest no
higher than 8 per cent. Hufbauer (1971, p.72) noted, "the
impact of PAYE is much bigger on paper than in reality Of the
115 authorized applications, less than 20 show any signs of implementa¬
tion. The main difficulty is the State Bank's insistence on compara¬
tively long repayment periods and modest interest rates, given the
absence of any repayment guaranteesThe magnitude of export
subsidy involved in the PAYE in 1966-67 was less than 0.6
per cent relative to the export subsidies involved in the
(22)
three schemes discussed above. Similarly, the impact of
other mini-schemes on export incentives was insignificant.
The institutional arrangements like the establishment of
the Export Promotion Bureau, participation in Trade Fairs/
Exhibitions or sending /receiving Trade delegations etc.
might have had some effect on export promotion from Pakistan,
(22) Based on data in Hafbauer (1971, Table 3.3, p.100)
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but unfortunately these arrangements defy quantification.
It is believed that among the quantifiable export promotional
measures the three schemes, i.e. the Export Bonus Scheme,
the Export Performance Licensing Scheme, and tax exemptions
and tax rebates would capture the bulk of the incentives
provided to export trade in Pakistan. We shall, therefore,
concentrate on some quantitative aspects of their analysis
in the next two chapters. It is hoped that this analysis
will encompass the major part of the export incentives and




THE EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATES FOR EXPORTS.
In the previous chapter we have discussed various
export incentive schemes which had been employed for
expanding exports from Pakistan. While most of the manufac¬
tured goods were given subsidies on their exports, certain
primary commodities like raw cotton and fresh fish were sub¬
jected to export duties when exported from the country.
After the devaluation of the Pakistani Rupee in May, 1972,
export duties were levied on a number of commodities. More¬
over, fresh fish, poultry and poultry products have been
liable to Sales Tax when exported from Pakistan.
Because of the export incentive schemes and the tax
measures that Pakistan has applied to its export trade,
what exporters actually received for each unit for foreign
exchange earned has differed substantially from the country's
official exchange rate. In the presence of export subsidies
and export taxes, a country's official exchange rate provides
a poor guide to the price competitiveness of its exports.
Export incentives are determined by what the exporters
actually receive for each unit of foreign exchange they earn.
Therefore, the appropriate rate for measuring incentives is
the effective exchange rate/1^ The effective exchange rate
may be defined as the official exchange rate adjusted for
export taxes and subsidies. In other words, the effective
exchange rate, expressed in units of domestic currency per
dollar, is the official exchange rate less export and other
taxes plus the subsidies applicable to one dollar's worth of
exports. In the following section we shall calculate the
effective exchange rates for some specific commodities as
well as for some broad sectors of the economy and analyse them.
(1) The term "effective exchange rate" has been applied to several quite
different exchange rate concepts. For example, it has been used as
the official exchange rate divided by the cost of living index
(Sheahan and Clark (1967)), or as the weighted average exchange rate
of a country vis-a-vis its trading partners using the shares of exports
going to each trading partner as weights (Donges (1972) and Rhomberg
(1976)). We have used this term in this study as defined in the text.
Moreover, the effective exchange rate for exports measures the nominal
subsidies given to export trade. Corden (1971a) among others has suggested
that for an examination of resource allocation an appropriate measure
would be the effective subsidy (i.e. subsidy to value-added) similar to
that of effective protection, which takes into account the tariffs and
subsidies given to both inputs and out-puts. However, due to the non¬
availability of input-output relationships for Pakistan over time, the
latter measure was not used.
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5.1 Data and Sources.
( 2)
Pakistan has compiled and published trade statistics
regularly since Independence (i.e. 14th August 1947), covering
trade with other countries via sea, land and air routes.
Due to a stand-still agreement with India till 31st March
1948, the sea-borne trade with that country was treated as
domestic trade. Complete land-borne statistics have been
maintained since July 1949. As a result, the data relating
to years 1947-48 to 1949-50 have since been revised. Therefore,
the trade data published are complete in coverage in the sense
that they are inclusive of trade on Government, semi-Government
and private accounts, and that the trade via sea, air and land
routes has been included. This statement must be qualified
because the following are excluded from Export Statistics:
i) Defences stores,
ii) Gold and silver coins or bullion and currency notes,
iii) Non-dutiable articles of baggages and personal effects
of passengers.
iv) Dutiable articles of baggage and personal effects of
passengers since July, 1960.
v) Trade in transit through Pakistan.
There are two basic sources of information on export
data - namely, the Central Statistical Office [(C.S.O.) now
Statistics Division in the Ministry of Commerce] statistics,
and the State Bank of Pakistan statistics. The two sets of
data do not agree with each other because the C.S.O. statis¬
tics reflect the physical exit of goods out of the country
irrespective of monetary considerations, while the State Bank
statistics reflect purely monetary credits on transfer of
ownership of money. Apart from this difference in the nature
of data published by the two agencies, differences are also
attributable to:-
(i) Classification of commodities:-
The C.S.O. follows Standard International Trade
Classification (SITC), while the State Bank's classifi-
(2) The information on the compilation of Trade Statsitics and on the
differences in statistics published by the C.S.O. and the State Bank
is based upon the explanatory notes to the 'Foreign Trade Statistics
of Pakistan'.
- 127 -
cation is designed to suit the local requirements of
the Trade Community.
ii) Purpose and source
The C.S.O. figures are the by-product of Customs
Administration, while the State Bank figures are the
result of the accounting needs of exchange control.
iii) Method and basis of valuation
The C.S.O. figures are on an F.O.B. basis for
exports as declared by the exporters and accepted by
customs authorities for realization of duty etc; the
State Bank figures are on a mixed C&F/FOB basis and
show the actual amount received by exporters for the
commodities exported at the current Rate of Exchange.
iv) Coverage
The C.S.O. figures include trade by land and
parcel post, and the exports of supplies and fuel to
ships/air-craft etc., while the State Bank figures do
not include them in as much as they do not pass through
Exchange Control.
v) Timing:-
The C.S.O. figures are recorded at the time of
movement of goods across the country's international
border, while the State Bank accounts for them on trans¬
fer of ownership of money,and there is generally a time-
lag of 3 to 6 months in the transfer of money and
physical exit of goods.
Besides these, re-exports (imported goods subse¬
quently re-exported without further processing) were included
in the C.S.O. export data up to July, 1967, while the same
were not included in the State Bank figures. Due to all these
( 3)
reasons and short-shipment of goods, the C.S.O. figures are
(3) Short-shipment of goods:- Sometimes the goods for which Shipping
Bills are filled by exporters and a copy of which is sent to the
CSO may not be shipped in full or in part, due to the non-availability
of shipping space, etc. At a later date, when these goods are shipped,
fresh shipping bills are again submitted by the exporters to Customs
through whom they pass to the CSO. This results in double counting of
figures in the CSO. During 1972-73 short-shipments were to the extent
of 0.033 per cent of total exports. [ Calculated from data in Foreign
Trade Statistics of Pakistan, Vol.8, No.4 (April-June 1973 Issue)]
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slightly higher than the State Bank figures.
In the present study, the C.S.O. data have been used
because (a) they are published according to SITC classifi¬
cation, and (b) they represent the actual export of commo¬
dities during a certain period. There may be some element
of error in these data on account of errors of measurement,
double-counting of short shipments and the inclusion of
re-exports up to July, 1967, but it is believed not to be
very serious.
From July 1960 onwards, the C.S.O. has published
export data according to a commodity classification prepared
on the basis of the Standard International Trade classifica¬
tion (SITC-original) covering about 2,500 items. In July,
1963, because of the revision of the SITC-original, the
commodity trade classification of Pakistan was also revised
and named as the Pakistan Standard Trade classification -
Revised [PSTC-(R)]. Since then, this revised classification,
which covers about 3,500 items, has remained in force with
modifications and extensions at the 6-digit level. The
question in the present study was: What level of classifi¬
cation should be used for estimating the Commodity-Specific
Effective Exchange Rates for exports? There was really no
firm answer to this question. The term "commodity" is rather
confusing. It may be applied to the finest detail, or to
the sufficiently homogeneous groupings of the detailed classi¬
fications. For example, Pakistan in its 1972-73 trade statis¬
tics lists 7 varieties of raw cotton. The question is how
many commodities are there in this example - one or seven?
As another example, the same source lists 21 varieties of
cotton yarn (excluding different varieties of cotton thread
and yarn of mixed varieties) and 28 varieties of cotton
fabrics. How many commodities are there in this case - 21
and 28, or one for each? The answer depends on the use to be
made of the classification, and thus depends on whether the
products are sufficiently homogeneous as to unit prices,
economic uses and market conditions etc. We have chosen to
use in fact arbitrarily, the 3-digit level of classification
for this study, and even so only for important representative
commodities, depending upon the extent of their share in total
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exports. It is hoped that they will be sufficiently homo¬
geneous in respect of their market conditions, unit prices
and economic uses. The commodities selected have covered
from about 69.3 to about 87.9 per cent of total exports in
different years under study. The year-wise ratio of these
commodities to total exports is given in Table 5.1.
TABLE 5.1:
Ratio of Commodities studied to Total Exports (percentages)
Year Per cent Year Per cent
1959-60 73.95 1968-69 83.07
60-61 72.08 69-70 79.02
61-62 69.30 70-71 79.27
62-63 78.45 71-72 86.22
63-64 76.97 72-73 87.94
64-65 79.61 73-74 80.35
65-66 76.94 74-75 82.97
66-67 83.81 75-76 83.71
67-68 83.42 76-77 80.51
SOURCE: Calculated from Data in Appendix Table.A-
The Effective Exchange Rate (EER) for exports, expressed
in units of local currency, as defined above, is the official
exchange rate adjusted for export and other taxes and subsidies
applicable to one dollar's worth of exports. Pakistan has
applied a large number of export promotional measures, des¬
cribed in the previous chapter, to its export trade. In
order to quantify the export incentives implied by the measures
which can be quantified (there are many like the services
provided by the Export Promotion Bureau, participation in
exhibitions abroad, businessmen's delegations etc. which do
not easily lend themselves to quantification), data on all
of them are required. It was extremely difficult, if not
impossible to obtain data on all schemes. We have, therefore,
decided to include in the estimation of EERs the Export Bonus
Scheme, the Export Performance Licensing Scheme and tax exemp¬
tions and tax rebates on the subsidy side and export duties
and sales tax, where applicable, on the tax side. It is
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expected that these estimates would capture a major part of
the true behaviour of the EERs and thus of the incentives
provided by the export promotional schemes. The basic
sources of information on the structure, working and export
incentives provided by the export promotion schemes are the
Government Gazettes - extraordinary, Public Notices, Press
Notes and Handouts. If they are difficult to obtain, some
alternative sources may provide the required information.
The latter course was resorted-to in our case. The Manual
of Imports and Exports Control, compiled by the Office of the
C.C.I & E. in the Ministry of Commerce, published in Oct.
1964, is a compendium of regulations about export trade and
contains complete lists of items eligible for the Export Bonus
Scheme and the Export Performance Licensing Scheme, along with
the applicable rate for each item. The Pakistan Economic
Survey, a pre-budget document, published annually by the
Ministry of Finance,Government of Pakistan, provides a review
of the economy and performance of the major sectors of the
economy during the fiscal year. In addition, it provides
information on major changes in economic policies during the
year. Pakistan is a member of the International Monetary
Fund (IMF). [Since 1950, though its par value was established
(4)
in March 1951] . The IMF's series of 'Annual Reports on
Exchange Restrictions'^ has published since 1950, surveys
of the Exchange Systems of member countries as well as some
non-member countries. Besides aspects of exchange restric¬
tions or exchange controls, these surveys have included such
features as import licensing, advance deposit requirements,
import surcharges, export licensing and export incentive
schemes, etc., and have listed important 'changes during the
year' chronologically.
The Board of Trade Journal (now Trade and Industry
Journal) published by HMSO used to publish full details of
Pakistan's Import and Export policies up to 1964, since when
it has published only the important changes in those policies.
(4) Andrus and Mohammad (1958,p.301).
(5) Since April 1, 1978 the title has changed to 'Annual Reports on
Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions'.
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All these sources, for the period under study, i.e.
1959-60 to 1976-77, were consulted. The Export Bonus Rates
applicable to various items in 1963-64 were taken from the
Manual of Imports and Exports Control, and the changes in
them for the earlier and later periods were incorporated from
Pakistan Economic Surveys, Annual Reports on Exchange Restric¬
tions and the Board of Trade Journal. Under the Export
Performance Licensing Scheme, the exporters of specified
industries had been allowed to import raw materials, spare
parts and machinery for balancing and modernization, at a uni¬
form rate of 100 per cent of FOB value of their exports up
to June 1964. The specified industries with the additional
import privileges for this period were taken from the various
issues of the Board of Trade Journal. In June, 1964, the
scheme was expanded and the rate structure was rationalized.
The new rates permissible to different industries were taken
from the Manual of Imports and Exports Control, and the
changes in the scheme for the later period were included from
the above-mentioned other sources. The export subsidies for
different industries implied by tax exemptions and tax rebates
expressed as a percentage of FOB export value were taken from
Hufbauer (1971). These rates had been calculated on the basis
of excise, sales and other indirect taxes imposed on domestic
production during 1965-66 and customs duties and other import
charges prevailing during 1966-67. Since indirect taxes have
been increasing over time, these rates would over-estimate
the rebates and exemptions in the earlier years, and under¬
estimate them during the later period. However, this is not
expected to be serious enough to change the level and direc¬
tion of EERs and the resultant export incentives.
Certain commodities were subject to export duties when
exported from Pakistan; particularly, after the devaluation
of the Pakistani Rupee in May, 1972. A large number of
commodities were placed in this category. The export duties
levied on them were taken from the Budget document (1972-73)
and the Pakistan Economic Surveys. In most of the cases these
duties were specific charges; they were expressed as ad
valorem duties.
For example, in 1972-73, the following duties were
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payable on the export of rice.
i) Rice Basmati @ Rs 34.00 per cwt.
ii) Rice coarse @ Rs 7.00 per cwt.
In the same year, the exports of rice were as follows
Quantity (tons) Value ( '000 'Rs)
i) Rice Basmati 108,922 272,922
ii) Rice Coarse 667,493 863,214
From the export figures, price per cwti was calculated
for each category and the duty was expressed as a percentage
of the price, i.e.










And finally, the weighted duty for the commodity 'Rice'
was calculated, using the shares of each item in the total
value of export of the commodity 'Rice' as weights, which
in this example was:
0_ 272,922 ,rt QO 863,21427 14 x + 10 83 v
272,922 + 863214 272,922 + 863,214
= 14.75%
A similar procedure was adopted for all the years for which a
commodity had been liable to export duty, and for all the
commodities which were subject to export duties.
A difficulty arose in the case of raw cotton, on which
the export duty had remained in force until 21.11.1967, and
again after the devaluation. In the earlier years (i.e.
until 22.11.1962) different rates of duty had applied to the
export of DESI cotton and to superior varieties of cotton.
The Foreign Trade Statistics for those years have not shown
their respective exports separately, but instead have shown
most of the exports against the item - raw cotton, n.e.s.
It was not possible to calculate their prices separately. We
have, therefore, calculated the Unit Price per bale of cotton
(392 lbs), expressing the duty as a percentage of that unit
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price and weighting it by 30% of the share of Desi cotton
and 70% of the share of other varieties. These weights
correspond to the shares of these varieties in the total
value of raw cotton in 1961-62 in rupees.
When different rates of duty had applied within the
year or the rate of duty was changed within the year, the
rates calculated were further weighted by the number of
days a certain rate had remained in force within the year.
Weighting by number of days a certain rate had applied was
also done in the case of the Export Bonus Scheme and the
Export Performance Licensing Scheme. An example may eluci¬
date this point. Under the Export Bonus Scheme, Cotton
yarn was allowed bonus vouchers at the rate of 20 per cent
of F.O.B. exports on 15.1.1959, which was reduced to 10 per
cent w.e.f. 22.1.1960. For the year 1959-60 the bonus rate
was calculated as follows:-
The rate of 20% remained in force from July 1,1959 - Jan.21,1960 i.e.205 days
The rate of 10% remained in force from Jan.22,1960 - June 30,1960 i .e . 160 days.
The rate for the year 1959-60
205 _ 160
20 x —— + 10 x
365 365
= 15.62%
We had decided to calculate the commodity-specific Effective
Exchange Rates at the 3-digit commodity level. It is evident
from the Appendix tables BSC that different items included
in these 'aggregate' commodities were allowed different rates
of Export Bonus and Export Performance Licensing, which did
not correspond to the 'aggregate' commodities. In order to
find the bonus and performance licensing rates for the
'aggregate' commodities, the export values of the items, within
the 3-digit commodities, enjoying a particular rate were added,
expressed as a percentage of the total value of exports of
the 3-digit commodity, and were used as weights for calculating
the weighted rate for the 3-digit commodity.
Let us take an example. For the sake of simplicity and
convenience, we take the year 1964-65 when only two rates of
the export bonus (i.e. 20% and 30%) were in force. In the
commodity (as we are using this term) yarn and thread (PSTC-651)
Cotton and woollen yarn were allowed bonus vouchers at the
rate of 20 per cent, while worsted yarn,thread embroidery and
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thread sewing etc. were given bonus vouchers at the rate
of 30 per cent. In the total yarn and thread exports of
Rs.141.6 million, the export of Rs 132.3 million belonged
to the former category, while the export of Rs. 9.3 million
to the latter. Thus the bonus rate for yarn and thread in
1964-65 was calculated as:
In the same year, Nylon gut and Monafilament, thread
spooling and woollen yarn etc. which were permitted export
performance licencing at the rate of 50% of their FOB exports
accounted for Rs. 9.3 million. Therefore, the Export Per¬
formance Licencing rate for yarn and thread in 1964-65 was
calculated as:
As another example in the same year 1964-65, cotton
cloth (PSTC 652) exports comprised of mill-made cloth and
cloth made by a hand-loom industry, which were further class¬
ified as bleached and unbleached, processed and unprocessed
and in a number of other ways. The bonus rates of 20 per
cent was applied to the exports of unprocessed and semi-
processed cloth, while the rate of 30 per cent was allowed
on the exports of fully-processed cloth. Out of the total
cotton cloth (652) exports of Rs 133.4 million, the exports
of Rs 76.4 million pertained to the former category, while
the exports of Rs 57.0 million belonged to the latter. The
export bonus rate for cotton cloth in 1964-65 was calculated
as:
The additional facility of performance licensing in that
year at the rate of 50 per cent of FOB exports was allowed
only to the exports of hand-loom fabrics and some cotton-cum-
synthetic fabrics. The value of exports attributable to
those items amounted to Rs 0.742 million in 1964-65. There¬






the exports of cotton cloth in 1964-65 was calculated as
= 0.28 per cent.
The export bonus rates and the export performance
licensing rates for all the commodities studied were cal¬
culated in a similar way. The procedure was the same even
when more than two rates had applied to items comprising the
3-digit commodity. The rates of bonus and performance
licensing thus calculated for the 'aggregate' commodities




5.2 The Estimates of the EERs.
After having computed the relevant rates of the Export
Bonus Scheme, the Export Performance Licensing Scheme, the
export duties and the sales tax etc. applicable to 3-digit
commodities for all the years in which they had been in force,
the EERs were estimated in the following way:-
EER. = OERx (1 + b. P + EPL. xfp + RT. - T. )
x 1 l3^ll
where:-
EER^ = The effective exchange rate for exports of commodity
i, as rupees per dollar,
OER = Official exchange rate as rupees per dollar,
b^ = The bonus rate applicable to commodity i, expressed
as a percentage of the FOB value of exports of
commodity i,
EPL^ = The export performance licensing rate applicable
to commodity i, expressed as a percentage of the
FOB value of exports of commodity i,
p = The premium on bonus vouchers (i.e. Annual averages
of the month-end market quotations on bonus vouchers),
RTj. = Tax rebates and tax exemptions applicable to commodity
i, expressed as a percentage of the FOB value of
exports of commodity i,
T^ = Taxes like export duties and sales tax levied on the
exports of commodity i, expressed as a percentage of
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the FOB value of exports of commodity i.
The amount by which the Export Bonus Scheme provided
higher domestic currency earnings than at the official
exchange rate per unit of foreign exchange earned was not
difficult to determine. The bonus vouchers,being transfer¬
able and negotiable,could be sold on an organised market,
and the premium on them could be obtained from those quota¬
tions. On the assumption that the exporters of commodity i
sold all the bonus vouchers in the market, the EER for that
commodity was enhanced by the extent of the applicable rate
of bonus for commodity i times the premium on bonus vouchers
during that period. The difficulty was with determining the
level of premium on the Export Performance licences. The
import licences granted under this scheme could not legally
be sold or transferred, nor could the resultant imported
commodities be traded. The surmise that a premium had
existed on performance licences follows from the fact that
for most of the period the Scheme was in force there had been
an excess demand, and a consequent scarcity of imported raw
materials and spare parts in the domestic market. Based
upon the discussion in the previous chapter, we have assumed
the premium on performance licences to equal two-thirds of
the premium on regular bonus vouchers, and thus linked it
with the premium on which regular quotations were available.
This rough approximation would under-state the actual premium
on performance licences if the restrictions on the import of
raw materials and spare parts were more stringent, and would
over-state it in the case of a more liberal import policy.
However, since most of the period of operation of the EPL
was marked by quantitative restrictions on the importation
of raw materials and spare parts and their excess demand in
the domestic market, this rough approximation does not appear
to exaggerate the level of premium on performance licences.
In addition to the effects of the EBS and the EPL on the EERs,
the EERs would increase on account of the tax rebates and
tax exemptions, while the export taxes would diminish the
domestic currency earnings below what they would be at the
official exchange rate, per unit of foreign exchange earned.
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The estimates of the commodity-specific EERs for
exports for the period of 1959-60 to 1976-77 are given in
Table 5.2.
Table 5.2 shows that the EERs for raw cotton and
fresh fish have been below the official exchange rate for
most of the period under study. With the exception of the
short period from 22nd November 1967 to 11th May 1972, raw
cotton had always been liable to export duty. Fresh fish, in
addition to the export duty in some earlier years and again
after the devaluation of May 1972, has throughout been
subject to sales tax when exported from the country. The
EERs for hides and skins rose above the official exchange
rate for the period of 1963-64 to 1966-67, when some varieties
like pickled hides and skins were granted bonus vouchers,
and again during 1970-71 to 1971-72 when all the exports from
Pakistan were given the facility of a 10 per cent bonus. The
EERs for all other commodities have remained higher (in many
cases substantially higher) than the official exchange rate
during the period before the 1972 devaluation. From January
1962 to June 1964, when some industries had been granted
the facility of additional licences under the Export Perfor¬
mance Licensing Scheme at the rate of 100 per cent of their
FOB value of exports, the EERs for canned fish and fish
preparations, paints and varnishes, medicinal and pharma¬
ceutical products, perfumery and cosmetics, leather manu¬
factures, footwear and electric machinery etc. became more
than double the official exchange rate. This rise in the
EERs and the consequentially higher domestic currency earn¬
ings from exports would be expected to have reduced the bias
against exports and make the export market more attractive
at the unchanged official exchange rate. After the devalua¬
tion in May 1972, export duties were levied on a number of
commodities. As a result, their EERs fell below the official
exchange rate. However, in 1974, excluding some primary
commodities like raw cotton, rice and fresh fish etc., export
duties on most of the other commodities were either removed
or lowered.
Over time, the EERs for exports have generally been
increasing, although the rate of increase in the EERs for
- 138 -

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































different commodities has been different during different
sub-periods. Between 1960-61 and 1962-63, the EERs for
commodities which had been given the facility of the EPL
Scheme, namely fish preparations, paints and varnishes,
medicinal and pharmaceutical products, perfumery and cos¬
metics, leather manufactures and footwear etc., rose
sharply and were more than 50 per cent higher than those
two years before in 1960-61. However, the share of their
value of exports in the total value of exports covered in
the study was only about 1.4 per cent in 1962-63. In the
same year the EERs for more than 93 per cent of exports were
not more than 10 per cent higher than those in 1960-61.
Even the very high EERs for the EPL entitled commodities
did not last very long, because in June 1964 the EPL Scheme
was rationalized, and the entitlement rates were reduced
from a uniform rate of 100 per cent value of FOB exports
to a maximum of 50 per cent, which resulted in a decline
in their EERs. For other commodities the EERs have been
rising over time. The general trend of increase in the
EERs and the percentage of exports benefitting from that
increase may be seen from Table 5.3.
It may be seen from Table 5.3 that whereas the EERs
for the majority of exports (i.e. more than 93%) were only
up to 10 per cent higher than those in 1960-61, none of the
exports except fresh fish remained in that range in 1970-71.
The EER for fresh fish in 1970-71 was less than that in
1960-61, because of a high sales tax on its exports. In
1970-71, the EERs for a large number of commodities like
beverages and tobacco, inorganic chemicals, soaps, cleansing
and polishing products, tanned leather, leather manufactures,
carpets and rugs, electric and non-electric machinery,
medicinal and pharmaceutical products, paints and varnishes,
perfumery and cosmetics, clothing and footwear etc. were
20 to 30 per cent higher compared with those in 1960-61.
Most of these commodities had gained another 10 per¬
centage points in EERs by 1976-77. While in 1970-71 nearly
one-fourth of the exports were getting EERs up to 30 per cent
higher than those in 1960-61, the proportion of exports in
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TABLE 5.3
Percentage increase in EERs over 1960-61 and the distribution of
exports benefitting from that increase.











-5.0 to 0 3.34 —
0 to 5 29.97 — —
5 to 10 63.26 — —
10 to 20 2.12 1.05 —
20 to 30 2.58 17.72 0.02
30 to 40 0.33 37.77 23.67
40 to 50 0.37 17.54 7.70
50 to 60 — 22.57 —
60 to 70 0.76 — 25.11
70 to 80 0.61 — 27.25
80 to 90 — — 16.84
Percentages in Cols. 2, 3 and 4 are of the total value of exports under
study. Columns 2, 3 and 4 may not add to 100 due to rounding.
SOURCE: Calculated from data in Table 5.2 and Appendix Table A.
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this range in 1976-77 was negligible. Almost all the exports
were getting EERs more than 30 per cent higher compared with
those in 1960-61.
Raw cotton, on which the export duty had been decreas¬
ing over time, was allowed a bonus of 10 per cent in 1970-71.
Consequently, the EERs for raw cotton along with cotton cloth
were 30 to 40 per cent higher in 1970-71 compared with those
in 1960-61. Although the export duty was reimposed on raw
cotton after the devaluation of 1972, the trend of increase
in its EER continued, so that in 1976-77 it was nearly double
that of 1960-61. Similarly, the EERs for other commodities
like rice, thread and yarn, art-silk and synthetic fabrics,
woollen fabrics, made-up articles of textiles and tulle, lace
and embroidery etc. also showed an increasing trend over time.
Compared with 1960-61, the EERs for these commodities were 40
to 60 per cent higher in 1970-71 and 60 to 100 per cent higher
in 1976-77. While by 1970-71 the EERs for exports had risen
up to 60 per cent above those in 1960-61, by 1976-77 they
had risen up to 100 per cent above their level of 1960-61.
In 1976-77 nearly 70 per cent of exports were benefitting
from the EERs which were 60 to 100 per cent above their, level
of 1960-61.
5.3 The EERs for Primary vs. Manufactured Exports.
At the time of introduction of the Export Bonus Scheme
in 1959, the exports of manufactured commodities were allowed
bonus vouchers at the rate of 20 and 40 per cent of their FOB
exports, while the exports of primary commodities were
excluded from the purview of the scheme. The main reason for
that was the country's objective to expand the exports of
manufactured commodities. Similarly, the EPL scheme and
other export promotional policies were also directed to help
the exports of manufactures. On the other hand, major primary
exports like raw cotton were subject to export duty on their
export from Pakistan. In order to see the extent of differ¬
entials in incentives for the exports of primary and manufac¬
turing sectors, we have calculated the weighted EERs for the
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two sectors. Raw cotton, hides and skins, unmanufactured
tobacco, rice and fresh fish were taken as belonging to the
primary sector, and all other commodities under study were
included in the manufacturing sector. The value of exports
of a particular commodity in each year as a percentage of
the total value of exports included in the sector were used
as weights. The weighted EERs for primary and manufactured
exports are given in Table 5.4.
It is clear from Table 5.4 that the domestic currency
earnings from the export of manufactured commodities have
remained consisently higher than at the official exchange
rate throughout the period under study, except for one year,
i.e. 1972-73, when they were slightly below those at the
official exchange rate. The reason for the EER for the
manufacturing sector being below the official exchange rate
in 1972-73 was the levying of export duties on a large number
of commodities after the devaluation of 1972. For the period
before the devaluation (i.e. 1959-60 to 1971-72) the differ¬
ential of EERs over the official exchange rate had ranged
between about 35 per cent in 1960-61 to about 93 per cent in
1968-69, averaging around 68 per cent for the whole period
of 1959-60 to 1971-72, though this differential was low,at
about 6% on average, for the period after the devaluation.
On the other hand, the EERs for the exports of the primary
sector have remained below the official exchange rate for
some earlier years of 1959-60 to 1961-62, and again from
1972-73 onwards. For the intervening period of 10 years
they remained slightly above the official exchange rate,
on average about 9 per cent, though this figure from 1962-63
to 1966-67 was only about 3 per cent. If we exclude the
EERs for rice from the calculation of the EERs for the primary
sector, the latter remain below the official exchange rate
for almost the whole of the period under consideration.
The EERs for primary exports as a ratio of the EERs
for manufactured exports ranged between about 58 to 71 per
cent for the period of 1959-60 to 1971-72. The average ratio
for this period was about 63.5 per cent. After the devalua¬
tion, the ratio of EERs for primary exports to the EERs for
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TABLE 5.4












1959-60 4.76 4.53 6.92 65.46
60-61 4.76 4.54 6.37 71.27
61-62 4.76 4.71 7.31 64.43
62-63 4.76 4.84 7.98 60.65
63-64 4.76 4.78 7.99 59.82
64-65 4.76 4.87 7.68 63.41
65-66 4.76 4.90 7.85 62.42
66-67 4.76 5.10 8.14 62.65
67-68 4.76 5.18 8.48 61.08
68-69 4.76 5.37 9.23 58.18
69-70 4.76 5.27 8.67 60.78
70-71 4.76 6.27 9.01 69.59
71-72 5.54 6.44 9.75 66.05
72-73 10.59 7.57 10.47 72.30
73-74 9.90 8.28 10.02 82.63
74-75 9.90 8.03 10.55 76.11






SOURCE: Calculated from data in Table 5.2
and Appendix Table A.
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manufactured exports ranged between about 72 to 84 per
cent, averaging around 78 per cent. This shows that the
terms of trade of the exports of primary commodities
relative to the exports of manufactured commodities in
terms of domestic currency earnings improved after the
devaluation by about 22.8 per cent.
Over time the pattern of change in the EERs for the
primary vs. the manufactured exports can be seen from
Table 5.5.
Table 5.5 shows that by 1962-63 the EERs for manufac¬
tured commodities had risen by more than 25 per cent over what
they were only two years previously in 1960-61. During the
same period they were only about 6 per cent higher for
primary exports, for which they never attained even the
20 per cent mark over 1960-61 during the 10 year period
of 1959-60 to 1969-70. However, the EERs for primary exports
went up sharply in 1970-71, since when they have kept an
upward trend, with some oscillations in 1974-75 and 1975-76.
For manufactured commodities the EERs declined somewhat in
1964-65 due to the rationalization of the EPL Scheme, but
kept rising after that until 1969-70. The EPL Scheme was
again the cause for their decline in 1969-70, because it
was terminated in December 1969. Since 1969-70, there has
been a steady rise in the EERs for manufactured exports,
except in 1973-74. In early 1973, Pakistan revalued its
Rupee following the devalation of the U.S. dollar. The
official par value of the Pakistani Rupee vis-sl-vis the U.S.
dollar was adjusted from Rs 11.00 to one U.S. dollar to Rs
9.90 to one U.S. dollar in February, 1973.
Another point worth noting is that while the EERs for
the primary exports had always been below the EERs for the
manufactured exports for the whole 18 year period under study,
the extent of this differential changed markedly between the
sixties and seventies. The average index of ratios of the
EERs for primary exports to the EERs of manufactured exports
(with 1960-61 as 100) changed from approximately 88.6 for the
period of 1960-61 to 1970-71 to about 106.7 during the period
of 1971-72 to 1976-77 - an increase of about 20.5 per cent.
This differential between the EERs for the exports of primary
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TABLE 5.5
Indices of the EERs for the Primary and the Manufactured Exports
(1960-61 = 100)







1959-60 99.78 108.53 91.85
60-61 100.00 100.00 100.00
61-62 103.68 114.67 90.41
62-63 106.47 125.21 85.10
63-64 105.15 125.28 83.94
64-65 107.27 120.47 88.98
65-66 107.90 123.18 87.58
66-67 112.37 127.64 87.91
67-68 114.04 133.03 85.71
68-69 118.32 144.82 81.63
69-70 116.03 135.95 85.29
70-71 138.10 141.35 97.64
71-72 141.71 152.95 92.68
72-73 166.65 164.31 101.45
73-74 182.32 157.20 115.94
74-75 176.82 165.49 106.79
75-76 176.24 167.76 105.13
76-77 198.84 167.99 118.30
SOURCE: Calculated from Table 5.4
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vs. manufacturing sectors and the change in the magnitude
and direction of the differential should have had an impact
on the rate of growth of exports of the two sectors, on
the growth of the economy, on resource allocation etc.
among other things. Higher EERs for manufactured exports
implying higher domestic currency earnings from exporting
those commodities would provide higher incentives for expand¬
ing their exports. The lower EERs, on the other hand, for
the export of primary commodities in their raw form would
act as a disincentive for their export. As a result, the
exports of manufactured commodities would be pushed up,
while primary exports would be discouraged. That is, probably,
what happened in Pakistan. During the period of 1960-61 to
1970-71, the exports of manufactured goods increased at an
annual rate of 21 per cent, whereas the exports of primary
commodities increased at a comparatively lower rate of 7 per
/g\
cent. This rapid rate of increase in the manufactured
exports might well have been a response to the higher incen¬
tives afforded to them during the sixties. During the
seventies, when the relative size of incentives between the
manufactured vs. the primary exports changed, their annual
rates of increase were 31 per cent and 23 per cent respectively,
between 1971-72 and 1976-77. The exports of manufactured
commodities which had been increasing at a rate nearly three-
times the rate of increase in the primary exports during the
sixties, grew only at less than one-and-a-half times the rate
of growth of primary exports during the seventies. As far
as the growth of agricultural production was concerned, it
rose at the rate of about 4.7 per cent per annum during the
period of 1960-61 to 1970-71, compared with the 11.4 per
cent annual rate of growth of the manufacturing production
during the same period. During 1971-72 to 1976-77, the agri¬
cultural and the manufacturing sectors both grew at lower
annual rates of 2.1 and 4.1 per cent respectively. The
pattern of growth in the domestic production of the two
sectors was similar to their growth of exports. The manufac-
(6) The rates of growth for Primary and Manufactured exports are cal¬
culated from data in Appendix Table A , while the rates of growth
of their domestic production, are based on data in Statistical Table
2.1 in Pakistan Economic Survey (1978-79) pp.9-11.
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turing output which had increased at a rate of nearly
times the rate of growth of agricultural production during
1960-61 to 1970-71, grew at less than double the rate of
growth of the latter during 1971-72 to 1976-77. The higher
rates of growth in the manufacturing sector during the six¬
ties might have resulted from a better set of incentives
to this sector. However, the discriminatory EERs between
the primary as compared to the manufacturing sectors were
not the only reason for their differential performance in
the fields of exports and domestic production during the
sixties and the seventies. There were other reasons too. The
whole structure of the Pakistan economy had changed during
the 1970's. The dismemberment of the country in December
1971 destroyed the common market of the former East and West
Pakistan, and produced inevitable and far-reaching conse¬
quences for the economy by forcing changes in its production
and trading patterns. Over and above these events, the
nationalization of some industries in 1972 further depressed
the investment climate in the country. Floods of August 1973
and later troubles at Tarbela Dam, and the oil price hike
starting in late 1973 with consequent developments on the
international scene would have all contributed to differ¬
ential performance of primary vs. manufacturing sectors
between the 1960's and 1970's. An export duty on raw cotton
was a kind of additional subsidy to domestic textile produc¬
tion insofar as it kept the prices of raw cotton lower than
world prices. The imposition of an export duty on raw cotton
reduced the profitability of its production, and the produc¬
tion of competing crops became more profitable (unless their
prices were unduly suppressed). Thus the diversion of
resources took place from the production of exportable goods
towards food crops for domestic consumption having wider
implications for export growth and the growth of the economy.
In addition, the lower profitability in the agricultural
sector would divert resources to the industrial sector. This
was perhaps in line with the strategy of the planners, who
had planned to develop the industrial sector rapidly. Lewis
(1970, p.149) observed that agriculture was squeezed relative
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to manufacturing. He estimated that in the mid-fifties
out of approximately $500 million worth of agricultural goods
marketed annually, around $300 million were transferred out
of agriculture into the manufacturing sector every year.
(7)
5.4 The Real Effective Exchanges Rates.
The above analysis was couched in terms of the effec¬
tive exchange rates measured in current period prices, which
may be called as the nominal EERs. The comparison of the
nominal EERs at different points in time may not provide a
correct measure of the change in export incentives during the
intervening period. Both domestic and foreign price levels
may have changed during the period. If raw material and
labour costs rise faster than the nominal EERs, the margins
on export sales may shrink, as producers may not be able to
pass the increased costs on to the more elastic world market.
The relative attractiveness of exports may also weaken if
demand-pull inflation in the domestic market raises domestic
prices more than the export prices. Moreover, an increase in
the general level of domestic prices would result in a decline
in exporters' real income. They may become less keen to
expand exports, with the consequence of a deterioration in
export performance. For these and similar other reasons, the
changes in domestic,as well as foreign prices, should be taken
into account in order to calculate the real effective exchange
rates.
The 'price-level-deflated' effective exchange rate
(PDL-EER) is calculated by deflating nominal EERs for differ¬
ent years by the price level index of the country in question.
This PLD-EER shows the 'real' value of the receipts from each
dollar's worth of exports expressed in the prices of a given
base year. However, the PLD-EER takes into account only the
movements in the domestic price level, whereas the exporters
real incentives are also affected by the level of foreign
prices. The Purchasing-Power-Parity Effective Exchange Rate
(7) These concepts of real effective exchange rates have been taken from
the NBER study ' Foreign Trade Regimes and Economic Development' and
Guisinger (1977).
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(PPP-EER) has been devised to take into account the movements
in export prices along with the movement in domestic prices.
The PPP-EER is simply the PLD-EER multiplied by an index of
foreign prices. The question is which index of foreign
prices should be used? It can be either the unit value index
of the country's exports, expressed in units of foreign
exchange, or a weighted average of the domestic price indices
of the country's major trading partners. While the former has
the advantage of focusing on the country's existing exports,
it is subject to sharp cyclical swings. It also tends to
under-represent the prices of new or potential export products.
The average wholesale (or consumer) price index of the
country's major trading partners is more in-line with the
underlying notion of the purchasing-power-parity theory. But
for countries like Pakistan where exports are concentrated in
a small group of products - cotton and cotton manufactures,
leather and leather manufactures, and rice - the average index
of foreign prices may not give a correct picture of the
long-term changes in the world prices affecting their exports.
On a priori grounds, neither index of foreign prices has a
clear-cut advantage in the present case.
We have constructed a composite price index from the
wholesale price indices of Pakistan's major trading partners,
namely the U.S.A., the U.K., West Germany, Japan and Hong Kong,
using as weights the shares of exports going to each of these
/g\
countries in the total exports going to these countries.
(8) Pakistan's exports going to the U.S.A., the U.K., West Germany, Japan


















1959-60 38.7 1964-65 40.7 1969-70 38.0 1974-75 29.4
60-61 54.7 65-66 43.4 70-71 40.9 75-76 35.4
61-62 53.0 66-67 42.6 71-72 58.9 76-77 32.4
62-63 53.0 67-68 45.3 72-73 44.5
63-64 48.5 68-69 38.9 73-74 33.9
SOURCE:- Calculated from data in Pakistan Foreign Trade
Statistics (various issues).
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As another index of foreign prices, the unit values of
Pakistan's primary as well as manufactured exports were
expressed in dollars, by dividing the unit value indices
in domestic currency by the official exchange rate in
different years. These indices of foreign prices,along with
the indices of domestic prices, have been used to calculate
the real EERs.
As noted above, the exporters' incentives will be
affected if the prices of inputs going into the production
of export goods change, or the domestic prices of export-
ables vis-a-vis their export prices change, or the consumer
prices rise,resulting in the loss of purchasing power of
exporters' profits. Ideally, one would like to use an index
of domestic prices which takes into account all these effects.
None of the consumer or wholesale price indices regularly
reported in Pakistan yields a weighted index of all three of
these effects, nor can such a composite index be constructed
because the weights to be applied in constructing such an
index are not known. Therefore, a proxy may be used, but
its approximation to the appropriate composite price deflator
may not be exact. For example, the general wholesale price
index may be used because it reflects the prices of both raw
materials and final goods. The general wholesale price
index, however, gives considerable weight to export industries
and this produces a downward bias in the real EERs. The
reason for that is as follows:
An increase in the nominal EERs would be expected to
raise the domestic prices of export goods. This alone would
tend to push up the general wholesale price index. If then
the nominal EERs are deflated by this price index, which has
risen solely because of the export incentives, it would give
an incorrect measure of the real EERs - a measure biased
downwardly. This downward bias will be even greater, if the
wholesale price index of a particular sector like the primary
or manufacturing sector is used. However, in the absence of
an appropriate composite price deflator, we have chosen to
use the general wholesale price index and the wholesale price
indices of primary and manufacturing sectors for calculating
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Wholesale price index (General)
Composite price index (Pakistan*major tradingpartners)
Unit-Value indexfor primarygoods (expressedin$ )
Unit-value indexfor manufactures (expressedin$ )
Wholesale priceindex forprimary commodities

























































SOURCES:-(i)Cols.2,6and7:P ki tanEco omicSurvey(1976-77) StatisticalTable26,p.67changedobas19 0-61=0. (ii)Col.3:Wholesalepricindicesf rUSA,KWe tG rmanyandJ pant kefromIMF,"InternationalFin nci lSt tistics",var ouissuendf rH ngKfromCe sus andSt tisticsDepartment,HongK ng."HongMo thlyDigesfS atistics", variousissue .Compositepricindexcalculatedbyweightingthwhol salepric indicesofthesecountriesbythsharefPakistan'sxportsgoingte chf thesecountries. (iii)Cols.4and5:Upt1973-74fromPakistanEconomicSurvey(19 -75)Statist al Table38,pp.98-99,andforthrestStatisticalY arook(1 77-78),p.260.
the real EERs. These indices and the indices of foreign
prices, namely the composite index of wholesale prices of
Pakistan's trading partners and the unit value indices expressed
in units of foreign exchange, are given in Table 5.6.
Table 5.6 shows that the first half of the 1960s was
marked by relatively stable prices in Pakistan as well as
in its trading partners (in Pakistan the general level of
prices fell between 1960-61 and 1962-63). From 1966-67 onwards,
the general level of prices began to rise rapidly in both
domestic and foreign markets, and this rise was more pronounced
in the domestic market during the 1970s. Moreover, during
this period the general wholesale price index of Pakistan always
remained above the level of prices of its trading partners.
When the behaviour of prices for primary and manufacturing
categories is considered separately, a picture different from
the behaviour of the general level of prices emerges. While
their domestic prices have generally been rising throughout,
their unit values are dominated by cyclical swings. The
effects of these changes in the domestic and foreign prices
on the EERs can be seen from Table 5.7.
An examination of the nominal and real EERs in Table
5.7 shows that for primary exports, the nominal EERs, though
they had remained mostly below the official exchange rate,
showed a generally rising trend between 1960-61 and 1976-77.
This trend, however, was not maintained between the years
1962-63 to 1963-64 and again between 1973-74 to 1975-76, and
the rise in the nominal EERs was not uniform over time.
While the nominal EERs rose by about 38 per cent between
1960-61 and 1970-71, in 1976-77 they were nearly double their
level of 1960-61.
During this period, both indices of domestic prices, i.e.
the general wholesale price index and the wholesale price
index for primary commodities, had been rising with the
exceptions of 1961-62 and 1962-63 for the former and of 1967-68
for the latter when they were below their 1960-61 levels
respectively. The rise in these domestic price indices was
much faster in the 1970s compared with the rise in them in
the 1960s. The PLD-EERs on either index of domestic prices
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TABLE 5.7(A)
Nominal and Real Effective Exchange Rates





PLD-EERs(I) PLD-EER(II) PPP-EERs(I) PPP-EERs(II) ]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1959-60 4.53 4.75 4.90 4.73 4.89
60-61 4.54 4.54 4.54 4.54 4.54
61-62 4.71 4.72 4.60 4.78 4.46
62-63 4.84 4.93 4.73 4.99 4.42
63-64 4.78 4.71 4.6© 4.85 4.13
64-65 4.87 4.50 4.19 4.74 4.21
65-66 4.90 4.58 4.22 4.95 4.29
66-67 5.10 4.30 4.38 4.79 4.17
67-68 5.18 4.32 5.29 4.91 4.74
68-69 5.37 4.35 5.14 5.11 4.37
69-70 5.27 4.18 4.67 5.08 4.09
70-71 6.27 4.79 5.10 6.08 5.38
71-72 6.44 4.49 4.38 5.86 4.43
72-73 7.57 4.41 5.19 6.14 4.99
73-74 8.28 3.79 4 .37 6.33 7.33
74-75 8.03 2.91 3.74 5.51 5.70
75-76 8.01 2.61 3.26 5.24 5.09
76-77 9.03 2.80 3.13 6.18 5.92
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PLD-EERs(I) PLD-EER(II) PPP-EERs(I) PPP-EERs(II)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1959-60 6.92 7.25 6.86 7.21 N.A
60-61 6.37 6.37 6.37 6.37 6.37
61-62 7.31 7.32 7.18 7.41 7.21
62-63 7.98 8.13 7.50 8.24 7.18
63-64 7.99 7.87 7.40 8.10 7.03
64-65 7.68 7.09 7.11 7.47 7.15
65-66 7.85 7.34 6.91 7.93 7.29
66-67 8.14 6.85 6.90 7.63 6.87
67-68 8.48 7.07 6 .90 8.04 6.79
68-69 9.23 7.47 7.06 8.77 7.03
69-70 8.67 6.87 6.40 8.35 6.62
70-71 9.01 6.87 6.28 8.73 6.11
71-72 9.75 6.80 6.38 8.88 6.66
72-73 10.47 6.10 6.09 8.50 8.41
73-74 10.02 4.58 4.76 7.66 11.02
74-75 10.55 3.83 3.67 7.24 7.00
75-76 10.69 3.48 3.30 7.00 6.14
76-77 10.71 3.32 3.02 7.32 7.18
SOURCE:- Calculated from data in Tables 5. 4 and 5.6 as
(i) Col.3: PLD-EERs(I) = Nominal EERs for Primary or Manufactured Exports
deflated by the domestic wholesale price index.
(ii) Col.4: PLD-EERs(II) = Nominal EERs for Primary or Manufactured Exports
deflated by the relevant domestic wholesale prices of the
Primary or Manufacturing sector.
(iii) Col.5: PPP-EERs(I) = PLD-EERs(I) multiplied by the composite index of
wholesale prices of Pakistan's trading partners.
(iv) Col.6: PPP-EERs(II) = PLD-EERs(II) multiplied by the relevant unit
value indices of primary or manufactured exports.
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TABLE 5.7(B): Indices of Nominal and Real EERs
B.1: Indices of Nominal and Real EERs for Primary Exports (1960-61 = 100)
YEAR
■ ■
Nominal EERs PLD-EERs(I) PLD-EERs(II) PPP-EERs(I) PPP-EERs(II)
1960-61 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
61-62 103.68 103.80 101.25 105.17 98.12
62-63 106.47 108.45 104.16 109.89 97.20
63-64 105.15 103.59 101.22 106.72 91.03
64-65 107.27 98.98 92.19 104.37 92.65
65-66 107.90 100.91 92.95 108.96 94.34
66-67 112.37 94 .67 96.34 105.35 91.83
67-68 114.04 95.07 116.52 108.16 104.44
68-69 118.32 95.69 113.09 112.43 96.18
69-70 116.03 91.96 102.74 111.86 90.03
70-71 138.10 105.37 112.18 133.77 118.45
71-72 141.71 98.78 96.37 129.06 97.58
72-73 166.65 97.14 114.27 135.18 109.95
73-74 182.32 83.39 96 .18 139 .34 161.47
74-75 176.82 64.13 82.43 121.38 125.46
75-76 176.24 57.38 71.85 115.39 112.14
76-77 198.84 61.74 68 .91 135.96 130.29
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B-2: Indices of Nominal and Real EERs for Manufactured Exports (1960-61=100)
YEAR Nominal EERs PLD-EERS(I) PLD-EERs(II) PPP-EERs(I) PPP-EERs(IX)
1960-61 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
61-62 114.67 114.80 112.64 116.32 113.09
62-63 125.21 127.53 117.68 129.23 112.62
63-64 125.28 123.42 116.11 127.16 110.31
64-65 120.47 111.16 111.55 117.21 112.22
65-66 123.18 115.20 108.43 124.38 114.39
66-67 127.64 107.54 108.27 119.68 107.72
67-68 133.03 110.90 108.33 126.16 106.60
68-69 144.82 117.13 110;72 137.62 110.28
69-70 135.95 107.75 100.48 131.07 103.90
70-71 141.35 107.85 98.57 136.92 95.81
71-72 152.95 106.61 100.17 139.30 104.57
72-73 164.31 95.77 95.47 133.28 131.91
73-74 157.20 71.90 74.64 120.14 172.88
74-75 165.49 60.02 57.64 113.60 109.86
75-76 167.76 54.62 51 .73 109.84 96.40
76-77 167.99 52.16 47.31 114.87 112.68
I
SOURCE: Based on Table 5.7A.
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show a rising-falling trend, though the timings of rise
or fall do not necessarily coincide. The PLD-EERs based
on the general wholesale price index rose between 1960-61
and 1962-63, but fell over the next two years. Then from
1966-67 to 1969-70 remained below their 1960-61 level
throughout, because the rise in domestic prices was higher
than the rise in nominal EERs. In spite of the fact that
the nominal EERs for primary exports had risen very quickly
in the 1970s, the general wholesale price index rose even
more rapidly during this period. The result was a sharp
decline in PLD-EERs in the 1970s, particularly after
1973-74, so that in 1975-76 they were nearly 43 per cent
lower than their level of 1960-61. This means that taking
into account only domestic wholesale prices, the real value
of each unit of foreign exchange earned by the primary
exporters declined in the 1970s.
The PLD-EERs based on the other index of domestic prices
i.e. the wholesale prices of primary commodities also
showed a similar trend, but the timings of rise and fall in
them were different. For example, during the period 1967-68
to 1969-70 while the PLD-EERs based on the general wholesale
price index were lower than their 1960-61 level, they had
remained higher than the 1960-61 level for the same period
when based on the wholesale price index for primary commodities.
However, from 1973-74 onwards the PLD-EERs based on both
price indices showed a deterioration, although its extent
was different for the two measures.
The general wholesale price index in Pakistan and the
composite price index of its trading partners rose at about
the same rate until 1965-66, when they began to diverge
(in fact the former remained lower than the latter until
1963-64). The bulk of this divergence took place in the
1970s. After 1970-71, the general wholesale price index
in Pakistan increased so rapidly that against a divergence
of only 4 points in that year, it had soared to about 106
points above the average index for the countries receiving
her exports by 1975-76. The PPP-EERs(I) based on the
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general wholesale price index on the domestic side, and
the composite price index of Pakistan's trading partners
for foreign prices remained above their 1960-61 level for
the whole period of 1960-61 to 1976-77.
The point worth noting is that while the nominal
EERs had remained on average about 12 and 74 per cent above
their 1960-61 level for the periods 1960-61 to 1970-71 and
1971-72 to 1976-77 respectively, the average PPP-EERs(I)
were about 10 and 2Cj per cent higher than their 1960-61
level for the same periods respectively. The significant
divergence in the average nominal EERs and the average
PPP-EERs(I) during the 1970s was due to the widely differ¬
ent behaviour of prices in the domestic and the foreign
markets during that period. The incentives for the export
of primary commodities in the 1970s increased on average
by 74 per cent over 1960-61 on a nominal basis, whereas in
real terms they had not risen above 29 per cent on average
over the 1960-61 level. The year-to-year changes in them
showed a rising-falling pattern, which in many cases was
dissimilar to that of nominal EERs. The years in which the
domestic prices went up more than the combined rise in the
nominal EERs and the composite index of foreign prices over
the previous year, the PPP-EERs (I) registered a decline,
even though the nominal EERs had shown a rise in those years.
Such years were 1964-65, 1966-67 and 1971-72. Moreover,
the rates of year-to-year changes in the nominal EERs and
the PPP-EERs(I) were quite different for the two measures
of export incentives.
The PPP-EERs(II) based on the domestic wholesale prices
of primary commodities and the unit value indices of primary
exports expressed in units of foreign exchange focus directly
on changes in incentives for primary exports resulting from
changes in their nominal EERs and their price movements in
the domestic market vs. foreign markets. In the 1960s, the
unit value indices remained generally below their domestic
prices. During that period, therefore, in spite of the
modest improvement in their nominal EERs, the PPP-EERs(II)
always remained below the nominal EERs or the PPP-EERs(I),
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and showed generally a falling trend. The only exception
was the year 1967-68, when their domestic prices were below
their foreign prices, and the PPP-EERs(II) showed some
improvement above their 1960-61 level. The deterioration
in the PPP-EER (II) for primary exports during the 1960s
could have acted as a disincentive for their exports with
the consequent slower growth rate of their exports and
other effects on resource allocation. In the 1970s, the
PPP-EERs(II) exhibited a rising-falling pattern. They
reached their peak in 1973-74, but fell drastically over
the next two years, though picked up slightly again in
1976-77. All the three measures, i.e. the nominal EERs,
the PPP-EERs(I) and the PPP-EERs(II) suggest that the profit¬
ability from exporting primary commodities increased in the
1970s and their relative position improved in the 1970s
compared with their position in the 1960s.
The main thrust of the export promotion schemes in
the 1960s was on the exports of manufactures. The nominal
EERs for the manufactured exports, therefore, remained con¬
siderably higher (about 34 to 93 per cent) than the official
exchange rate during that period. In general, the nominal
EERs had been rising between 1960-61 and 1976-77, though
there were some minor reversals of this trend as well, and
the year-to-year rate of increase in them was not uniform
during this period.
As for the primary exports, four types of real EERs
were constructed for manufactured exports:-
i) the PLD-EERs(I) based on the general wholesale price
index in Pakistan,
ii) the PLD-EERs(II) based on the wholesale price indices
of manufactured commodities in Pakistan,
iii) the PPP-EERs(I) as the PLD-EERs(I) multiplied by the
composite price index of Pakistan's trading partners,
and
iv) the PPP-EERs(II) as the PLD-EERs(II) multiplied by
the unit value indices of manufactured exports
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expressed in units of foreign exchange.
Both types of PLD-EERs peaked around 1962-63 and
showed an almost similar rising-falling pattern during
the period of 1960-61 to 1976-77. The magnitude of the
rise or fall, however, was by no means similar because
of the different magnitudes of changes in the two series
of domestic prices. Moreover, the pattern of year-to-year
rise or fall differed from each other for the two types of
the PLD-EERs in 1965-66, 1970-70 and 1971-72. Compared
with 1960-61, the rise in the nominal EERs during the 1960s
was more than the rise in both indices of domestic prices,
so that the PLD-EERs of both types remained above their
1960-61 level in this period. This may be regarded as a
successful manifestation of the export promotion schemes.
The profitability from exporting manufactured goods remained
higher than their sales in the domestic market during this
period. Nonetheless, the extent of this profitability
had been declining since 1962-63, when only the domestic
prices were taken into account. Although the nominal EERs
had been rising modestly during the 1970s, the PLD-EERs of
both types showed clearly a declining trend after 1971-72.
In 1976-77 they were less than half those of 1971-72, and
were about 48 to 53 per cent lower than their level of
1960-61. This was due to the fact that domestic prices
had risen at a much faster rate than the rise in the nominal
EERs during the 1970s.
Both types of PPP-EERs for manufactured exports showed
a rising-falling trend between 1960-61 and 1970-71, though
their timings were different in many cases. In addition,
during this period the PPP-EERs(II) based on domestic whole¬
sale prices of manufactures and their unit value indices
expressed in units of foreign exchange always remained below
the PPP-EERs(I) which were based on the general wholesale
price index in Pakistan, and the composite index of wholesale
prices in the countries receiving Pakistan's exports. This
was because, during this period, generally the domestic whole¬
sale prices of manufactures increased at a higher rate than
the general wholesale price index, and the unit value indices
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remained lower than the composite price index, both relative
changes tending to depress the PPP-EERs(II). Since the high
level of nominal incentives to manufactured exports alone
would have raised their domestic prices, the PPP-EERs(II) as
a measure of real incentives to them was biased downwards.
In the 1970s, while the PPP-EERs(I) had been declining
between 1971-72 and 1975-76, the PPP-EERs(II) showed a rapid
rise between 1971-72 and 1973-74 and then a drastic decline
over the next two years. This may be seen from the fact
that the PPP-EERs(II) were about 65.3 per cent higher in
1973-74 compared with their level in 1971-72, and were
nearly 44.2 per cent lower in 1975-76 compared with their
1973-74 level. The primary reason for these swings was the
major changes in the unit value indices for manufactured
exports.
Unlike primary exports, whose profitability from
exporting in terms of nominal as well as real EERs, increased
in the 1970s compared with that in the 1960s, the position
for manufactured exports appears to have deteriorated in the
1970s. In spite of the fact that the average differential
of nominal EERs for manufactured exports over their 1960-61
level was somewhat higher during the period 1971-72 to
1976-77, i.e. 62.6 per cent compared with 25.6 per cent
during 1960-61 to 1970-71, the average differential in terms
of PPP-EERs(I) declined from 24.2 per cent in the 1960s to
about 21.8 per cent in the 1970s. The PLD-EERs of both
types were substantially lower in the 1970s than their
levels in the 1960s. These indicators may be interpreted
as showing a deterioration in the profitability from export¬
ing manufactured commodities in the 1970s compared with that
in the 1960s. However, the PPP-EERs(II) showed some improve¬
ment in the later period over the earlier one, but this
must be interpreted with great care. Firstly, this measure
had, in the sixties, a downward bias in incentives for
exporting, as noted above. Secondly, the improvement in
this measure in the seventies was very much influenced by
the unprecedented high unit values of manufactured exports
in 1973-74, which were not maintained in the later years.
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Therefore, this improvement in the PPP-EER(II) in the 1970s
over the 1960s is of dubious character. The general con¬
clusion which emerges from the examination of the EERs is
that the profitability from exporting manufactured commo¬
dities decreased in the 1970s compared with that in the
1960s, and the relative position of primary exports vis-ji-vis
manufactured exports improved in the 1970s.
5.5 Comparison with some other countries.
Many developing countries, in the 1960s, changed their
strategy. They shifted emphasis from import substitution
to export promotion. The timing of this shift, and the
extent of encouragement afforded to exports were, however,
(Q\
different in different countries.
It is not only the level of real EERs in a country
alone that affects its exports. The level of real EERs
in other competitor countries may also have an effect on
its export performance. If other countries exporting similar
products give better real EERs to their exports, then despite
an improved absolute level of EERs, the country in question
may fail to expand its exports. It is therefore worth while
to see the level of real EERs in some other developing coun¬
tries as well. For the purposes of comparison, the indices
of PLD-EERs in some developing countries are given in Table
5.8.
The data in Table 5.8 are not directly comparable,
because of the differences in inclusion or exclusion of
particular schemes from the construction of EERs in different
countries and because of the differences in methods of their
calculation/10^ Nevertheless, they may be regarded as indi¬
cations of the direction of change in the profitability from
exporting in those countries. During the 1960s, some coun¬
tries like Colombia, the Philippines and Pakistan had a
successful export-promotional strategy, as can be seen from
(9) Krueger: (1978, pp.20-21)
(10) For details see Krueger (1978,pp.288-89) and the references cited there.
- 167 -
TABLE5.8:IndicesofPLD-E Rsf rN n-traditionalExportsiSomeevelopingC untries(1960-61=0)
















































































































































N.A=otavailable. SOURCE:Cols.2t10fr mKrueger(1978),Table9.2P.189.hPLD- ERsint atlw efocal ndar yearsandwith1958=00.Theyerec ng dtonformtry arfPaki tanbt ki g asimpleaverageoftwoy rsandexpressingth tr tioof1960-61=00.F rexample,f 1961-62theaverageofEERsf r19 1andwast kenandexpre edr tioof1960-61=00. Col.11fromTab e5.7.
the Table. In other countries, the increase in the EERs
was short-lived, and as noted by Krueger (1978,pp.186-87)
generally the domestic inflation was quite high, so that
the PLD-EERs could not be maintained at their 1960-61
level. The nominal EERs for manufactured exports in
Pakistan had risen more rapidly than the domestic inflation
in the sixties. As a result, the PLD-EERs had remained
higher than their 1960-61 level during this period, and the
exports became more attractive at an unchanged official
exchange rate. Compared with some other developing coun¬
tries such as India, South Korea and Turkey etc, the
PLD-EERs in Pakistan remained higher than the PLD-EERs
in those countries during the sixties. This means that
during this period, the export trade in Pakistan was more
profitable and attractive than that in India, South Korea
or Turkey etc. The profitability of exporting from Pakistan
relative to the profitability of exporting from many
other developing countries, was higher during this period,
which may be regarded as a successful manifestation of
export promotion schemes of Pakistan.
The examination of the EERs (both nominal and real)
for the manufactured exports in the sixties has shown that
the export promotion schemes of Pakistan had made their
exports more profitable at an unchanged official exchange
rate during this period. Not only had the absolute level
of real EERs for exports in Pakistan risen, but their
level relative to the level of real EERs in many other devel¬
oping countries had also risen during this period. In the
seventies, while the nominal EERs for manufactured exports
showed some improvement, the rapid rise in domestic infla¬
tion had resulted in a deterioration in their real EERs
during this period. On the other hand, the EERs for primary
exports had always remained below those for manufactured
exports. However, the extent of differential between the
EERs for primary exports vs. the manufactured exports




The Response of Exports to the EERs
In the previous chapter, the commodity-specific EERs
were constructed, which reflected the effects of Government
policy on the incentives to export, and their behaviour
between different commodities and over time were discussed.
Since the declared objective of Government policies was,
among other things, the promotion of exports from the country,
it is imperative to see how far they succeeded in achieving
this objective. The responsiveness of exports to the EERs
is, therefore, discussed in this chapter.
6.1 Variables in a Trade Model^ and the Analytical Framework.
The export performance of a country is determined by
the demand for its exports from the rest of the world and
their supply from that country. In international trade text¬
books the demand for,and supply of exports of a country, is
traditionally considered in terms of excess demand and excess
supply. The demand for the exports of a country is the
demand from the rest of the world for the imports from that
country. The demand for imports as an excess demand is the
difference between total domestic demand for, and domestic
supply of the goods in question in the importing countries.
Therefore, in theory the demand for imports is a function of
all those variables which determine total domestic supply of,
and domestic demand for the importable goods in the importing
countries. A distinction between the importable goods as a
producer or consumer goods can also be made.
In all cases, price amongst other things determines
demand. The price relevant for demand is the one actually
paid, i.e. the transaction price, which comprises CIF price,
import duties and other taxes, etc. Price is not the only
element that reflects the competitiveness and availability of
goods. Non-price elements such as servicing, delivery delays
(1) For a good general discussion on variables in a trade model see
Basevi (1973) and Rhomberg (1973).
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etc. may also affect demand. All these 'effective price'
elements will affect demand for the goods directly when they
refer to the same goods and indirectly when they refer to goods
which are substitutes or complements for the goods in question.
In addition to 'effective price' variables, disposable income
will determine consumer's demand, while the level of produc¬
tion or the activity into which the goods enter as an input
will determine producer's demand for it. Thus we can write:-
xd = xd (P, T, E, Y,, A, )
where
x = demand for exports of a country from the rest
of the world,
P = price of the goods in question including trans¬
port costs, etc., and of its substitutes and
complements,
T = Tariffs and other taxes,
E = 'Effective-price' elements such as after-sale
service, etc.,
= disposable income, and
A = level of activity into which the goods enter as
an input.
The supply of exports is, in principle, an excess supply
resulting from the (POSITIVE) difference between total domes¬
tic supply of the exportable goods and its internal demand.
The excess supply formulation assumes that exports and domes¬
tically absorbed exportables are perfect substitutes. If this
assumption is accepted, the resulting excess supply should be
a function of all those variables which determine total domes¬
tic supply and domestic demand for the exportable goods. If
the assumption is not accepted, the export supply should be
considered as a pure supply function.
In the pure supply case, the producer price of the goods
in question is a prime variable determining the profitability
of its production. The wage level and the prices of material
inputs should thus be included. To take account of the costs
of capital, a financial variable might be added. Moreover, if
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technology is not assumed to remain constant over the sample
period, an index of productivity would be necessary to incor¬
porate possible shifts in the production function. Thus we
can write:-
Xs = Xs (P, W, Pi, y, tt, )
where
Xs = the supply of exports of a commodity from the
country in question,
P = the export price of the commodity,
W = wage rate,
Pi = prices of inputs,
y = financial variable, and
it = index of productivity.
The analysis of a country's export performance should
ideally be based on all the factors affecting the demand for,
and the supply of its exports. In that case the model would
become very complicated. Abstraction from reality and a com¬
promise between theoretical rigour and practical expediency
is a common practice with economists. The aim of the present
study is limited. The principal intent is to determine the
extent to which Pakistan's exports, during the period of
1959-60 to 1976-77, can be explained by export promotion
schemes, or the effective exchange rates. For this purpose
in making the small-country assumption, only a single equation
model will be used. The small-country assumption essentially
means that the world market prices are determined exogenously
as far as the country in question is concerned, and the demand
for its exports is perfectly price elastic. This assumption
seems justified for Pakistan's exports in the light of the
relative unimportance of any single export item in world
trade. Of course, such an assumption will be invalid for any
commodity if its exports are large enough to affect the world
price significantly.
If a country is only a marginal exporter of a standar¬
dized commodity, then that country has not much influence on
- 172 -
export prices. Such a country has to take export prices as
given from outside and the only course of action open to it
is to adjust its export supplies. This is similar to the
familiar world of pure competition in which any single seller
has to accept market prices as given, and then adjust his
supplies in the most profitable manner open to him. Theoret¬
ically, a seller under pure competition faces an infinitely
elastic demand curve for his product at the ruling price, and
the only effective limit on the volume of his sales is set by
his own willingness and ability to supply goods at that price.
On this analogy, the world demand is not a relevant deter¬
minant of the export performance of a country which is only
a marginal exporter of a standard commodity.
The mere fact that a country is only a marginal exporter
of a certain commodity does not, by itself, establish the con¬
clusion that it is operating in a world of pure competition.
For even though this country may not have any influence on
export prices, these prices may be set only by a few dominant
exporting countries, so that the market structure from the
point of view of world trade, may in fact, be oligopolistic.
In such a case, oligopolists may set the export prices and
the marginal exporter may have to follow their lead. In an
oligopolistic market environment, the outcome of an attempt
by a major exporter to raise its share of the market depends
upon the attitude of the oligopolists. In settled market
conditions, after a good deal of probing, oligopolists may
reckon 'peaceful co-existence' to be the safest, as well as
the most practicable policy, to adopt. The price competition
resulting from retaliation may turn out to be undesirable
from the point of view of the interests of the group as a
whole. (2) In such oligopolistic markets, if there are no
insuperable technological or other barriers, the small
(2) This sort of behaviour has been explained by Kahn (1937) in terms
of what he calls first, and second degree collusion. Many writers
on oligopoly feel that some form of collusion tacit or overt, will
eventually emerge. This is also the main theme of Fellner in his
book "Competition among the Few", New York, 1949.
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exporting country is often able to raise its market share
without inviting a retaliatory action from large exporting
countries. It is quite unlikely that the large sellers
would be willing to upset the existing market equilibrium
merely to punish a new intruder of negligible size. Any
disciplinary move on the part of any single,large seller may
be misconstrued by his rivals as 'aggressive competition'
being directed at them rather than at the new small entrant.
Thus for fear of being misunderstood by one another, the
oligopolists may be forced into inaction,and the new
entrant may successfully encroach upon their relative share.
Thus, in practice, the ability and willingness to supply
exports at world prices are likely to exercise a more impor¬
tant influence than conditions of world demand on the export
performance of countries accounting for only a small propor¬
tion of world exports of relatively homogeneous commodities.
In other words, in all such cases one must look largely to
domestic forces in these countries to explain their export
performance.
Domestic policies can affect the country's export
earnings insofar as they can influence the volume of produc¬
tion of export commodities, the domestic demand for them, and
also the terms on which they are made available for export.
The Government intervention in export trade through export
taxes and subsidies, monetary and fiscal policies and other
institutional measures, changes the effective exchange rates.
Due to export promotion schemes, the exporters receive
increased domestic currency units per unit of foreign exchange
earned. What happens when these schemes are introduced?
We can approach the analysis of the effects of the
export promotion schemes on export performance in terms of an
(3)
individual producer. The producer sells part of his product
in the domestic market and part of it he also exports. If he
maximizes his profit, he will produce where his marginal costs
are equal to the marginal revenue in both the markets -
domestic and export. The producer will divide his output
(3) This analysis draws upon Bruton and Bose (1963); Henderson and
Quandt (1971), and Tyler (1974).
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between sales to the domestic market and to abroad in such
a manner that the marginal revenues in each market are equal
to each other. Unless the demand curves confronting the
producer in the foreign and the domestic markets happen to
have the same elasticity at the same prices over the relevant
range, the domestic price and the foreign price will not be
the same. This seems unlikely enough to be ruled out of con¬
sideration. The special case in which both markets are per¬
fectly competitive may also be safely ignored. In this case,
the total quantity produced will be sold in the market where
price is higher (because price and marginal revenue are
identical if the demand curve is horizontal). If both demand
curves were horizontal at the same prices, then they would, in
effect, constitute the same market and the producer would be
indifferent as to the distribution of his sales. We may then
conclude that the demand curve in at least one market, domestic
or foreign, is negatively sloping.
Let P^ and P^ be the domestic price and foreign price,
and E , and E„ be the elasticities of demand in the domestic
d f
and the foreign markets respectively. If the marginal revenues
in the domestic and foreign markets are equal, then:-
pd #:> " pf <!- &<4)d f
Price will, thus, be higher in the market with the less elastic
demand curve. Moreover, neither of the two elasticities can be
(4) That marginal revenue equals average revenue (Price) times
(1-Jr) can be proved in a number of ways.£
Total revenue (R) is price multiplied by quantity sold:
or R = p q.
Marginal revenue (MR) is the derivative of total revenue with respect
to quantity
dR dp q dp.orMR = — = p+ q— = p(l + -.—) ....I
But the elasticity of demand (E) at a point on a demand curve is
E = * £ • T1q dp
the second term in the parenthesis in (I) is (- ^) .... II£
Substituting II in I gives:
MR = P(1 - |)
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less than unity; because in that case the marginal revenue
would be negative, and no firm would produce at a point where
marginal revenue is negative. However, it is reasonable to
assume that E „ > E , > 1 for the items that benefitted from
f d
export promotion schemes. It is reasonable because those
items, offered by a Pakistani exporter, constitute only a
very small part of the total supply in the export market;
and therefore, changes in the quantity of his export of these
items are unlikely to affect export prices very much. On the
other hand, the proportion of the protected domestic market
supplied by the producer is likely to be much greater than
that for the world market. If this inequality holds, then
P > P
d f •
In the preceding paragraphs the equilibrium conditions
of a producer, selling in the domestic market and abroad,
have been outlined. Now the question is what happens when
the export promotion schemes are initiated, or the effective
exchange rate for exports increases? With the introduction
of these schemes, the effective exchange rate for exports
increases. The exporter receives higher domestic currency
earnings for any given quantity exported. If we denote the
increase in the effective exchange rate by (AEER), he now
receives a price equal to [ P^ + (AEER)P^] in rupees for any
given quantity exported. The demand curve from abroad,
expressed in domestic currency (which is fixed in foreign
currency), shifts upwards in the proportion of AEER, and the
marginal revenue in the export market will also rise. The
producer is encouraged to shift his sales from the domestic
market to the export market. This can be shown with the help
of diagram No. 6.1
In diagram No.6.1 the domestic demand curve is less
elastic at a given price compared to the foreign market. The
equilibrium output of the producer is at the intersection of
the marginal cost curve with the combined marginal revenue
curves. Before the introduction of export promotion schemes,
a quantity q^ is produced, and allocated to the two markets
(5) is the price which the foreign importer pays to the Pakistani
exporter, converted in rupees at the official exchange rate.
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in such a way that marginal revenue is equal for each market,
i.e. q^ in the domestic market and q^ in the foreign
market. After the introduction of the schemes, when the
effective exchange rate for exports increases, the exporter
gets more in domestic currency for a given quantity of the
commodity. The demand curve in the foreign market, expressed
in domestic currency units, shifts upwards and so does the
marginal revenue. Now the exporter produces qand allo¬
cates it in the two markets (qh2 ^-n domestic market, and
q_£2 in the foreign market) in order to equate marginal
revenues from each market, and to be in equilibrium again.
Since the foreign market becomes more profitable, the
exporter shifts some quantity :from "the domestic
market to the foreign market. These results would hold even
if the foreign demand curve were downward-sloping.
The increase in exports will be greater, the more
elastic is the marginal cost curve, the domestic demand curve
and the foreign demand curve, and the more slowly these
elasticities fall as the quantities produced and sold in each
market, change. If output cannot be increased, then all
increments in exports would be at the expense of the domestic
use of the commodity. On the other hand, if domestic demand
were completely inelastic over the relevant range, and the
output could not be increased, no increase in exports would
take place, no matter how great was the elasticity of foreign
demand. If the elasticity of domestic demand was low, the
marginal revenue in the two markets would be equated with
only a small increase in exports. But if a small price rise
in the domestic market releases relatively large quantities
from the domestic use, i.e. the elasticity of domestic demand
is h igh, then it will be possible to increase exports by
substantially more. Similarly the elasticity of foreign
demand plays an important role in determining the level of
exports. Given the domestic demand curve, the marginal
revenue of the export market will fall more slowly, the more
elastic is the foreign curve and it will take larger increase
in exports to re-equate the marginal revenues. In the extreme
case of perfectly elastic foreign demand curve, the foreign
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market will absorb any quantity of the product that can be
supplied.
The above argument is in terms of price elasticities,
but over several periods there is also an income effect at
work. Therefore, income changes at home and abroad, and
income elasticities in the two markets should also be taken
into account. The demand curves will tend to move to the
right as incomes rise. If the domestic income elasticity of
demand is high relative to the foreign income elasticity,
then for an equal proportional rise in incomes, it will make
the foreign market less attractive. So in the long-run, both
foreign and domestic income elasticities become important
for the analysis of exports.
The preceding discussion was couched in terms of an
individual producing firm. Data are not available for single
producing units, so all producers in an industry are lumped
together as a giant firm. This introduces some degree of
error, but it is thought not to be significant. All producers
face approximately the same foreign demand curve. Different
producers may have different cost and individual domestic
demand curves. These differences, however, would not be so
great as to violate the logic of the argument.
6.2 Functional Form of the Model.
We have tried to examine the question whether the export
performance, particularly of manufactures, was responsive to
the Government's export promotional efforts during the period
1959-60 to 1976-77. Making the 'small country' assumption
that the country faces a perfectly elastic demand for its
exports in the world market, the so-called 'export function'
was estimated.
A number of other studies in recent years have used
similar specification of the models to analyse export perfor¬
mance in the developing countries. These studies include
among others, Halevi (1972), Tyler (1973), Teiigeiro and Elson
(1973), Pomfret (1975), Donges and Reidel (1977), Yang (1978),
and the NBER Project Country Studies summarised in the
Synthesis Volumes by Bhagwati (1978) and Krueger (1978).
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The basic model estimated was of the form:-
ln (X ) = a + b(In EERt> + c(ln Qt) + et
where:
X^. = Export variable, annual observations on quantity
or value of exports,
EER
t
Effective Exchange Rate or some other variable
of export prices,
Q.t
Index of production, relevant for the category
of exports considered, e.g. Index of Manufac¬
turing production for manufactured exports or
index of agricultural production for primary
exports, and
error term.
In considering the effects of policy variables on the
export performance, the export variable should actually be
the physical quantities of exports. Data on physical
quantities of exports were not available. Therefore, the
value of exports (FOB), expressed in U.S. dollars, data were
taken as the dependent variable.
The Foreign Trade Statistics of Pakistan have generally
reported the value of exports FOB in rupees: their value in
dollars was obtained by dividing the value in rupees by the
official exchange rate in different years. This transforma¬
tion was considered necessary because after the devaluation
in 1972, the value of exports recorded in current rupees
was inflated merely because of the change in the par value of
the rupee. However, value data are the product of quantity
and price. Changes in value over time may not accurately
represent changes in the quantity of exports. Therefore, to
remove the effect of price changes, value of exports data
were deflated, where possible, by the unit value index of
exports, and these deflated data as well were used as the
dependent variable.
EER , the explanatory variable, was the effective
exchange rate, i.e. what exporters actually received in
domestic currency for each unit of foreign exchange earned.
Since the regression results using the deflated value data, or where
possible the actual physical quantity of exports data, were generally similar
to those obtained by using the dollar value of exports as the dependent
variable, the former were not reported in the study.
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Various concepts of EERs and their estimates are explained
in the previous chapter. However, the choice before the
exporters is between producing for exports, or for some
domestic use. Therefore a relative price variable was also
tried. The relative price variable was obtained by multiply¬
ing the index of export prices by the EER and dividing it by
Pf x EER
an index of domestic prices, i.e. = . Indices of export
d
unit values, expressed in dollars, were taken as indicators of
/e\
foreign prices. The domestic price index to use depends
upon the type of situation being examined. For the exports
of manufactured commodities, the index of wholesale prices
of manufactures in the domestic market was used. In the case
of specific commodities, an index of their wholesale prices
in the domestic market can be used. The coefficient of
relative price thus specified can be considered a price sub¬
stitution parameter indicating the price elasticity of export¬
ing vs. supplying to the domestic market. A significant
positive estimated coefficient implies that producers are
responsive to marginal financial incentives to export.
Learner and Stern (1970) and Murray and Ginman (1976)
among others, have argued however, that the use of relative
price variable in the mathematical specification constrains
the influence of the two price variables to be equal in
magnitude, and opposite in sign. This constraint is suspect
and should be tested for the equality of elasticities of
export with respect to foreign and domestic prices.
The constraint is suspect on the following grounds:-
(6) Learner and Stern (1970) and Kravis and Lipsey (1971) have stressed
that one must exercise great care in the use and interpretation of
unit value indices. They have pointed out that a unit value index
is not a true price index, and there is never any certainty that a
change in unit value index represents a change in price. Unit
values are values per unit of quantity within detailed export
classifications. They cannot be narrowly specified unless their
number is increased beyond practical limits. So they are calculated
for particular commodity classes of exports by dividing the value
of exports of that class by the quantity exported. The unit value
index is a weighted average of such unit values. It may change
because of the commodity composition or any of the commodity classes
quite independently of any price change. Moreover, for many commodi¬
ties, the quantities are not reported at all, and their unit values
are not available. Therefore, only a small percentage of exports is
covered in unit value index calculations.
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1. If the investigation is limited to manufactured goods or
to some more narrowly defined, but still hetrogeneous
commodity groups, any individual commodity price is
likely to be weighted in the export price index differ¬
ently than it is in the domestic price index. In many
cases, a more general price index for domestic prices
such as the wholesale price index, the consumer price
index, the GNP deflator etc. is used, in which case the
range of goods covered in the domestic price index could
differ substantially from those covered in the export
price index.
2. Even if it were possible to correctly include only the
prices of exportables in the domestic price index, it is
possible that the domestic producers hold a preference
for domestic over the foreign market in view of the
relative ease in selling to the protected domestic market
rather than selling in the foreign market, where the
competition is tough and a number of other factors make
selling in the foreign market more difficult.
, the second explanatory variable, is the index of
production - index of industrial production in the
case of manufactured exports; index of agricultural
production in the case of agricultural exports, and
the index of production of specific commodities in
the case of specific commodities. In a developing
economy, the transformation curve is expected to
shift outwards. was used as a proxy for the out¬
ward shift in the transformation curve.
Besides effective exchange rates, prices in the domestic
and foreign markets, and the level of production etc. there are
a number of other factors which determine the export performance
of a country. Such factors include confidence in the export
market, entrepreneurial talent and commercial expertise, trans¬
portation infra-structure and the like, and they play an
important role in determining export behaviour. In Pakistan,
the Government pursued a policy of persuasion, exhortation and
pressure in order to encourage the export of manufactures.
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Entry into the export market was one of the most effective
ways of winning the favour of the government, which exercises
considerable direct and indirect control over private enter¬
prises. Compulsory fixation of export quotas, non-fulfilment
of which incurred the displeasure of the government, was not
(7)
uncommon. Unfortunately these factors defy measurement;
so it was difficult to capture quantitatively their influence
on export performance.
6.3 Some Statistical Problems.
(1) Indentification of the relation.
The above specification of the model resembles an export
supply function, in which EER measures movements along the
function and Q accounts for shifts in the function. Only
under special circumstances would the points obtained from
time series of EERs (price) and quantity data fall along the
supply curve. This is so becuase there is not only a supply
relation, but also a relation between price and quantity
demanded. We are using annual EERs (price or relative price)
and value as a proxy for quantity of exports historical data,
in order to obtain quantitative estimates of the way in which
exports of manufactures (or primary products or particular
products at a more disaggregated level) responded to EERs.
The price and quantity sold each year might be represented as
a single point on a diagram, having price measured along one
axis, and quantity along the other. The historical data might
then be represented as a set of points on a scatter diagram.
A line would then be fitted through these points in such a way
( 8^
as to obtain the best fit in some sense. The question is:
Can we identify this relation to be the supply relation, and
not the demand or some other relation?
If the quantity demanded and supplied depended exclusively
on the price, and the rate of exchange were fixed, the point of
intersection of the demand and supply curves would be the only
point at which they would match. We would be able to observe
(7) Islam (1969, p.178).
(8) The usual criterion by which a line of best fit is chosen is that of
minimizing the sum of squared residuals from the line in a direction
parallel to the axis along which the dependent variable is measured.
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only this point. Any line passing through this one point
would fit perfectly well. We would not be able to deter¬
mine whether it is the supply relation, or the demand
relation, which is the classical problem of identification.
However, in our case, the EER is not fixed, but is changing.
The change in the EER in itself does not affect the short-run
supply curve. The supply of exports from Pakistan is deter¬
mined by the production function and the under-lying costs
of production, technology etc., which would not change rapidly.
Industries do not grow up or fade-away in six months or a year.
The short-run supply schedule of exports may, therefore, be
taken as given. On the other hand, the demand for Pakistan's
exports in the importing countries is determined by the import
prices, incomes in those countries, tastes and habits and other
factors affecting demand. Any positive change in the EERs
would shift upwards, in terms of rupees, the demand schedule,
which is given and fixed in foreign currency. If the demand
curve is infinitely elastic (in the case of the small country
assumption), it will shift upwards, parallel to the original
demand curve, in proportion to the increase in EER. If
the demand curve is less than infinitely elastic (in the case
of downward sloping demand curve) it will pivot upwards about
the intersection point with the quantity axis in proportion
to the increase in the EER. Then the historical points
generated by the intersection of the shifting demand schedule
and fixed supply schedule would be scattered along the supply
curve. In this case, the supply surve will be identified.
Particularly with the small country assumption, the points of
intersection would all fall along the supply curve, and a true
supply relation would be identified. Assuming random variation
around the true supply curve, we can still hope to be able to
identify the supply curve.
Given that we have some confidence that the supply curve
has been identified, it remains to consider what sort of
supply function has been identified. We, therefore, conclude
this section by considering long-term and short-term effects
on supply.
Although the short-run supply curve is not affected by
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changes in EERs, the same cannot be assumed over several
periods. The working of export promotion schemes in Pakistan
allowed for more imports of raw materials and capital goods.
This would result in fuller utilization of the existing
capacity and/or creation of new capacity. As the Government's
announced policy was to continue the export incentive schemes
for a number of years, the producers could expect a permanent
rise (in terms of rupees) in the foreign demand curve. If
the prices of exportables in the domestic market equal those
in the export market, they would rise after the introduc¬
tion of export promotion schemes. The increase in EERs and
the resultant shift of quantity from the domestic market to
the foreign market will also increase the prices in the
domestic market. The higher domestic prices encourage expan¬
sion of capacity by the existing firms and/or entry of new
firms. Over several periods, therefore, fuller utilization
of the existing capacity and/or creation of new capcity would
make the supply curve more elastic or would shift it towards
the right. If the shift in the supply curve is substantially
less than the shift in the demand curve, we can still hope
to identify the supply curve. In this case, however, the
regression coefficients will estimate neither short-run nor
long-run supply response to EERs, but will estimate some com¬
bination of the two.
(2 ) Shifts in the Function.
The trade between former East and West Pakistan, which
had been built over nearly a quarter-of-a-century, was dis¬
rupted in 1971. After delinking of the Eastern wing from
the rest of the country, the exports going to that part were
diverted to the international market. This diversion of trade
complicates the analysis. One of the objectives among others,
of the devaluation of the Pakistani Rupee in May, 1972, was to
dispose of this surplus created by the cessation of trade.
The discontinuation of trade between the two wings would have
caused an upward shift in the export (supply) function from
Pakistan. The problem of shift in the function can possibly
be dealt with in two ways:-
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(i) by the introduction of a dummy variable,
(ii) by treating the exports, expressed at world prices,
going to former East Pakistan as international trade,
adding them to exports going to the international
market for the period before 1971, and thus making
the exports time-series 'consistent'.
Both these methods were tried. The data for (ii) on exports
going to former East Pakistan, in terms of world prices, were
taken from Radhu (1973, p.153). Radhu had estimated the
value of inter-wing trade at world prices in the following way:-
1. For those commodities which one region exported to the
other region as well as to foreign countries, and could
be easily identified, FOB unit values were used to
arrive at their value at world prices.
2. For those primary commodities which were not given any
export subsidy, their domestic prices were assumed to
equal their world prices except for the difference of
freight and insurance etc.
3. For the remaining commodities, which were given export
subsidy, the differential between the domestic price
and world price was approximated by the amount of subsidy
originating from the Export Bonus Scheme. To arrive at
world prices, their domestic prices were deflated in the
following way:-
P .
w (1 + bp)
where:
Pw = world price (FOB)
P^ = domestic price,
b = bonus rate, and
p = rate of premium on the bonus.
However, deflating the domestic price by the amount of export
bonus alone would over-state the world price, because:-
(i) In addition to the export bonus scheme, there were other
export incentive schemes as well, like the export per-
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formance licensing scheme, exemption from indirect taxes
and tax rebates etc.
(ii) Many commodities entering the inter-wing trade involved
domestic prices substantially above the world prices
due to import restrictions.
Nevertheless, it is believed that the over-statement of world
prices for some of the manufactured goods is not large
enough to influence the regression coefficients in any signi¬
ficant manner and make them biased.
6.4 Estimation Results
Both linear and log-linear forms of the regression were
estimated. The logarithmic form differed very little from
the arithmetic form, and in some cases gave a better fit. In
addition, the coefficients of the logarithmic function are
easier to interpret. It assumes a constant elasticity between
the dependent and the independent variable at all points on
the same curve, and the coefficients of explanatory variables
(9)
can directly be interpret ed as estimates of the elasticity.
We have, therefore, reported below only the results of logar¬
ithmic estimation.
Some problems in the estimation and interpretation of
the results must be spelled out at the outset. First, there
is the problem of multi-collinearity. Least squares estima¬
tion assumes that there is no linear dependence between the
X dy
(9) The elasticity of Y with respect to X is defined as (— x —*-) .
6
In the function Y = Ax or In Y = In A + 3 In X. To get elasticity
X dy
of Y with respect to X, substitute for Y in the expression (— x ——) ,
V V, • X d /Awhich gives —5- x —(Ax ) ,
AxP dx
or —-5— x A$x^ 1 = 0
Ax
.". 6 is the estimate of elasticity of Y with respect to X.
(Johnston (1972,p.52)) .
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explanatory variables. Whilst there are few economic
variables which exhibit perfect collinearity, it is not
uncommon for them to be almost collinear. We should know
what consequences to expect if this is the case. If the
explanatory variables are highly but not perfectly collinear,
the main consequences are:-
i) The precision of estimation falls so that it becomes
difficult to disentagle the relative influence of
various explanatory variables.
ii) Regression parameters have very high standard errors
and we cannot reject the null-hypothesis that the
coefficients are not significantly different from
zero. The true situation may be not that a variable
has no effect but simply that the set of sample data
has not enabled us to pick it up.
iii) If the estimated coefficient of one explanatory variable
under-estimates its true value, then the estimated
coefficient of the other is likely to over-estimate its
true value and vice versa. There is a possibility of
one explanatory variable being 'robbed of its influence'
by the other collinear explanatory variable.
Secondly, in time-series analysis, there is often the
problem of serial correlation. Least squares estimation
assumes that errors corresponding to different observations
are uncorrelated. The assumption of serial independence for
the disturbance terms may not be satisfied in time-series
studies because of either the high degrees of correlation
over time present in the cumulative effects of the omitted
variables in the regression model, or because of correlation
in the measurement error component of the error term. In the
presence of serial correlation, in general, we shall obtain
unbiased estimates of the regression coefficients, but the
ordinary least squares formulae will give estimates of the
standard errors (of the regression coefficients as well as
of the regression) smaller than the true standard errors.
(10) With perfect collinearity, we cannot calculate the least-square
parameter estimates.
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This will lead to the conclusion that the parameter esti¬
mates are more precise than they actually are. There will
be a tendency to reject the null hypothesis that the coeffi¬
cients are not significantly different from zero, when in
fact, it should not be rejected. Therefore care must be
exercised in interpretting the results.
6.4.1 Regression Results for Manufactured Exports.
Regression results for Pakistan's manufactured exports
are given in Table 6.1. Data used are annual observations
on both the dependent and the explanatory variables. Regres¬
sions 1 through 6 relate the FOB dollar value of manufactured
exports (X) to the effective exchange rates for exports (EER),
a relative price index (RP), an index of export prices
actually received (indomestic currency) by the exporter (PF),
an index of domestic wholesale prices of manufactures (PH) and
the index of manufacturing production in the country (Q). A
dummy variable for the period 1971-2 to 1973-74 was also used
to take account of the separation of former East Pakistan
*■
from the rest of the country. Cessation of trade between the
two wings of the country was expected to have shifted upwards
the export supply function from former West Pakistan. However,
given the chaotic situation in the country during the early
seventies, some very rapid and perhaps unexpected changes like
the nationalization of a number of industries and social and
economic reforms establishing new management-employee rela¬
tions etc. made by the Government would have speeded up
re-structuring of the manufacturing sector. The process of
re-structuring was reinforced by oil price rises since 1973.
In addition, trade with former East Pakistan, though
on a limited scale, was resumed in 1974-75. Later, a general
good-will trade agreement was concluded between the two
countries in April 1976. The agreement provided for free
trade in all items of imports and exports subject to the rules
and regulations of each country. As a result, the upward
* Later, it was recognised that in the treatment of the dummy variable
an error had been made. The dummy variable of 1 should have been
used for the whole period after the separation of former East Pakistan.
Therefore, only the results of regressions for the alternative method
of dealing with the separation of former East Pakistan are satisfactory.
(10) Pakistan Economic Survey (1975-76), p.133.
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shift in the export supply function would not have lasted
long. In view of this, the dummy variable was included
only up to 1973-74. In all the regressions, the intercept
term and the coefficient of the index of manufacturing
production were highly significant, but the coefficients
of EER or other price variables, though of expected signs
except in 6, were not statistically significant. In view
of the great importance attached to export promotion schemes
in Pakistan and the generally held view that Pakistan's
export promotion schemes, particularly with regard to
exchange rate policy, have been successful in expanding
exports from the country, this result needs to be examined
carefully. Examination of the data revealed that the EER
had remained relatively stable during the period (with mean,
2.17 and standard deviation, 0.15). This relative stability
was the result of the Government's deliberate policy to
arrest fluctuations in the EERs within narrow limits. This
was achieved through changes in rate structure of the Export
Bonus Scheme, changes in the bonus import list and allocation
of cash foreign exchange resources for direct import licen¬
sing etc. Such lack of variation in an explanatory variable
presents problems in statistical estimation, of which the
most serious was the problem of multi-collinearity between
the EER and Q. When the effective exchange rate for manu¬
factured exports increased, their production became more
profitable. Resource allocation moved towards manufacturing
production. It is not possible to say how much of this pro¬
duction increased due to favourable EERs, and how much of it
increased because of other growth factors. There was a very
high positive correlation between the EER and Q. Consequently,
it is probable that the coefficient of Q included part of
the effect of EER on exports. The exact magnitude of this
part is not known. Therefore, it may be argued that the
statistically non-significant coefficient of the EER or the
RP was obtained, not because the export promotion policies
were unimportant, but because there was multi-collinearity
between the EER and Q, and because changes in the EER over
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time were relatively small. Given the small year to year
changes in EER, the EER could still significantly affect
(not statistically) exporting of manufactures by making it
profitable if it was sufficiently higher than the official
exchange rate. This most probably was the case.
The dummy variable was of the expected sign suggesting
that the delinking of former East Pakistan might have
shifted upwards the export supply function from former West
Pakistan. In general, the coefficient of the dummy variable
was not significantly different from zero and changed the
other coefficients. Moreover, in view of the very few
degrees of freedom on the dummy variable, we cannot place
much confidence on it. Therefore, the dependent variable
was adjusted to take account of the exports going to former
East Pakistan during the period of 1960-61 to 1970-71. This
was done by taking export data on the inter-wing trade,
expressed at world prices, from Rahdu (1973), converting it
into U.S. dollars and then adding it to exports from former
Wast Pakistan to the international market. This would make
the export time-series 'consistent' for the period of 1960-61
to 1976-77. This adjustment may be justified on the grounds
that
a) former East and West Pakistan were separated from each
other by more than 1000 miles of Indian territory or
about 3000 miles of sea-voyage;
b) presumably, the exporters from former West Pakistan
would not be selling their products to former East
Pakistan at prices below what they could get from
selling them in the international market (i.e. prices
paid by the importers plus export subsidies implied
by the export promotion schemes).
Therefore, exports to former East Pakistan, expressed at
world prices, may be regarded as exports to the world market
for present purposes. Regressions on 'consistent' export
time-series were run, the results of which are given in
relations 7 to 9 in Table 6.1. These results are consistent
with a priori beliefs. While the intercept term and the
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coefficient of the index of manufacturing production remain
highly significant, the coefficient of the EER in 7 also
becomes significantly different from zero at the 5 per cent
level. This supports the hypothesis that the exchange rate
policy did matter in expanding exports from Pakistan. The
estimates of parameters in relation 7 mean that for a 1 per
cent increase in the EER,there was a 1.78 per cent increase
in the FOB value of exports, level of production being held
constant; whereas for a given level of the EER, a 1 per
cent increase in the index of manufacturing production led
to a 1.65 per cent increase in exports. While the numerical
precision of these elasticities may be questionable, these
results do suggest that both the EER and Q were important
in expanding exports from Pakistan. Regressions 8 and 9
produce correct signs for all the coefficients, but the
coefficient of the relative price index (RP) in 8 is signif¬
icant only at the 10 per cent level of significance, and the
Durbin-Watson statistic is very low. The presence of serial
correlation makes the tests of significance on estimates of
parameters doubtful. Therefore, in regression 9 we intro¬
duced separate price variables (i.e. PF and PH) for the
export market and the domestic market along with Q. The
results are quite satisfactory. There is no serious serial
correlation as can be seen from the Durbin-Watson statistic
of 1.70. The DW lies above the (for k = 3 and n = 17) of
1.58, and is less than 2. R2 and F-statistic both are very
high. The significant coefficient of PF suggests that in
spite of a generally falling unit value for manufactured
exports/10^ the high EERs made the export market profitable.
(10) Unit values for Manufactured exports of Pakistan (1960-61= 100)














SOURCE: Up to 1973-74 Pakistan Economic Survey (1974-75), Table
38, pp.98-99; for the rest, Statistical Yearbook (1977-78)
p.260, which were changed to base 1960-61 = 100.
The coefficient of PH not being different from zero may be
taken to mean that the rise in domestic prices for manu¬
factures relative to the subsidies involved in the export
promotion schemes was not high enough to make the export
market unfavourable. The coefficient of Q is highly signi¬
ficant as usual. However, it must be noted that all these
results are in the face of multi-collinearity, which would
be quite high between PF and PH, and also between these
price variables and Q.
So far in all regressions, the exports in period t
have been regressed on the EER or the other price variables
and Q in period t. The exporters may not have been able to
respond fully to the increased EER or RP in the current
period. Time is required for production and delivery; or
the exporters may have had contractual obligations in the
domestic market. Again some time may be needed before they
have confidence in export promotion measures as policies
which are going to last. The process of adjustment cannot
be measured fully by using current data variables alone;
lags need to be taken into account. Omission of lags exag¬
gerates the immediate effect of a given year's price varia¬
bles and under-states their cumulative effect. Therefore,
a partial adjustment model^^was employed so as to intro¬
duce a lagged adjustment of exports to changes in the
independent variables.
*
Let X^_ be the optimal (expected) value of exports when
the EER and other independent variables of period t have had
sufficient time to operate, i.e.
X* = a + b(EERt) + C(Qt) + e . . . (I)
The adjustment function may be postulated such that the
current exports (X ) adjust from the starting position (X. .. )
sjc L— -L
to the optimal level (Xt) by 6 100 per cent, with 0 < 5 < 1:
Then Xt = Xt_j + « (X*t -^)
(11) For details see Johnston (1972, pp.300 - 320) and the references
cited there.
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OR Xt = 6 X* + (l-6)Xt_1 ..(II)
substituting I into II gives:
Xt = 6[a + b(EERt) + C(Qt) + et] + (l-5)Xt_1
OR X = 6a + 6b(EERt) + Sc(Qt) + (1 - 6)Xt_1 + 6et . .(Ill)
The Constant 6 is to be interpreted as a coefficient
of adjustment and should fall between zero and one. Its
value can be obtained by substracting the coefficient of
X^_^ in III from one. The closer 6 is to unity, the greater
is the adjustment made in the current period, and the closer
it is to zero the slower the adjustment process will be.
The long-run coefficients a, b and c can be calculated by
dividing the regression coefficients by one minus the
coefficient of X^_^.
The relation of type III for Pakistan's manufactured
exports for the period of 1961-62 to 1976-77 was estimated
and the results (of log-linear form) are reported in Table
6.2. The results of this exercise look generally better
than those without the lag-structure. This means that
the introduction of lag-structure was probably important,
and the exporters responded to export incentives only partly
within the current period. However, in regressions 1 through
4, in which the unadjusted export variable was used as the
dependent variable, the coefficient of the lagged dependent
variable was not found to be significant except in 4. The
dummy variable was also of expected sign but not significant.
Therefore relations 5 and 6 were estimated using the 'Consis¬
tent' export time-series as the dependent variable. In
regression 5 all the coefficients were significant - the
intercept term at the 1 per cent level and all other coeffi¬
cients at the 5 per cent level of significance. The
coefficient of the lagged dependent variable suggests that
nearly two-thirds adjustment took place in the current period.
The long-run elasticity of exports with respect to the effec¬
tive exchange rate was about 2.51, and that with respect to
the index of manufacturing production was about 1.6.
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Similarly, in regression 6, the coefficient of the lagged
dependent variable is significant at the 1 level and
suggests an even slower process of adjustment. It suggests
that only about 53 per cent of adjustment was taking place
in the current period. This may be plausible in view of
the price variable used in this regression, which is the
relative price variable. The exporters might need more
time to fully appreciate movements of actual prices in both
the foreign and the domestic markets. The significant
coefficient of RP in regression 6 implies that exporters
did respond to export incentives, and the price elasticity
of substitution of exporting versus supplying to the
domestic market was significant. The significant coefficient
of Q implies that the expansion of manufacturing production
was export-biased. Whatever questions exist about the
numerical precision of these elasticities, the results of
regressions 5 and 6 strongly suggest that the elasticity of
exports with respect to export incentives was greater than
unity. This view is supported by the formulation of the
model in 5 and 6 which contains a lagged dependent variable
on the right-hand side. Such a model under-estimates the
coefficients of explanatory variables. Johnston (1972,
pp.304 - 7) has proved that even if disturbances are seri¬
ally uncorrelated, the presence of a lagged dependent variable
among the explanatory variables, and the consequent correla¬
tion of the disturbance term with the explanatory variables,
will produce biased estimates in small samples. The bias
will be downwards and the coefficients will be under-estimated.
6.4.2 Regression results for primary exports.
Similar regressions were performed for the exports of
primary commodities; the results are given in Table 6.3.
The FOB value of primary exports, expressed in U.S. dollars,
was regressed on the effective exchange rate for primary
exports (EER), their relative price index defined as the
ratio of export prices actually received by the exporters
after taking into account the export taxes or subsidies
included in the effective exchange rate to their domestic
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wholesale price index (RP), and the index of agricultural
production in Pakistan (Q). Both actual exports to the
rest of the world and the 'consistent' exports time-series
were used as the dependent variable. The dummy variable
for the period of 1971-72 to 1973-74 was also tried. The
coefficient of the dummy variable was generally of the
correct sign, but in no case was it significant. We have,
therefore, not reported the results of relations with the
dummy variable. The correct sign of the dummy variable
might suggest that the disruption of trade with former
East Pakistan caused an upward shift in the exports from
Pakistan to the rest of the world, but statistically the
shift was not significant. The reasons for that might have
been, among other things, the bad weather conditions during
the early seventies - drought in 1971-72 followed by heavy
floods in 1973-74^12^ - which badly affected the production
of agriculture and reduced the exportable surplus of this
sector.
The results in relations 1, 3, 5 and 7 all suggest
that the effective exchange rate significantly affected the
export performance of the primary sector. The exporters
responded to changes in the effective exchange rate. The
elasticity of primary exports with respect to the EER was
more than unity in all cases. In relations 1 and 3, where
the current exports were regressed on the current explana¬
tory variables, it ranged from 1.75 to 2.09. This means
that for a 1 per cent increase in the EER, the exports
increased by 1.75 to 2.09 per cent. The adjustment process
was introduced in relations 5 and 7 in the same manner as
for manufactured exports. The coefficient of the lagged
dependent variable suggests that nearly two-thirds of the
adjustment took place within one year. The long-run
elasticity of primary exports with respect to the EER given
by relations 5 and 7 ranged between 2.06 to 2.46. The
numerical precision of these elasticities may be questionable,
(12) The Pakistan Economic Survey (1973-74), p.33.
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but they strongly suggest that the elasticity of primary
exports with respect to EER was greater than unity. The
exporters of primary commodities, like those of manufac-
tued goods, responded significantly to changes in the EER.
In none of these relations was the coefficient of
the index of primary production (Q) found to be significant.
Rather in relations 5 and 7, though not different from zero,
it had a negative sign. There could be a number of reasons
for that:-
i) The level of the EERs for primary exports relative to
the EERs for manufactured exports had always been low,
as analysed in the previous Chapter. This would have
made the production of primary commodities relatively
less profitable. The resources would have moved out
of this sector into the comparatively more profitable
manufacturing sector and/or the production of non-
exportable primary commodities might have increased,
making the production of the primary sector biased
against exports.
ii) Since manufactured exports enjoyed a more favourable
effective exchange rate, it was natural to export,
whenever possible, the primary commodities in their
transformed manufactured form, rather than in the
unprocessed form. Raw cottom, raw hides and skins and
raw wool etc., the major primary exportable commodities
of Pakistan were being used in increasing quantities
at home instead of being exported in raw form. Even
if their production had increased, in the face of
increasing domestic demand, their quantity could fail
to affect primary exports.
iii) Institutional arrangements as well played an important
role in determining the export performance of primary
commodities from Pakistan. Compulsory fixation of
export targets in respect of cotton and rice, among
other commodities, was not uncommon. The procurement
of rice on a monopoly basis by the Government had
generally allowed 10 per cent of superior varieties of
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rice for domestic consumption . The Trading
Corporation of Pakistan, established in July 1967
to act as a counterpart of the State Trading Organi¬
sations of the Socialist countries for the imple¬
mentation of barter trade agreements, was gradually
entrusted with additional responsibilities of export
trade. Rice and cotton became two important items of
(14)
export by the Corporation. In 1973, the Cotton
Export Corporation, and later the Rice Export Corpor¬
ation, were made responsible for the export of cotton
and rice respectively. The Government, after consid¬
ering the domestic demand and supply situation for raw
materials, could instruct these Corporations whether
to enter, or not to enter into any new export contracts.
Under these circumstances, the Government calculations
would play a greater role than the production index
of primary commodities.
However, the negative sign for the coefficient of Q
in relations 5 and 7 arouses the suspicion that in the long-
run perhaps the resources were transferred from the produc¬
tion of primary exports to other activites.
In relations 2 and 4, the exports were regressed on
the index of relative prices for primary commodities and
their index of production. The intercept term and the
coefficient of Q were found to be highly significant, while
the coefficient of RP was significant at the 5 per cent
level. This means that given the level of production of
primary commodities when the prices in the export market
(after taking account of the EERs) were more favourable
relative to their prices in the domestic market, the expor¬
ters tended to shift some of the commodity from the domestic
market to the export market; and given the level of relative
prices, when the production of primary commodities increased,
their exports were increased also. This may suggest that
exporters were responsive to EER variations, which in the
present context were included in the export price index.
(13) The Pakistan Economic Survey (1973-74), p.27.
(14) Government of Pakistan "Government Sponsored Corporations"(1973-74)
p.170.
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Similarly, whenever the production of primary commodities
increased,probably due to favourable weather conditions,
the surplus, after having met the domestic requirements,
was sold into the foreign market. These relationships
were found only when the current values of all the variables
were used in the regressions. When the lagged dependent
variable was included among the explanatory variables,
all the coefficients except the one for the lagged depend¬
ent variable became non-significant. This may be because,
over time, the index of unit values for primary exports
had exhibited a rising-falling pattern, and the EERs as well
had not been high enough to make the exporting of primary
commodities profitable in the long-run. Similarly, the pro¬
duction of the primary sector was probably biased against
exports in the long-run.
From the discussion of the regression results for
the manufacturing and the primary sectors and other evidence
analysed so far, it may be concluded that the exporters both
of manufactured goods and of primary commodities responded
significantly to the effective exchange rates. The exchange
rate policy played an important role in expanding exports
from Pakistan. Since the export promotion schemes afforded
favourable treatment to the manufactured exports, their
EERs were more favourable. Consequently the growth of the
manufacturing sector was biased towards exports. On the
other hand, the primary sector was given less favourable
treatment and the EERs assigned to this sector were compara¬
tively lower. As a result, the growth of the primary sector
over time turned out to be biased against exports.
6.4.3 Regression results for 'diaggregated' exports.
After having analysed the relation of exports to the
EERs and Q for the manufacturing and primary sectors, it
seems pertinent to analyse a similar relation in respect of
some 'disaggregated' commodities. For this purpose, the
FOB value of exports, expressed in U.S. dollars, for some
commodities at PSTC 3-digit level,was regressed on the EERs
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and Q for the commodity in question; when Q was not avail¬
able, time was used as a proxy. The results are given in
Table 6.4. Relations 1 through 4 and 8 in Table 6.4
present regression results for a major export of Pakistan,
i.e. raw cotton and cotton manufactures. The coefficient
of the EER for raw cotton was not different from zero, while
Q was found to affect its exports significantly. The
Government policy towards exports of raw cotton, and perhaps
weather conditions,may have been the reason for this. For
most of the period under consideration, the export of raw
cotton had been subject to export duty, which meant an
unfavourable rate of exchange for the export of raw cotton.
Given the generally less profitable exports of raw cotton,
the Government, after taking into account the domestic
demand for, and supply of raw cotton situation, would fix
export targets for raw cotton. The years in which favour¬
able weather conditions resulted in a bumper crop or in
which the domestic activity in textile industry was low,
were characterised by mounting surpluses of raw cotton.
This surplus was then likely to be disposed of in the export
market. This is perhaps why only Q has affected the exports
of raw cotton significantly, and the EER has had no effect
on its exports. The Government policy, throughout the period
of 1960-61 to 1976-77 has aimed at increasing the exports of
manufactures. All the export promotion schemes were directed
towards this objective. The regression results for yarn
and thread, cotton fabrics, clothing and made-up articles
of textiles are generally consistent with the a priori belief
that the EERs for these commodities significantly affected
their exports, and that their domestic production was
export-oriented. However, the Export Bonus Scheme for
yarn and thread had been less certain in its effect in the
earlier years. The rate of bonus vouchers allowed to cotton
yarn and thread was reduced from 20 per cent to 10 per cent
w.e.f. 22nd January, 1960. Later, their exports were
totally excluded from the purview of the scheme from 30th
January 1961, and were not allowed a bonus of 10 per cent
until 21st August 1962. Even after that there had been
minor changes in the bonus rate allowed to cotton yarn and
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thread. Perhaps due to these reasons the coefficient of
the current EERs for yarn and thread was not found to be
significant, but the EER, a year-lagged, turned out to be
highly significant. In relation 3A for cotton fabrics,
the coefficient of the EER was highly significant, but
the coefficient of Q was not found to be significantly
different from zero, and the Durbin-Watson (DW) statistic
was also quite low. The low DW statistic suggests positive
serial correlation/15^ The non-significant coefficient of Q,
which means that the production of cotton fabrics was not
export-biased, was against all expectations. The Government
policies throughout have encouraged the production of cotton
cloth for the purposes of export. In view of the fact that
Pakistan faces a good deal of competition in the export
market for cotton cloth and the markets of the developed
countries are not easily accessible to Pakistani exporters
becuase of tariffs, and in some cases even country quotas,
more effort and time might have been needed to export this
commodity. We tried the EER and Q, both lagged one period,
the coefficients for which turned out to be highly signifi¬
cant, and the DW statistic also improved. All other statis¬
tics of goodness of fit in 3B were better than those in 3A,
(15) The relation was also estimated by the Hildreth-Lu procedure.
In the Hildreth-Lu scanning procedure a set of 'grid' values
for p are specified. For each value of p, the transformed
equation
(yt - = a<1 - p) + b<xt - pxt-1) + — + u
is estimated. The procedure selects the equation with the
lowest sum of squared residuals as the best equation. For
cotton fabrics the estimated coefficients by the Hildreth-Lu
procedure were as follows:-
In X652 * = 2.66 + 1.97 In EER* - 0.38 In Q*
(0.93) (1.28) (-0.46) 1
p = 0.85, R2 = 0.92, F - statistic = 89.94,
DW = 2.16, SEE = 0.26.
Pindyk and Rubinfeld (1976, p.108) have, however, pointed out
that the use of alternative procedures to deal with the problem
of serial correlation may introduce inefficiencies which are
greater than the inefficiency associated with serial correlation.
Therefore, judgement must be exercised in the choice of estima¬
tion technique.
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which may mean that the relation in 3B captures the
behaviour of cotton fabrics' exports better than that in
3A. However, it should be pointed out that a simple model,
as in the present case, is unable to take account of all
the institutional and other factors which determine the
exports of a major commodity like cotton fabrics from
Pakistan. Further research should be carried out for
cotton and cotton manufactures, which should take into
account all the relevant domestic and external, economic,
institutional and other factors. Only then can some firm
conclusions be reached. Nevertheless, the regression
results in Table 6.4 strongly suggest that the elasticity
of exports of yarn and thread, cotton fabrics, clothing and
made-up articles of textiles with respect to their respec¬
tive EERs was greater than unity, and their domestic produc¬
tion was export-biased. Similarly, synthetic cloth and
embroidery etc. also showed a significant relationship with
their EERs. The coefficient of the EER for special textile
fabrics (like buckram, fishing nets, wicks, ropes etc) was
not different from zero, nor was it significantly different
from zero for carpets etc. While special textile fabrics
were not a major item of export from Pakistan, the same was
not true for carpets. We, therefore, regressed the FOB
value of exports of carpets on the EERs, lagged one period,
and time. The coefficient of the EER turned out to be sig¬
nificant at the 5 per cent level. It showed an elasticity
of nearly 2 for carpets exports with respect to their EERs,
and for a given level of the EERs a 19 per cent annual
rate of growth in their exports.
The regression results in the present exercise have
shown that the elasticity of exports of cotton fabrics and
other cotton manufactures with respect to their EERs was
greater than unity, and that the growth in their domestic
production was generally export-biased. A question which
naturally comes to one's mind is: Did the export promotion
policies of Pakistan lead to a real increase in export earn¬
ings from these commodities in the long-run? The export
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policies of Pakistan were formulated in such a way that
they discriminated in favour of export of manufactured goods
and against export of raw materials. Thus the increase in
exports of cotton manufactures was being achieved at the
expense of exports of raw cotton. To the extent that the
value-added in the exports of manufactures was greater
than the value-added in the exports of raw cotton, the
export policies might have resulted in increasing the
earnings from exports. Mallon (1966, p.76), however, was
doubtful about the export of cotton yarn resulting in any
net foreign exchange benefit in the year 1960, because the
export price of raw cotton was quite high in that year.
Apart from the increase in foreign exchange earnings due
to increas in value-added, any real increase in export
earnings from the manufactures of cotton depended upon the
real increase in the production of raw cotton in the
country. Given the conditions in the export market, if
the production of raw cotton had increased in a real sense
during this period, and if more investment was coming into
its production, then the export earnings from cotton group
could be expected to have risen in the long-run. The data
on production, acreage and yield per acre of cotton are
given in Table 6.5.
The data in Table 6.5 show that in absolute terms,
the production, acreage and yield per acre of cotton, all
had generally been rising during the period of 1960-61 to
1976-77, although year-to-year variations were also discern¬
ible. The rise in the area under cotton production was
more than the rise in either the cotton production or the
yield per acre of cotton. In relative terms when compared
with some other major crops, the area under cotton produc¬
tion had shown a modestly rising trend, while both the pro¬
duction and the yield per acre of cotton, with the exception
of a few years, had been declining. The increase in the area
under cotton production might have been necessitated by the
relatively low yield per acre, if the cotton growers wanted
to prevent their relative incomes falling below the level
of those growing other crops. The declining yield per acre
of cotton relative to other crops suggests that in the
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(a)Otherprincipalcro sin ludewheat,ib jrjow rmaize,arl yg affls g cane,a ed andmustard,sesamumtobacco. SOURCE:BasedonDatainP kist nEconomicSurvey(1977-78),t tisticalT bles0,1a d2pp.20-28.
already depressed sector of agriculture, the growing of
cotton was even worse-off. Probably neither the improved
seed, fertilizer and modern techniques of its growing
were being used, nor was any substantial research for im¬
proving its yield per acre being carried out. The lack of
investment in cotton growing might have been caused, among
other things, by the unfavourable effective exchange rates
for its exports. Under these circumstances, it is doubtful
if any substantial real increase in export earnings from
cotton manufactures could be achieved in the long-run.
Relations 10 through 13 give regression results for
the leather group. The coefficient of the EER for raw
hides and skins was not significant, while the coefficient
of time was -0.19, and was significant at the 1 per cent
level. This means that exports of raw hides and skins have
been declining at the rate of 19 per cent per annum during
the period of 1960-61 to 1976-77. The exports of raw hides
and skins have declined primarily because of the growth
of the domestic leather industry, increased internal consump¬
tion of the raw hides and skins in the growing domestic
industry, and the Government policy regarding their export
in raw form. Hides and skins were another commodity like
the raw cotton, which had been excluded from the purview of
the Export Bonus Scheme from the outset. The Government
policy was to encourage the exports of leather and leather
manufactures instead of the raw hides and skins. The exports
of tanned leather in relation 11 showed a significant rela¬
tionship with their EERs and the coefficient of time for
their exports was also highly significant. In relations 12
and 13 the coefficients of the EERs for manufactures of
leather and footwear, though not significant, were of the
correct sign, and the coefficient of time in both cases was
highly significant. However, the low DW statistic for tanned
leather and manufactures of leather suggests the existence
of positive serial correlation. Therefore, search for a
better explanation which should take into account all the
relevant factors, like the competition from artificial leather,
and from countries with better techniques of curing and tanning,
changes in fashion in the export market, import restrictions
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in the industrialized countries etc. as well as the
increased domestic consumption of leather goods, should
be continued.
Rice is another major export of Pakistan. The
regression results on this commodity in relation 14 gave
a significant coefficient for the EER, but the coefficient
of Q was neither significant nor of the expected sign.
The export of rice was generally determined by the Govern¬
ment in the sense that for most of the period under con¬
sideration, the Government fixed a quota for the procurement
and export of rice, and since establishing the TCP and
later the Rice Export Corporation, most of the export of
rice has been done in the public sector. It is probable
that due to favourable weather conditions when the produc¬
tion of rice was more in the country, more was left for
domestic consumption. With the given export targets for
rice which were generally fixed before the actual harvest,
the deviations from the expected harvest could show a
negative relationship with the exports. However, here again
the low DW-statistic is indicative of positive serial
correlation.
The next four relations in Table 6.4, i.e. 15 through
18, give regression results on the exports of tobacco and
fish. Unmanufactured tobacco, which had been given export
incentives, responded significantly to the EERs and the
growth of its production was also export-biased. The
coefficients of the EERs and Q were both significant at the
1 per cent level. The coefficient of the EER for manufac¬
tured tobacco was not found to be significant, though it
was of the expected sign, but its production was found to
affect its exports significantly. The coefficient of Q for
manufactured tobacco was significant at the 1 per cent level.
Fresh fish is the only commodity among the ones analysed in
this study, which has been subjected to a sales tax on its
export. Consequently, its exports showed no relationship
with the EERs. The coefficient of the EER was not different
from zero and was rather of negative sign.
The positive and significant intercept term for fresh
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fish suggests that fresh fish was exported even if its
EER were quite unfavourable. This might have been because
of the limited domestic capacity for processing fish, and
because of the difficulty of mobility to other jobs for
people engaged in this profession.
The coefficient of time for fresh fish was also
highly significant. The exports of fish preparations and
canned fish showed a significant relationship only with
the time variable, and the coefficient of the EER for this
commodity was not found to be significant, perhaps because
of limited processing capacity.
Turning now to the chemicals group (relations 19
through 23) and machinery (relations 24 and 25), the EERs
for these commodities were generally found to have no posi¬
tive effect on their export performance. In many cases the
sign was negative. Pakistan, all along, has been a net
importer of chemicals and machinery. In the mid-sixties or
early seventies, Pakistan started to export (in any meaning¬
ful sense of the word) some relatively simple-technology pro¬
ducts in these groups, like paints and varnishes, perfumery
and cosmetics, soaps, cleansing and polishing preparations,
sewing machines, hardware and electric fans etc. Time is
required before the markets can be penetrated and the
Pakistani exporters can acquire the necessary expertise in
the export of these commodities. Developing countries like
Pakistan are at a disadvantage in the export markets when
faced with competition from the high-technology industrial¬
ized countries. The superior technology of developed coun¬
tries, their long-standing brand names, vast accumulation
of marketing knowledge, advertisement and similar other
factors have established the exporters from those coun¬
tries in the export market. Moreover, supply constraint
in the country might have been a factor in making EERs not
a significant determinant of export performance of these
commodities. However, for the medicinal and pharmaceutical
products, especially medicinal herbs, the coefficient of
the EER, lagged one period, was found to be significant at
the 1 per cent level, which means that the exporters of
these products responded significantly to the export incen-
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tives. Similarly the coefficients of the EER for perfum¬
ery and cosmetics, soaps and cleansing preparations and
electric machinery, though not significant, were of the
expected sign.
Before concluding the discussion, we may summarise
the main results of the regression exercises. The regres¬
sion results on Pakistan's exports were generally consis¬
tent with the hypothesis that the export promotion schemes
of Pakistan played an important role in determining the
export performance of the country. For the commodities,
which had been given export incentives and as a result
had enjoyed favourable EERs, the EERs turned out to be a sig¬
nificant determinant of their exports. The exports of the
manufacturing sector, which had enjoyed favourable EERs
all along, were found to have been affected significantly
by the EERs and the growth of the manufacturing sector was
export-biased. On the other hand, the commodities which
were not given export incentives and which in consequence
had had unfavourable EERs, did not show any significant
relationship between EERs and their exports. The exports
of the primary sector had been accorded generally a less
favourable treatment as far as their exchange rates were
concerned. Consequently the growth of the primary sector
over time was found to be biased against exports. It appears
that during the period under consideration the resources
were transferred from the primary sector to the manufactur¬
ing sector and/or from the production of exportable primary
commodities to the production of other crops. Particularly
the position of cotton production relative to the production
of other major crops deteriorated during the period under
study.
The evidence presented above on deficits in the balance
of payments and on the problem of debt-servicing, and (in
the face of a tightening 'aid' situation) the dependence of
growth of the economy on export growth, all suggests
Pakistan's need to expand exports. The export promotion
schemes have helped in expanding exports from the country
- 217 -
during the period studied. For the growth of exports in
the future, Pakistan should continue to operate and probably
strengthen the export promotion measures. However, a
careful examination of export policy in respect of the
primary (agricultural) commodities should be made, and in
the light of its findings, if necessary, the policy towards




The purpose of the present study, as set out in
Chapter 1, was to describe, express quantitatively and
analyse the export promotion schemes of Pakistan, and to
determine how far they have been effective in expanding exports
from the country during the period 1959-60 to 1976-77.
To put the problem in proper perspective, we proposed
to present the economic background of the study. This was
done by examining in Chapter 2 the growth of the economy of
Pakistan since 1949-50, major structural changes which had
taken place in the economy during the period 1949-50 to
1978-79, and some of the policies adopted to foster indus¬
trialization. An examination of the problem of the balance
of payments and the problem of debt-servicing of Pakistan was
also undertaken. The intention was to give the reader a
general background to the developmental stage of the Pakistan
economy and an understanding of the structural transformation
which had taken place over the period of three decades. The
information on the magnitude of deficits in the balance of pay¬
ments and on the ever-increasing burden of debt-servicing was
intended to establish the need for expanding exports from Pakistan.
Main features of commodity exports from Pakistan were also
presented to make clear their structure and composition etc.
The rapid growth of industrialization in Pakistan was
achieved through policies of protection. Chapter 3 was
mainly concerned with the discussion of some of the arguments
for protection in developing countries, and with the investi¬
gation of the history of protection in Pakistan. The instru¬
ments of protection like tariffs, import licensing etc., and
the level and structure of proptection implied by them were
discussed in order to give an impression of the extent of pro¬
tection afforded to the manufacturing industry of Pakistan.
It is generally believed that policies of protection
without corresponding policies of export promotion create
a bias against exports and are detrimental to the growth
of exports. Since 1959, Pakistan has developed schemes
to overcome some of the deficiencies of protection. In
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Chapter 4, the details of such schemes were presented.
The Export Bonus Scheme and the Export Performance Licen¬
sing Scheme were discussed in detail in respect of their
institutional framework, rate structure, scope and coverage,
premia and other important features. The present study
gives a comprehensive unified account of these schemes,
based on the descriptions of such schemes which are
scattered in scores of Government publications. At the
present time, this appears to be the only unified account
of the complexities of these schemes for the whole period
of their operation. The rebates of import duties paid on
inputs used in the production of exported commodities and
the exemption of exports from other indirect taxes were
also discussed. The discussion of export promotion schemes
and the export subsidies involved in them lays the founda¬
tion for the data required for the statistical analysis of
Chapter 6.
Having analysed the major export promotion schemes of
Pakistan in their institutional details in Chapter 4, we were
then able, in Chapter 5, to construct the data base necessary
for detailed statistical analysis of Chapter 6. Calculation
of the commodity-specific, as well as the sectoral EERs for
exports, was undertaken in Chapter 5. This was perhaps an
unglamorous but a necessary part of the scientific process.
It is hoped that the estimates of export EERs provided by the
present study might be a factor contributing to cumulative
scientific progress in this field. A comparison of the export
EERs with the import EERs (if and when available) can be used
to determine the relative profitability of production for
export vs. import-substitution and (given the policy of pro¬
tection) to determine the extent of bias-reduction against
exports. The estimates of export EERs given in the present
study can serve as data for a detailed disaggregated analysis
of exports by more specialised modelling in any further
research. The level and structure of discrimination of the
Government policy between different industries and between
different sectors of the economy can also be determined by
- 220 -
an examination of the export EERs, and the effects of dis¬
criminatory EERs on resource allocation can be seen.
An examination of the EERs in Chapter 5 showed that
the EERs for manufactured exports had remained consistently
higher than the official exchange rate throughout the
period under consideration, except in 1972-73. In 1972-73,
the official exchange rate itself had increased (in terms
of domestic currency units) by more than 91 per cent over
1971-72 The average differential of the EERs for manu¬
factured exports over the official exchange rate had been
around 68 per cent during the period of 1959-60 to 1971-72,
while it was about 6 per cent for the period after the
devaluation. The EERs for primary exports had remained below
the official exchange rate for some earlier years, and again
after the devaluation of 1972, while for the intervening
period of 1962-63 to 1971-72 they had remained, on average,
about 9 per cent higher than the official exchange rate.
The EERs for primary exports as a ratio of the EERs for
manufactured exports had been, on average, about 63.5 per
cent during the period of 1959-60 to 1971-72, and about 78
per cent for the period after the devaluation, i.e. from
1972-73 to 1976-77. Since the exports of the manufacturing
sector had always received better terms of trade (in terms
of domestic currency earnings) than the exports of the primary
sector during the period under consideration, on a priori
grounds, the resources would have been transferred from the
primary sector to the manufacturing sector. This was also
in line with the official strategy of economic planning and
development. The Third-Five-Year Plan (pp.7,33) noted,
(1) The official rate of exchange of Rupee vis-a-vis the U.S.dollar
has been as follows:-
Up to 11th May 1972, one U.S.$ = Rs 4.76.
Between 12th May 1972 and 13th February 1973, one U.S.$ = Rs 11.00
Sinee 14th February 1973, one U.S.$ = Rs 9.90.
The official rate of exchange for 1971-72 as one U.S.$ = Rs 5.54
and for 1972-73 as one U.S.$ = Rs. 10.59 was calculated, using as
weights the number of days a particular rate had been in force.
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"There was a considerable transfer of income from the
agriculture to the industrial sector during the 1950s as
terms of trade were deliberately turned against agriculture
through such policies as licensing of scarce foreign exchange
earned primarily by agriculture to the industrial sector,
compulsory Government procurement of food-grains at low
prices to subsidize the cost of living of the urban,
industrial workers, generous tax concessions to industry
and lack of similar incentives for commercial, agricultural
investment Thus, the rural areas were transferring
savings to the fast modernising, urban capital sector
Already, a sizeable transfer of savings is taking place
through the rural branches of the commercial banks to the
urban centres. The planned extension of the branches of the
Agricultural Development Banks to the far-flung corners of
the country-side, and the proposed acceptance of deposits by
these branches will further encourage the mobilization of
rural savingsIt would be interesting to see how much
resources were transferred from the primary sector to the
manufacturing sector; what part of the resource transfer
could be attributed to the discriminatory EERs, and what were
its effects on the overall development of the economy. Further
research should be continued in these directions.
The examination of the EERs in Chapter 5 also showed
that compared with their level of 1960-61, the temporal
increase in the EERs for exports of manufactured goods was
higher during the sixties than that in the seventies. The
behaviour of the temporal increase in the EERs for primary
exports was found to be the opposite of the temporal
behaviour of the EERs for manufactured exports. This suggests
that an improvement in the relative terms of trade (in terms
of domestic currency) for the exports of the primary sector
had taken place during the seventies. The examination of
the real EERs also confirmed a similar conclusion. In
addition, the real EERs based on the domestic wholesale
prices alone were compared with the similar EERs in some
other developing countries. It was found that during the
period 1960-61 to 1970-71, the profitability of exporting
- 222 -
from Pakistan, due to the export promotion schemes, was
higher relative to the profitability of exporting from many
other developing countries during the same period.
With the data on EERs for exports, a statistical
analysis for the exports of the manufacturing and primary
sectors, as well as for a wide range of commodity groups
was undertaken in Chapter 6. The statistical analysis was
in the spirit of che NBER study 'Foreign Trade Regimes and
Economic Development', and was quite consciously conceived
in that way. However, a number of statistical problems
which were given little attention or were entirely neglected
in the NBER study, have been given fairly careful consider¬
ation in the present work. The analytical framework of the
model was elaborated in some detail, in contrast to the NBER
study in which little attempt was made to justify the model
in terms of a priori notions. Furthermore, some of the pro¬
blems unique to Pakistan such as the separation of former
East Pakistan from the rest of the country, and the conse¬
quent problem of a shift in the export function, were
spelled out. Since Pakistan's exports constitute only an
insignificant part of total world exports, the prices in the
foreign markets for Pakistan's exports were assumed to be
determined exogenously. Making the small country assumption
a single-equation model was estimated. The purpose was to
determine whether or not exporters from Pakistan signifi¬
cantly responded to export promotion measures adopted by
the Government during the period under consideration. It
was found that the exporters of manufactures showed a signi¬
ficant response to such measures during the period of 1960-61
to 1976-77. The elasticities of export earnings from the
manufacturing sector with respect to the EER and the index
of manufacturing production were found to be 1.78 and 1.65
to 1.98 respectively. The partial adjustment model was
also estimated in order to take account of the lag-structure.
The regression results of this exercise suggested that nearly
two-thirds response was completed within the current period.
The estimate of the long-run elasticity of manufactured
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exports with respect to the EER wasabout 2.5. The coeffi¬
cient of the relative price index for the manufacturing
sector was also found to be significant in the long-run,
which suggests that in response to export incentives, the
exporters from Pakistan tended to shift a part of the sale
of their output from the domestic market to the foreign
market in the long-run. The growth of production of the
manufacturing sector was found to be export-biased. For
the exports of the primary sector, while the coefficient
of the EER was found to be significant at the 1 per cent
level, the coefficient of the index of its production was
not different from zero. Probably, the institutional
factors played a greater role in determining the export
performance of the primary sector for Pakistan.
The regression results for the 'disaggregated'
commodities were, in general, consistent with the hypothesis
that the EERs were a significant determinant of export
performance of the commodities which had been given favour¬
able EERs. This was generally true for the exports of manu¬
factured commodities. However, some commodities in the
chemicals and machinery groups did not show many signifi¬
cant relationship between the exports and the EERs. Pakistan,
being a net importer of chemicals and machinery, made a start
in the sixties in the export of some simple-technology pro¬
ducts in these groups. Given the competition from developed
countries in these products, it would take some time before
the foreign markets could be penetrated. In addition, the
supply constraint in the country might have been a cause of
the lack of any relationship between their export and the
EERs. A detailed investigation should be made in respect
of these products. The exports of the primary commodities
had, generally, been given less favourable EERs during the
period under consideration. As a result, their EERs did not
turn out to be a significant determinant of their exports.
This was in-line with the Government policy, which has aimed
at expanding the exports of manufactures at the expense of
the exports of primary commidities.
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The results of the statistical analysis in the present
study have shown that, in general, the exporters of the
manufactured commidities who had been given export incentives
responded significantly to them during the period 1960-61
to 1976-77. In view of the deficits in the balance of pay¬
ments, the problem of debt-servicing and the need for foreign
exchange for developmental imports Pakistan would require to
expand exports in the future. For this purpose, Pakistan
should continue, and probably strengthen the export promotion
measures. However, a careful analysis of the efficiency of
earning foreign exchange from different industries, and
from the manufacturing exports vs. the primary exports should
be made, and the costs of earning foreign exchange in terms
of domestic resources from each of these should be determined.
The study has further shown that the growth of agricul¬
ture relative to the growth of the manufacturing sector
had been slower during the period studied. In agriculture,
the position of cotton production, compared with the produc¬
tion of some other major crops, generally deteriorated during
this period. The discriminatory EERs afforded to the primary
and the manufacturing sectors might have contributed to the
divergent rates of growth of the two sectors. In the light
of the proposed efficiency analysis, the export policy
regarding the primary sector might call for a re-examination.
Due to the overwhelming importance of agriculture in the
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LIST OF ITEMS WITH BONUS RATES ADMISSIBLE UNDER THE EXPORT
BONUS SCHEME











Group I - AGRICULTURAL AND FOREST PRODUCTS.
Agar atar 40 Honey 20
Agarwood 20 Kapok, raw 20
Agar or Agarwood Dust 20 Kapok, ginned 40
Asafoetida (Hing) 20 Loban 20
Bamboos 20 Maize starch 8c gluten 40








Betelnut fibre 8c shel 1 20 all sorts, n.o.s) 20
Bran, rice 20 Palmyra fibre 20
Bran, wheat 20 Plants 20






Dundasa (walnut back) 20
Rosin 40











20 Sital Patti 20
Guar gum, crude 20 Squills
20




Guar protein extracts 20 Turpentine
40
Guar protein extracts 40
Turpentine, vegetable 40
hyprofeed. Vegetables (chillies, g: .n-
Guar splits 20 ger, dry Tumeric)
20
Hena leaves 20
Wood 8c Timber 20
Hena powder 20















Animal blood - dehyd¬
rated.
Bees-wax -
(i) cleaned 8c packed
(ii) other than (i)










Furs, incl.raw 8c tanned
Fur Skin manfrs. incl.
gloves 8c caps.
Gelatine





(i) refined 8c packed
(ii) other than in (i)
Horns 8c hoofs, crushed,
uncrushed inc.shavings.








































































Group III - MINERALS.
Antimony 20 Lime stone. 20
Antimony Troxide 40 Magnesite 20
Aragonite & Marble Magnesium Silicate 20
(incl. dressed, and (soapstone)
their chips & powder) 20 Manganese ore. 20
Aragonite-cut, dressed
crust-removed, polished




Barytes & Barytes Powder 20 in blocks. 40
Bauxite Lump 20 Mica. 20
Bentonite 20 Mica - articles made
Beryl stone 20
mainly or wholly of - 40
Caolin clay 20
Ochres. 20




Slab of aragonite &
Marble-cut, dressed,
Cement 40 crust-removed,
Chrome ore, all types 40
finished & polished. 40
Coal 20
Red Oxide or Iron 20
Coke 20
Rock Salt 20
Earth & Clay (other
Saltpetre 20
than china clay) 20 Silica 20
Felspar 20 Plaster of Paris 40
Fluorspar 20 Stones (other than
Fluorite 20 precious stones)
20
French chalk 20 Stones, precious (roug ti) 20
Fullers Earth 20 Stones, Precious (cut
and polished). 40
Green onyx 20
Sulphur, re fined 40
Gypsum 20 Vermiculite 20
Hartal or Orpiment
Yellow 20 Whiting. 20












Group IV - MARINE PRODUCTS.
Fish, canned (inc. frozerj) 40
Fish,dried (inc.salted) 20
Fish,fresh 20




Fish, Puti Sidal 20
Fish, Salted Hilsha 20
Frogs & snakes (frozen) 40
Lobsters or lobsters
tails (frozen. 40




Canned (incl frozen 40
Prawn bran 20







Shark - fin tails. 20
Tortoise, dead. 20






























as well as produced in
woven form.
Nets & doras for birds.
Niwar
Pillows






















JUTE,HEMP & SIMILAR FIBRES.
Carpets, Jute pile,
Wilton type. 20













Gunny Bags. 20 Jute ropes, twine,
Hessian Cloth 20 yarn, thread & strings
all sorts. 20
Jute carpets 20 Manfctrs of Mesta,
Jute Mats (chataiyan) 20 Rosella & hemp incl.
Jute Matting (water¬ Hemp fishing nets.
20
proofed) 40 Moonj strings. 20
WOOLLEN AND WORSTED.
Afghan carpets (Pakistan Woollen buckram cloth 40
origin) 40 Woollen carded web 20
B1ankets 40
Shawls, embroidered 40





Wilton type. 40 Woollen fabrics,n.o.s. 40
Carpet Yarn n.o.s. 20 Woollen overcoating 40
Milton cloth 40 Woollen patties 40
Namda. 40 Woollen Roomals 40
Pashmina cloth 40 Woollen shawls 40
Serges 40 Worsted fabrics 40
Shawls, unemboidered 40 Worsted yarn incl.
Tweeds 40 knitting wools. 40
Velours 40
Woollen yarn, twistless 20
SILK & ARTSILK -
Artsilk braids. 40 Handloom cloth of silk
Art silk fabrics mill-
or art silk 40
made . 40 Silk carpets. 40
Art silk fringes 40 Silk ribbons of 3" or
Art silk laces 40
less width. 40
Benares Silk sarees 40
Silken scarves. 40
Gas mantles 40










SYNTHETIC CHEMICAL MIXED -
Fishing nets manufctd. Mixed fabrics (contain¬
from imported Nylon ing rayon 8c cotton) -
parachute cord. 20
i) with 60% or more
Handloom cloth or art. of rayon. 40
silk/silk 8c cotton
mixed - ii) with 60% or more
of cotton. 20
i) with 60% or more
artsilk/silk. 40
iii) with 50% cotton. 20
ii) with 60% or more Rayon Fabrics. 40
cotton. 20
MANUFACTURES OF CLOTH & YARN -
Arab roomals made of Woollen coats, frocks 8c
indigenous cloth (Handloc m other apparel of the
or mill-made) 20 category. 40
Arab roomals, emboidered. 40 Rucksack with supporting
Cotton Jerseys 40 straps.
40
Cotton 8c Woolen 'Chughas' 40
WEB equipment pattern 44. 40
Handkerchiefs. 20 MISCELLANEOUS.
Hosiery, the following: Canvas Cloth Ordinary -
(i) Artsilk hosiery. 40 Grey - unbleached.
20
(ii) Cotton Hosiery. 40
Can-^s Cloth treated with
chemicals 8c turned into





artificial leather cloth 40
jerseys, socks, Canvas 8c Leather (incl.
stockings. 40 art. leather) cloth
Manufctrs. of handloom
manufactures. 40
cloth of cotton silk or Rain covers (tarpaulins) 40
artsilk. 40
Tents 8c shamianas made
Namda articles. 40 of indigenous materials. 40
Pashmina cloth mfrs with Thread, Embroidery. 40
or without silk and/or
cotton embroidery work 40 Thread, Sewing.
40
Map-cases of cloth 20
Ready-made garments-
i) Artsilk 8c silk. 40
ii) Cotton 40
iii) Nylon 40






Description of Goods „
Percentage
Admissible Admissible
Group VI - BEVERAGES, FRUITS, TOBACCO, VEGETABLES AND THEIR PRODUCTS.
Achaars 40 Potatoes. 35
Chutnies 40 Provisions, tinned and
Curry Powder 40
canned. 40










Cigar wrapper leaf 20
Tobacco, all varieties. 30
Condiments excl. cori¬





garlic, ginger, potatoes f
Confectionery products onions) 20
(siwayyan) 40 Vermicelli (raw orbakecD 40













Group VII - CHEMICAL & PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCTS OR COMPOUNDS.
Aluminium sulphate Denatured spirit. 40
Benzoin. 40
Distemper (powder as
Boot Polish 40 well as oil-bound) 40
Calcium carbonate, Drugs & medicines,
precipitate. 20 indigenous, manfctd n.o. s. 40
Car polishes, cleaners, eti ; 40 Ephedrine Pseudo. 40
Chalk, French 20 Ephedrine hydrochloride
Chrome pigment 40














Gas, Oxygen. 40 Printing link. 40










than soap, nuts &
Oils. 40 washing powder. 40
Paints & varnishes 40 Tooth paste. 40
Perfumery 40 Tooth Powder. 40
Phenyle & other disin¬ Whiting. 20
fectants . 40
Potash alum. 40
Group VIII - MACHINERY, MILLWORK & GOODS PRINCIPALLY MADE OF METALS.
Agricultural implements. 40 Electric fans








origin) 40 Hardware, builders,nos.
40












Clips for electric wiririg 40
Iron & Steel castings -
Clips, Motor battery. 40 General - up to 2\ ton:
Clips, Suitcase 40
in weight per unit. 40
Conduit pipes. 40
Iron wares, all sorts
incl. pans & kettles. 40
Crown corks 40
Iron hook bolts with
Cutlery. 40 nuts and washers. 40
Expanded metal 40 Machinery & parts &
Cycles 40
accessories thereof. 40
Cycle accessories/parts 40 Telegraph & Telephone
stores & equipment. 40
Door & window fittings. 40
Machine tools incl.














Piston & Piston rings








Pumps for motor cars.
Razor blades
Rifles, shotguns &










































Watch straps (of steel
chromium or gilt)
Water & steam fittings.
Wire netting.
Group IX - HANDICRAFTS AND SMALL INDUSTRIES PRODUCTS.
Badges, Regalia & other
distinctive marks and











Caps made of cloth
Caps made of Karakuli









Gold & Silver leaf.











Gold & Silver Thread Charkhas (spinning
(real Zari) 40 wheels) 40
Handbags for ladies. 40 Cigarette cases. 40
Handbags,all sorts,n.o.£ 40 Clips 40
Hand-fans, all sorts 40 Fan Handles 20
Hats. 40 Flower pots & vases. 40
Horn & Hoof Manuftrs, Hair combs. 40
incl. buttons & combs. 40
Inkpot stands 20
limitation Jewellery. 40 Kashmir artware. 40
Ivory goods. 40 Lamp stands 40
Ivory-inlaid Wooden
articles. 40 Looking-mirror stands.
40






of bamboo, palm, or Sandals (Kharaon) 40
date-palm leaves,etc.
(other than Jute mats) 20
Shoe lasts & wooden hee Is 20
Jewellery boxes (wooden/
Snuff boxes. 40
card-board) 40 Umbrella sticks, wooden
Mazri produe ts. 20
with or without clips. 20
Military & police equip - Walking sticks.
20
ment. 40 Woven Name-labels
Novelties & curios othe r
(cotton) 40
than those containing
silver, gold or other
precious metals. 40
Paintings, all sorts. 40


















Group X - MISCELLANEOUS PRODUCTS.
Asbestos & Asbestos Paper & board and their
manufactures. 40 products. 40
Agarbatti. 40 Postage stamps, Pakis¬
Brushes, all sorts. 40
tani, used/unused. 20
Buttons, all sorts incl
Plastic manufactures. 40
horn buttons & mother- Plastic watch straps. 40
of-pearl . 40
Pottery & earthenware. 40
Canvas & rubber foot¬
wear . 40
Reed Board. 40
Celluloid manftrs .nxi. s 40
Rubber manufactures. 40
Dry battery cells. 40
Ships & vessels built
in Pakistan. 40
Electric lamps, both





than those mainly of
silver, gold or other
Electrodes, Arc. 40 precious metals. 40
Films, exposed cinemat¬ Sports goods, all sorts >
ographic whether expor- excl. hockey blades. 40
ted on outright sale o
rental basis, or expor
r
Bags - Cricket, Golf. 40
ted through agency Balls, all srots. 40
arrangements. 40 Baseball bats. 40
Furniture & other mfrs
of cane and ratten. 40
Bladders. 40
Furniture wooden. 40











Glassware, all sorts. 40 in sports. 40
Gramophone records 40 Golf mitts. 40
Holdalls & Wallets. 40 Golf head covers. 40





















Gun covers. 40 Sports wear (incl. caps
Guts & strings all sorts




all sorts incl. hori¬
Sticks -
Golf, Hockey, Polo. 40
zontal & parallel bars Shuttle cocks. 40
chiefly made of wood. 40 Tables all sorts reqrd.
Ice Hockey accessories. 40 for sports purposes. 40
Indoor games requisites Tennikoit rings. 40
all sorts. 40
Tennis net stretchers. 40
Inflaters required for
sports purposes 40
Tennis sheep guts. 40
Lacing awls. 40
Whistles. 40
Lace pusher & puller. 40
Stationery articles, all
sorts (other than sil¬
Lace used in sports ver, gold or other
goods. 20 precious metals. 40
Net required in sports. 40 Tiles, cement & Mosaic. 40
Nylon monofilament, Toys, all sorts - 40
all sorts. 40 Celluloid, Plastic,
Pads. 40
rubber & wodden.
Ping-pong bats, poles Tongas
40
and sets. 40 Umbrellas 40





Waste products, - 20
Polo helmets. 40 Artsilk yarn waste.
Polo saddles. 40 Battery waste.
Playing cards, all sorts 40
Cotton linters & yellow
pickings.
Presses. 40 Cotton seed hull fibre •
Punching gloves. 40
Cotton seed hull shav¬
ing fibre.
Rackets all sorts reqrd Cotton pads.
for sports purposes. 40 Cotton waste hard -
Rackets and frames -
tennis, badminton,squash 40
Cuts, Oily, Piecer
clean or dirty, etc.
Ski gloves 40
Cotton waste, soft, -
Bondas, card fly, comber
Ski leather bags. 40 fly, cylinder fly, drop>-
Skipping ropes. 40 pings etc.Cotton wicks caulking.
Sports cups. 40
Cotton-Yarn waste.
Sports Medals & Shields 40










Hide & skins, fleshings
cuttings & trimmings,
chrome shavings, pic¬
ker waste dry pieces
in hair.
Iron & steel scrap
Jute-bag cuttings.
Jute waste, all types.
Leather cut-pieces.
Milk waste (in solid
form)
Paper waste.





or rags of hosiery or |





























Note:- Rates shown in the Appendix were amended with effect from June 12,
1964. All rates at 20 per cent or less were made 20 per cent.
All other rates were made 30 per cent.
SOURCE: Government of Pakistan, Office of the C.C.I & E., "Manual of






(i) LIST OF INDUSTRIES WITH 100 PER CENT OF F.O.B. VALUE OF EXPORTS
ADDITIONAL LICENSING UNDER THE EXPORT PERFORMANCE LICENSING SCHEME.
(In the January - June 1962 Import Policy)
Absorbent cotton Boot polish.
Brass Water fitting Biscuits and confectionery
Cosmetics Cutlery.
Centrifugal pumps Diesel Engines
Electric fans Fountain pens.
Fruit and fish canning Hosiery (yarn restricted) including
and preservation. Handkerchief manufacturing.
Leather goods (excluding Gramophone records.
leather and fabrics)
Optical
Nylon gut and monafilament Pencil (paint restricted)
Paints and varnishes




Rubber tyres and tubes.
Soap (tallow restricted)





Watch straps and Bracelets.
SOURCE:- Board of Trade Journal, dated 26th January, 1962, p.185.
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APPENDIX C.
(ii) LIST OF INDUSTRIES WITH PERCENTAGES OF ADDITIONAL LICENSING
UNDER THE EXPORT PERFORMANCE LICENSING SCHEME.













Absorbent cotton 10% Domestic sewing
Accumulators and
machines. 50%
batteries. 50% Dry cells 50%
Arts and handicrafts 50% Electric appliances 50%
Artsilk fabrics (incl Electric cables and





Asbestos cement sheets 40% fluorescent tubes 10%
Beer 40% Electric meters 50%
Biscuits & confec¬ Electric motors 50%
tionery. 50%
Electric switchgears
Bonemeal 10% and transformers. 50%
Boot polish 10% Enamelled ware 10%
Brass water fittings 20% Fish canned 50%
Brushes 50% Footwear -
Caps incl.Karakuli caps 50% (a) Leather shoes 50%
Carpet 15% (b) Rubber shoes 25%
Cattle feed. 10% Fountain-pens 50%
Centrifugal pumps 50% Fruit canned/bottled 50%
Cereal manufactures 10% Gas mantles. 50%
Cigars 50% Clycerine 50%
Cigarettes 50% Gramophone records. 50%
Collapsible tubes 50% Grinding wheels 30%
Cosmetics 50% Guar gum 10%
Cotton waste 10% Handloom fabrics, all
Cutlery 50% sorts, incl.Banarsi
goods. 50%



















Hospital equipment 10% Rubber tyres & tubes 25%
Hurricane lanterns 10% Sheet glass 50%
Kapok 10% Soap 50%
Lace, braid & tape. 25% Sports goods 10%
Leather board 25% Stoves and pressure
Leather goods other
lamps. 50%
than footwear. 50% Surgical instruments 20%
Manilla hemp and coir Tanned leather 10%











Novelties and toys 50% Watch straps and
Nylon gut and mono¬ bracelets. 40%
filament 50%
Waterproofing textiles 25%
Optical frames 50% Woollen shawls. 40%
Paints 10%
Woollen yarn/woollen
Pencils 50% piecegoods. 50%








wear and tyres and tube 3) 20%
SOURCE: - Government of Pakistan, Office of the CCI&E, "Manual of Import
and Exports Control", Rawalpindi, 1964. Appendix 23, pp.358-361.
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APPENDIX D.
Weighted Bonus Rates as Percentage of FOB Value of
Exports Applicable to Commodities at PSTC 3-digit




(i)WeightedBonusRatesPercentagefFOBV l eExportsApplic bletC mmoditi sSTC 3-digitlevelunderthExporBo usScheme. YEARRaw Cotton (PSTC263)Textile Yarnnd Thread (PSTC651)Cotton Fabrics (PSTC652)Synthetic Fabrics (PSTC653)Tulle, Laceand Embroidery (PSTC654)























































































































































































































































(i)WeightedBonusRatesPercentagefFOBV luExpor sApplicabltCommoditiePSTC 3-digitlevelunderthExportBo usSchem . YEARHides and Skins (PSTC211)Leather (PSTC611)Manufactures of Leather (PSTC612)Footwear (PSTC851)Organic Chemicals (PSTC512)
Paints and Varnishes {PSTC533)
Medicinaland Pharmaceutical products (PSTC541)
























































































































(i)WeightedBonusRatesPerce tagefFOBV luExpor sApplicabltCommoditiePSTC 3-digitlevelunderthExportBo usSchem . YEARSoaps,cleansing andpolishing preparations (PSTC554)Non-Electric Machinery (PSTC71)Electric Machinery (PSTC72) 1959-6040.0040.0040.00 60-6140.0040.0040.00 61-6240.0040.0040.00 62-6340.0040.0040.00 63-6439.4839.4839.48 64-6530.0030.0030.00 65-6630.0030.0030.00 66-6730.0030.0030.00 67-6835.8335.8335.83 68-6940.0040.0040.00 69-7040.0040.0040.oa 70-7144.8644.8644.86 71-7238.8438.8438.84 SOURCE:Computedasex laineinthxt.
APPENDIX D
(ii) Weighted Performance Licensing Rates as Percentage
of FOB Value of Exports Applicable to Commodities














































































































































































































































(iii) Weighted Export Duty Rates as Percentage of FOB
Value of Exports Applicable to Commodities at
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